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Summary 
 
Democracy is discussed in the comparative empirical literature as an important determinant of 
corruption. Several studies show that not only are democracies less corrupt than authoritarian 
regimes, but also that there is great variation in corruption levels across democratic regimes. 
This dissertation is concerned with examining the reasons behind this pattern. It begins by 
arguing that the study of democracy’s impact on corruption requires a stronger focus on the 
causal mechanisms linking these two phenomena. Based on a review of causal arguments 
raised in the literature, a discussion of different dimensions of accountability–electoral, social 
and horizontal–is introduced as a useful framework for this purpose. 
This sets the ground for the two main empirical contributions of the dissertation. In both 
cases, the study relies on original corruption data collected from over 600 audit reports on 
municipalities randomly selected through a federal audit program implemented in Brazil. First, 
a panel data set with 130 municipalities that have faced multiple audits between 2003 and 
2013 is used to examine whether those three dimensions of accountability exert a deterrent 
effect on corruption over time. Second, a cross-section of 383 municipalities is the basis for 
analyzing the factors explaining when accountability effectively occurs, focusing on 
conditioning factors of electoral accountability against corrupt politicians. 
In line with previous studies, the findings are not very optimistic. In the first case, no robust 
evidence is found for a deterrent effect of accountability on corruption over time, either 
through elections, increased civil society and media presence, or formal institutional sanctions. 
From the second analysis, we conclude that conditions for successful electoral accountability 
of corrupt incumbents may be more restrictive than usually expected. The study corroborates 
two hypotheses discussed in the literature: (a) electoral accountability is weakened by recent 
positive assessments of incumbents’ performance in office, and (b) voters punish more 
strongly politicians facing more corruption accusations, but this may be conditional on the 
salience of corruption before elections. These results reinforce the existing literature 
suggesting that neither the expected corruption-reducing effects of accountability nor the 
effective occurrence of electoral accountability can be taken for granted in democratic 
regimes.  
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation is motivated by a daunting policy problem: how to fight systemic corruption, 
in particular when prevalent at high levels of government. In this case, corruption, also 
characterized as political corruption, may be understood as “[…] the behavior of public 
decision-makers where preferential treatment is provided to individuals and where narrow 
interests are advanced at the expense of the interests of broader segments of society” 
(Lambsdorff 2007, 82). Corruption in general has been shown to have significant detrimental 
effects to society by hurting economic growth, social well-being and regime legitimacy, among 
other things (Dahlström and Lapuente 2011; Holmberg et al. 2009; Mauro 1995; Seligson 
2002), and political corruption is especially distortive with regards to policy-making and the 
allocation of public resources. 
About two decades ago, when a number of studies were published pointing out in particular 
corruption’s negative consequences for economic activity (e.g. Mauro 1995), the previously 
held functionalist view of corruption as economically beneficial in some cases (Huntington 
2002; Nye 1967) was strongly challenged. Corruption became a key issue in the international 
good governance agenda that was shaping, and at the same time increasingly attracted the 
interest of academics from different fields, who have continuously engaged in understanding 
the causes of corruption and the factors that contribute to reducing it in a society. In search for 
answers, an ever growing body of literature has analyzed the so-called determinants of 
corruption (see Andvig et al. 2001; Lambsdorff 2007; Seldadyo and de Haan 2006 for a review). 
This line of comparative research was able to identify a number of relatively robust empirical 
regularities: low-corruption countries tend to be economically developed, Protestant, 
consolidated democracies that share common-law based legal systems; among former 
colonies, British colonial heritage emerges as a strong predictor for lower levels of corruption 
(Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Serra 2004). As it turns out, most of those findings can hardly be 
translated into helpful policy advice for countries, especially at lower levels of development, 
currently struggling with corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). Moreover, the actual causal chains 
that might explain the connection between those, to a large extent, historically determined 
characteristics and corruption outcomes in contemporary political systems were not fully clear.  
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However, two factors do stand out as potential channels for broader anti-corruption efforts: 
economic development and democratic consolidation. It is true that even these avenues for 
tackling the corruption problem would require long-term efforts that are likely to pay off only 
after many years, if not decades. Nevertheless, if these factors can in fact help curb corruption 
in a society, they are at least feasible outcomes that are worth pursuing also for other benefits 
to society that they entail. This dissertation is concerned with the more political of those 
potential determinants of corruption: the impact of democracy. 
What exactly do we know about the relationship between democracy and corruption? Several 
recent studies have corroborated earlier findings of an association between stronger 
democracy and lower levels of corruption, but the development of more elaborate hypotheses 
and the use of more sophisticated methods to test them have yielded additional insights, in 
particular about the non-linearity of this association (Kolstad and Wiig 2016; Montinola and 
Jackman 2002; Pellegata 2012; Saha et al. 2014; Treisman 2007). A simple scatter plot for a 
cross-section of countries, using the Freedom score by Freedom House as an indicator of 
democracy and the World Governance Indicators’ (WGI) Control of Corruption estimate 
published by the World Bank, broadly illustrates this pattern, as shown in Figure 1. As 
indicated by the black line representing the quadratic fit of the data in the graph, a negative 
association between stronger democratic institutions is not observed throughout the whole 
democracy scale, but rather after a certain level, and it is actually most pronounced among 
countries that are already considered as democratic based on this scale, i.e. those which are to 
the left of the gray dashed line. 
If, on the one hand, recent scholarly work seems to show little controversy about the empirical 
pattern observed between democracy and corruption, there is much less consensus about the 
causal mechanisms behind it. What is it about democracies that explains not only how more 
democratic polities manage to become less corrupt than their undemocratic counterparts, but 
also how the strengthening of democratic institutions even after a country has established 
itself as a democratic regime can contribute to curbing corruption even further? This is the 
broader research puzzle that this dissertation departs from. In addressing this puzzle, it argues 
that one of the reasons why this still remains largely unclear in the literature is that common 
approaches to examining the relationship between democracy and corruption empirically have 
considered the former as an aggregate phenomenon, without taking into account how distinct 
17 
features of democracy may impact this relationship. Therefore, existing research has been 
unable to disentangle the effects of different possible mechanisms. 
 
Figure 1. WGI Control of Corruption and Freedom House scores, 2015 
 
Source: Own elaboration. WGI Control of Corruption ranges from -2.5 to 
2.5 (lowest corruption). Freedom House assesses democracy with scores 
from 1 to 7 (least democratic), and considers countries with a score of 2.5 
or lower to be democracies (placed left of the gray dashed line). 
 
With this perspective in mind, the first part of the dissertation seeks to make a contribution to 
this debate by thoroughly reviewing the multiple theoretical arguments proposed in the 
relevant literature on the link between democracy and corruption, the different hypotheses on 
the nature of this link and the associated empirical evidence accumulated in the last two 
decades of research in this field. This is done with a focus on the causal mechanisms described 
and how they are connected to different components of democracy. 
From this review, it is possible to highlight four main features of democracy as central 
elements to the most recurring explanations for an expected negative effect of democratic 
institutions on corruption levels in a political system. The most prominent argument 
emphasizes the role of elections in enabling voters to exercise some form of control over their 
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representatives by threatening to vote them out of office when they “misbehave”. Under the 
assumption that politicians derive utility from staying in office and thus have an interest in 
maximizing their probability of being reelected, elections are expected to help deter self-
interested behavior, of which corruption is an example, and to generate incentives for greater 
responsiveness on the part of elected officials (Adsera et al. 2003; Andvig et al. 2001; 
Montinola and Jackman 2002; Pellegata 2012; Przeworski et al. 1999). A second important 
explanation refers to the impact of democratic freedoms of information, expression and 
association which, by fostering the development of a free press and a vibrant civil society, 
create the conditions for active monitoring of governments by society. This should in turn 
contribute both to reducing incentives for corrupt behavior and to helping uncover 
malfeasance by public officials through watchdog activities. Another argument refers to the 
existence of institutional mechanisms of control, such as checks and balances and oversight 
agencies, which serve to ultimately put a check on government and restrict its ability to engage 
in corruption. Finally, the long-term consolidation of democratic norms is a fourth element 
that should contribute to strengthen anti-corruption sentiments in the population. 
Drawing on the works of O’Donnell (1994, 1999, 2003) and Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006a), a 
conceptual framework is proposed where those democratic features are directly or indirectly 
linked to one common denominator, namely accountability, through its sub-dimensions. 
Accountability here is broadly understood in connection with “[…] subjecting power to the 
threat of sanctions; obliging it to be exercised in transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its 
acts” (Schedler 1999, 14). In particular in the case of the three first democratic features listed 
above, they can be directly associated with electoral and social accountability, as sub-
dimensions of vertical accountability, and with horizontal accountability, respectively, while 
democratic norms are seen as feeding into these three channels of accountability and 
indirectly fostering their consolidation. 
This perspective of the dimensions of accountability as representing the main causal 
mechanisms that might account for the association between stronger democracy and lower 
corruption is embedded in a theoretical framework of political corruption in democratic 
regimes as a principal-agent problem. According to this approach, the principal delegates 
functions to the agent, which are to be performed according to certain rules and taking into 
account the principal’s interests. In exercising the delegated functions, the agent may have the 
opportunity to follow his personal interests instead and extract rents from his entrusted 
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power, deviating from the rules imposed by the principle. This is possible due to the 
information asymmetry between the two, that is, the principal is not fully informed about the 
actions of the agent and cannot fully control them (Lambsdorff 2007). What determines the 
agent’s decision to pursue his own interests is a calculation of the potential costs of doing so 
against the benefits that would entail from the transaction (Andvig et al. 2000). 
The general principal-agent model has been used by several authors in the study of corruption 
(Klitgaard 1988; Klitgaard et al. 2000; Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1999). Most 
commonly it is applied in the analysis of bureaucratic corruption, where the principal is 
understood as a high-level official, in charge of a government agency or even the public 
administration as a whole, and assumed to be committed to serving the public interest, and 
the agent in turn is another official at a lower level of hierarchy, who is entrusted with 
functions by the principal. However, the same approach can be easily applied taking society as 
the principal and public officials as agents (supposedly) acting in its interest. As this 
dissertation focuses on political corruption, the framework is considered with elected officials 
as agents and the citizenry as the principal; corruption thus represents a violation of the trust 
delegated by voters and can be considered to harm the public interest in benefit of private 
interests (Amundsen 1999; Lambsdorff 2007; Philp 2002)1. 
From this model’s perspective, the key to curbing corruption lies in two main strategies: (a) 
reducing the information asymmetry between principal and agent, and (b) improving detection 
and punishment of corruption, in order to deter corrupt behavior. Both strategies are linked 
with strengthening accountability: minimizing the information asymmetry problem in the 
principal-agent relationship can be associated with what Schedler (1999) has called the 
answerability side of accountability, which refers to how accountability mechanisms serve to 
exercise pressure on office holders to be more transparent about their actions and justify them 
                                                          
1
 Conceptualizations of corruption in association with the public interest have the disadvantage of not 
clearly defining the normative substance of “public interest” (Philp 2002), but they are appropriate for 
this analysis because they reinforce the idea of an accountability link between voters and the 
government. More recent conceptual contributions in the field have addressed the lack of a universal 
normative standard in commonly used definitions of corruption by proposing that corruption be 
understood as the violation of specific principles for the exercise of public authority, such as impartiality 
(Rothstein 2011) and universalism (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, 2015). Although these authors do not make an 
explicit reference to the public interest in their conceptual discussions, they also describe corruption i.e. 
partial or particular treatment as favoring private interests. It is thus possible to interpret these notions 
as representing an ultimate common denominator of what constitutes the public interest that should 
guide government decisions. 
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to the public, whereas strengthening detection and punishment of corrupt acts refers to what 
the same author has named the sanctioning side of accountability. 
They can also be more specifically associated with the three dimensions of accountability 
discussed earlier. In the case of electoral accountability, efforts by the opposition to call the 
incumbent administration to account on its decisions or on corruption accusations raised 
against it would be an example of how this accountability dimension may help reduce the 
information asymmetry problem, and the electorate’s potential reaction to information on 
malfeasance by voting the incumbent out of office would constitute the sanctioning 
component of electoral accountability. In the case of social accountability, efforts by a free 
media to investigate on government acts and abuses, as well as civil society initiatives to 
disseminate political information to the general public, illustrate channels that help increase 
society’s ability to learn, as principal, about policy-makers’ actions as its agents. The 
sanctioning component for this dimension of accountability, however, differently than with 
electoral accountability, would be of a more reputational nature, but could also create 
important costs for politicians (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006b). Finally, agencies exercising 
horizontal accountability (e.g. Congressional Committees, Ombudsmen, Courts of Accounts) 
may similarly function as channels through which office holders are called to justify their 
actions and clarify suspicions of abuse, or may directly lead to concrete sanctions as a 
consequence of that abuse, through criminal prosecution, for instance. 
It is important to emphasize, however, that the sanctioning element of these accountability 
channels is of greater relevance for the causal mechanisms proposed in the literature on how 
they are expected to impact corrupt behavior, because it is the threat of sanctions, or actors’ 
assessment of their likelihood, that is believed to give them incentives to behave according to 
the interest of citizens (Manin et al. 1999a), thereby exercising a deterrent effect on 
corruption (Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1999). 
With the proposed focus on the dimensions of accountability, the research described in this 
dissertation attempts to contribute to the broader literature on democracy and corruption in 
two ways. First, by applying a conceptual perspective in which democracy is expected to help 
reduce corruption mainly through different mechanisms of accountability, it seeks to go one 
step further towards a better understanding of the relationship between these two 
phenomena and its potential underlying causal mechanisms. Second, it also addresses the lack 
of clarity with regards to how democracy is conceptualized in this literature. By highlighting 
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the dimensions of accountability as key features of democracy for analyzing its potential 
impact on corruption, this perspective offers an alternative approach that bypasses the maze 
of conflicting definitions and measures of democracy observed across different studies on the 
subject.  
Building upon the framework discussed above, two more specific research questions are 
formulated to guide the empirical contributions of the dissertation, which are presented in its 
second and third parts. First, the framework of dimensions of accountability is directly tested 
empirically to verify whether effective electoral, social and horizontal accountability indeed 
contribute to reducing corruption in a political system. The main goals of this analysis are to 
examine the validity of the hypothesized deterrence effect of these mechanisms of 
accountability on corruption, but at the same time going further than most previous studies in 
this field, in that it also attempts to disentangle the effects of those mechanisms which are 
potentially simultaneously at work. This question is addressed in the second part of the 
dissertation, which is composed of two related articles. The first one mainly presents an 
original panel data set of political corruption that was collected for this research, based on 
audit results from Brazilian municipalities, also contextualizing it as a broader contribution to 
recent developments in the field of corruption measurement. The second article engages more 
specifically in hypothesis-testing through a series of statistical procedures attempting to 
determine whether the data at hand offer support to the claims that accountability helps 
reduce corruption, in a contribution to a more specific, newer branch of empirical research 
about the deterrent effects of accountability on corruption. 
Most studies in this line of work focus on electoral accountability (Bobonis et al. 2012; Crisp et 
al. 2014; Ferraz and Finan 2011; Pereira et al. 2009), but a few others offer interesting insights 
on the impact of the other dimensions of accountability as well (Avis et al. 2016; Brunetti and 
Weder 2003; Camaj 2013; Grimes 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011; Olken 2007). However, to 
the best of my knowledge, no study examining the relationship between accountability and 
corruption has so far fully accounted for the potential simultaneous effects of these three 
dimensions of accountability. Also, very few works have used longitudinal data to test the 
impact of accountability on future levels of corruption. Finally, most analyzes in the literature 
operationalize accountability only indirectly, often through institutional variables such as term 
limits, in the case of electoral accountability, or judicial independence, in the case of horizontal 
accountability. This dissertation seeks to address these three empirical gaps by developing a 
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single model to account for possible confounding effects of the different mechanisms of 
accountability, using an original panel data set that includes a concrete audit-based measure 
of political corruption and direct indicators of electoral and horizontal accountability.  
The other specific research question addressed in the dissertation is concerned with what 
makes accountability effective in the first place, or more specifically, under which 
circumstances are corrupt politicians sanctioned for their malfeasance? As an assessment of 
this question applied to all three dimensions of accountability would certainly warrant another 
full research project, the analysis presented in the third part of this study focuses on examining 
the conditioning factors of electoral accountability in the case of politicians accused of 
corruption. 
There are a few theoretical and strategic reasons that justify the choice to focus on this 
particular dimension of accountability. Firstly, it is directly linked to the electoral component of 
democracy, which can be considered as its most essential attribute. From the narrowest 
conception of democracy to its most comprehensive and demanding counterpart, the 
existence of regular competitive elections is the only omnipresent pre-requisite of a 
democratic regime. The centrality of this component of democracy becomes clear also in the 
discussion on sub-types of defective democracy (Merkel 2004), where the electoral regime is 
the only dimension that cannot be impaired without modifying the very democratic status of 
the regime. There are two main reasons for the primacy of this dimension: (a) it is the most 
manifest expression of democracy’s underlying principle, i.e. the sovereignty of the people, 
and (b) it represents the central distinguishing element between democracies and autocracies 
(Merkel 2004; Møller and Skaaning 2010). It is thus an absolutely necessary attribute, 
hierarchically superior to other attributes of democracy (Møller and Skaaning 2010). O’Donnell 
also highlights this point in his discussion on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
accountability, claiming that the existence of vertical electoral accountability is in fact a 
definitional aspect of democracy, without which no democratic regime can exist (O’Donnell 
1999, 29, 2003, 36). 
Secondly, and also related to the previous point, electoral accountability is the most 
ubiquitous causal mechanism discussed in the literature on the effects of democracy on 
corruption. Indeed, the idea that elections can work to induce politicians to refrain from 
corruption is a widely held assumption in the literature on democracy and corruption. 
However, the empirical evidence on this link is still relatively weak. Recent empirical studies on 
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the effect of electoral accountability on corruption suggest that politicians respond to some 
electoral incentives that constrain corrupt behavior (Bobonis et al. 2012; Ferraz and Finan 
2011; cf. Pereira et al. 2009), but at the same time, other findings put into question how 
effective this mechanism can be in substantially lowering corruption in a political system over 
time (Bobonis et al. 2012; Crisp et al. 2014).  
In addition to doubts about the effects of electoral accountability on corruption outcomes, the 
literature on democratic accountability has also raised deeper concerns about the functioning 
of electoral accountability in democratic regimes (Diamond et al. 1999; Manin et al. 1999a; 
O’Donnell 1999; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006b). A number of arguments, both from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective, question the effectiveness of electoral control by 
voters more generally. On more theoretical grounds, it is argued, for instance, that the 
occurrence of electoral accountability predicted by certain theoretical models rely on 
assumptions2 that are too restrictive with regards to how voters behave. As a consequence, 
electoral accountability would function as expected by economic theory only in very limited 
circumstances that do not appropriately reflect the context of actual democracies (Maravall 
and Sánchez-Cuenca 2008). 
Other arguments emphasize that elections are a very limited instrument for voters to 
effectively punish or reward incumbents (Maravall and Sánchez-Cuenca 2008, l. 139; O’Donnell 
1999, 30) and keep governments under control (Diamond et al. 1999, 2). One reason for that 
are the multiple roles of elections, which negatively impact their functioning as a mechanism 
of control by voters. Persson et al. (1997), for instance, highlight that providing a mechanism 
to hold politicians accountable for past performance is only one of several purposes that 
elections serve in a political system3. Therefore, voters may prioritize other purposes when 
making a voting decision, instead of punishing an incumbent for unsatisfactory performance or 
misconduct. Manin et al. (1999a) and Fearon (1999) argue that the incentives for “good 
behavior” that should result from voters’ threat to sanction bad performance and rent-seeking 
                                                          
2
 Common assumptions in models of retrospective voting include: citizens ignore promises and only care 
about outcomes; there is no candidate heterogeneity; voters’ distributive preferences over welfare are 
uniform; and they are able to coordinate on a voting rule for the welfare level that determines their 
vote for or against the incumbent (Maravall and Sánchez-Cuenca 2008, ll. 129-132). 
3
 These include aggregating and representing voters' conflicting preferences, aggregating dispersed 
information about the correct political decisions, and allowing citizens to select the most competent 
individuals for public office (Persson et al. 1997, 1165). 
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are in fact weakened when the vote is at the same time used to select better governments, i.e. 
these two goals cannot be effectively simultaneously pursued. Manin et al. (1999a) mention 
yet another reason why electoral accountability is an inherently imperfect control mechanism: 
even under the most favorable conditions, where voters have enough information about 
politicians’ behavior and can clearly attribute responsibility for specific outcomes, each voter 
still has only one vote to make a judgment on hundreds of decisions that the government has 
taken during the previous term. As they put it, “One cannot control a thousand targets with 
one instrument” (1999a, 50). 
Additionally, an extensive empirical literature has examined the question of whether voters in 
fact punish incumbents based on their performance in office. A dominant perspective on this 
question is that of studies on economic voting, which seek to assess to what extent the state of 
the economy affects voters’ decision to support the incumbent government or not. In general, 
findings point to an intermittent and substantively small effect of economic outcomes–usually 
proxied by measures of unemployment, income growth and inflation–on electoral results 
(Anderson 2007). Moreover, this impact is observed more with regards to government 
popularity and incumbent parties’ vote share than governments’ actual survival in office 
(Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; Manin et al. 1999b). These results also appear to be contingent 
on a number of institutional factors and voter characteristics (Anderson 2007; Kayser 2014). 
Another stream of research focusing more specifically on the impact of corruption accusations 
on voting behavior shows a similar picture: incumbents appear to suffer some vote share loss 
after being associated with corruption scandals, but a vast majority of them gets reelected 
nonetheless (Chang et al. 2010; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Golden 2006; Jiménez and Caínzos 
2004; Muñoz et al. 2012). Therefore, understanding the conditions under which voters are (or 
are not) able and willing to uphold their role of principals and hold corrupt politicians to 
account remains an intriguing empirical question in political studies.  
Finally, a strategic reason to focus this analysis on electoral accountability is that the literature 
on this dimension is much richer in terms of insights on the conditions for its effectiveness 
than scholarly work on social and horizontal accountability. The relatively advanced state of 
theoretical and empirical research on the factors that should affect electoral accountability, in 
particular in response to corruption, provides for numerous testable hypotheses on what could 
make it more or less effective. At the same time, there are still significant gaps that can be 
explored in further research. In contrast, the determinants of social and horizontal 
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accountability on corruption have been much less systematically explored, and more 
theoretical work is needed to articulate testable predictions on the factors that may affect or 
condition their effectiveness (Olsen 2013). Especially in the case of social accountability, we 
are dealing with a rather recent concept (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006b; Smulovitz and 
Peruzzotti 2000) that has been so far mostly illustrated in case studies (see Grimes 2008 for a 
review). With horizontal accountability, even though the debate on its deficit in young 
democracies has been around for a longer time (O’Donnell 1994, 1999; Schedler et al. 1999), 
still little is known on what makes it effective. 
In sum, the continuous discussion in the literature on the effectiveness of electoral 
accountability, in particular as a response to politicians’ involvement in corruption, reinforces 
this study’s motivation to further explore this question empirically, which is done in the third 
part of the dissertation. The current state of empirical research on electoral accountability 
suggests several factors that may foster or hinder the effective sanctioning of corrupt 
politicians by voters (see Jiménez and Caínzos 2004; de Sousa and Moriconi 2013 for a review), 
but they have been mostly examined in a fragmented way by studies that test isolated 
hypotheses, neglecting relevant alternative explanations and providing partly contradictory 
results. This dissertation seeks to make a contribution to this literature by conducting a more 
systematic and comprehensive analysis of those factors, testing the main competing 
hypotheses simultaneously in order to examine their relative strength in explaining effective 
electoral accountability against corrupt politicians, or what has also been described in the 
literature as corruption voting. 
Based on a comprehensive review of existing empirical research, five hypotheses related to 
different conditioning factors were selected as most relevant for the empirical analysis. The 
first one highlights information as a necessary condition for voters to exercise electoral 
accountability. The second hypothesis refers to an “implicit exchange mechanism”, through 
which voters may face trade-offs in their retrospective assessment of the government: while 
they may be inclined to punish incumbents accused of corruption, they may at the same time 
hold a positive view of their overall performance in office, or have congruent policy 
preferences or ideological leaning with the government, and the latter criteria could under 
certain conditions prevail in the voting calculus, thus weakening corruption voting. A third 
hypothesis deals with a more material kind of trade-off linked to clientelistic ties between 
corrupt incumbents and voters, which may lead the latter to “look the other way” when 
26 
casting their vote. A fourth explanation considered highlights that, in order to vote corrupt 
politicians out of office, voters need first to identify suitable alternatives among the 
challengers that they perceive both as “cleaner” than the incumbent and as sufficiently 
congruent with their own political preferences. In the absence of such alternatives, electoral 
accountability could also be jeopardized. Finally, the severity of corruption accusations may 
also be considered by voters as a relevant factor determining their voting decision. These five 
hypotheses are tested with a cross-section of Brazilian municipalities. 
The choice of Brazilian sub-national units as a setting to base the empirical analyses described 
in the second and the third parts of the dissertation is justified by a series of advantages in 
terms of methodological possibilities and data availability. A central motivation for this choice 
of context is a valuable source of corruption data available for Brazilian municipalities, namely 
a series of audit reports produced as a result of a randomized audit program introduced by the 
Federal Comptroller’s Office (CGU) in 2003. This program represented a strong shift in anti-
corruption efforts in Brazil, in particular considering the relatively weak and to some extent 
politicized monitoring mechanisms that are otherwise in place to oversee the use of public 
funds at the municipal level (Arantes et al. 2005; Hidalgo et al. 2016; Loureiro et al. 2009; 
Weitz-Shapiro et al. 2015). Between 2003 and 2013, the time frame considered for the data 
collection conducted as part of this research project, around 1,800 municipalities were audited 
through the program at least once, in a universe of over 5,500 municipalities eligible to be 
selected. Therefore, the wide geographical and temporal coverage of the program offers a 
broad range of cases to be explored in the analyses proposed for this dissertation. Moreover, 
the fact that a single federal agency, with a highly professionalized and well-trained body of 
auditors, runs the audits throughout the country further ensures comparability of the data for 
the different municipalities. 
The analysis exploits three other key advantages associated with this data source: (a) the 
possibility to derive a concrete indicator of political corruption from the audit results, (b) the 
availability of longitudinal data for a sub-sample of the municipalities, and (c) the randomized 
selection of municipalities to be audited. These elements provide a great opportunity for 
improving empirical research on corruption through the use of concrete instead of perception-
based indicators (Mondo 2016), for more than one time period in some cases, and the 
minimization of selection bias and its shortcomings for statistical inference. 
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Exploring the sub-national context in Brazil also taps into great potential for comparative 
analyses, while at the same time allowing us to hold constant a number of relevant 
institutional factors that would need to be controlled for in cross-national comparisons to 
assess the links between democracy, accountability and corruption. Being a large and diverse 
country, Brazil offers sufficient internal variation across a number of relevant municipal 
characteristics. Additionally, various data sources available for the sub-national level in this 
country provide rich and reliable data for the key dependent and independent variables 
examined in this study and many other relevant covariates considered in the analyses. 
For the purpose of the specific analyses presented in the main empirical contributions of the 
dissertation, original data collection was conducted on two fronts. First, an indicator of 
political corruption was produced from the coding of over 600 audit reports published by the 
CGU following the municipal audits. One part of this process refers to a sample of 140 
municipalities that have faced multiple audits in the program, which provides sufficient 
material to generate corruption estimates for different time periods. As a result, a unique 
panel data set covering five municipal administrative terms between 1997 and 2013 was 
compiled to be used in the analysis presented in the second part of the dissertation, which 
examines the impact of the three dimensions of accountability on future corruption levels. The 
second part of the coded reports is related to a cross-section of 383 municipalities audited 
between 2005 and 2008; this second data set was used in the analysis described in the third 
part of this work, which focuses on conditioning factors of electoral accountability against 
corrupt politicians, taking as a reference the 2008 municipal elections. 
The second portion of original data collection consists of the coding of an indicator for the 
occurrence of horizontal accountability, also employed in the second part of the dissertation. 
For this variable, three possible channels of horizontal accountability were considered: (a) legal 
sanctions due to criminal or civil prosecution, (b) administrative sanctions associated with 
oversight procedures from Courts of Accounts, and (c) political sanctions deriving from 
impeachment procedures against mayors. In order to gather sufficient information on all three 
channels, data sources such as court records, rulings by Courts of Accounts and media reports 
were used. 
In addition to these original indicators, the dissertation also makes use of data from existing 
sources to devise new forms to operationalize other relevant variables used in the empirical 
analyses which have not been explored in previous studies in this field. One example is a 
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measure of patronage, used in the analysis described in the third part of the dissertation to 
capture the clientelistic mechanism hypothesized as a potential moderator of corruption 
voting. In the same analysis, a municipal development index published by the Industry 
Federation of Rio de Janeiro (Firjan) is taken as one measure of incumbent performance to 
account for the implicit exchange mechanism also believed to impact electoral accountability. 
As a whole, these integrate a parallel effort in this dissertation to make a contribution in 
increasing the repertoire of useful indicators that could be further explored in future studies 
on the Brazilian context. 
In terms of the findings that result from the two main lines of empirical inquiry pursued in this 
study, they partly reinforce the skepticism in the literature regarding the impact of 
accountability on corruption and the functioning of electoral accountability. The articles 
integrating the second part of the dissertation, focused on estimating the effect of electoral, 
social and horizontal accountability on future corruption, fall short of confirming the 
deterrence hypothesis put forth in the related literature, resonating with previous findings 
from recent studies (Bobonis et al. 2012; Crisp et al. 2014). Based on the analysis at hand, it is 
difficult to say whether certain factors particular to Brazil may in part explain why the 
expected effect of accountability doesn’t appear to materialize in this context, whether there 
are other contingencies that need to be taken into account regarding this effect, or whether 
we should be looking somewhere else for evidence of the underlying causal mechanisms that 
might explain the broader patterns of association between democracy and corruption levels 
discussed in the beginning of this introduction. In any case, the results presented here indicate 
that the relationship between democratic institutions and corruption is likely more complex 
than depicted in some of the theoretical arguments usually raised in the literature, and other 
than simply assuming an effect of accountability on corruption, scholarly work in this field 
should go much deeper in trying to dissect the concrete causal mechanisms linking democracy 
and corruption.  
In the case of electoral accountability against corrupt politicians, we see that, as already shown 
in myriad empirical studies on this topic, voters’ reaction to corruption accusations in the form 
of electoral punishment of corrupt incumbents is anything but an automatic response, 
differently than oftentimes assumed in the literature on democracy and corruption. Indeed, 
the results presented in the third part of the dissertation further corroborate that corruption 
voting is highly contingent on other factors. In particular, partial evidence is found for a 
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conditioning effect of the incumbent’s performance on areas such as the economy or the 
provision of public services–thus offering some confirmation for the implicit exchange 
hypothesis–and of the severity of corruption charges. However, even these moderating effects 
appear to be conditional on third factors, such as the time frame of the performance 
assessment and the timing of release of the corruption information, which in turn could be 
linked to how salient this information becomes for the public through other dissemination 
channels. In sum, these findings illustrate how the conditions for successful electoral 
accountability against corrupt incumbents may be even more restrictive than usually expected. 
Throughout the empirical sections of the dissertation, several particularities related to the 
relevant mechanisms of accountability in Brazil are briefly mentioned in connection to the 
respective data sources and later in the discussion of the results. As a complement to those 
more isolated discussions, a general overview of recent developments with regards to those 
accountability institutions might be useful to provide unfamiliar readers with a more 
comprehensive background about the country’s institutional environment. For this purpose, 
the last section of this introduction below seeks to contextualize some topics of interest for 
this dissertation in the scope of Brazil’s recent political history. 
 
Contextualizing democracy and accountability in Brazil 
Brazil offers an interesting context for a study of the relationship between democracy, in 
particular with a focus on accountability channels, and corruption. It is a relatively young 
democracy, which underwent its latest democratic transition in 1985, but has by now 
accumulated three consecutive decades of democratic experience4, thus offering a time frame 
where certain consolidation patterns could be observed in terms of building effective 
accountability mechanisms, and its potential impact on corruption outcomes. Indeed, a 
number of recent studies have argued that a trajectory towards the strengthening of 
accountability institutions, but also of other democratic features more generally, such as 
                                                          
4
 The Polity IV indicator classifies Brazil as a democracy since 1985, with a stable score of 8–in a scale 
with a maximum of 10 points–since 1988. Similarly, Freedom House considered Brazil as a free country 
after its democratic transition in 1985, with slight deterioration in the scores between 1993 and 2002, 
but the country has recovered and maintained the “free” status ever since, with a stable score of 2–in a 
scale of 1 to 7 (least free)–in recent years. 
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political competition and participation, has in fact materialized in the country since re-
democratization (Hagopian 2005; Power and Taylor 2011; Praça and Taylor 2014; Rennó et al. 
2010; Weyland 2005). Despite these improvements, Brazil still faces serious deficits in terms of 
the quality of its democracy, especially regarding effective rule of law, equal access to justice 
and the full protection of civil liberties, in particular for less privileged and marginalized social 
groups (Hagopian 2005; Kingstone and Power 2000; Weyland 2005). 
If the general perspective in the literature on accountability institutions in Brazil is of a positive 
development in the last decades, what does this mean in concrete terms? What specific 
improvements have been observed in recent times, and what are the weaknesses that 
potentially remain? These are the questions that this brief overview attempts to address. In 
order to better structure the discussion provided here, the three dimensions of accountability 
applied throughout the dissertation will also serve as a reference in the assessment of 
accountability mechanisms in Brazil. 
 
Electoral accountability 
An assessment of how well electoral accountability is exercised by the electorate in Brazil 
should include two considerations. The first one refers to voters’ ability to use the ballot as a 
means of signaling their retrospective evaluation of their representatives and withdrawing 
support when they are not satisfied with their performance in office. This ability, in turn, is 
influenced by several institutional factors and other characteristics of the political 
environment. 
A number of elements related to the way elections are structured in Brazil can be construed as 
favoring electoral accountability, in that they provide voters with sufficient possibilities of 
retrospectively rewarding or punishing their representatives. Due to separation of powers, 
direct elections for Executive office at all levels of government allow voters to directly decide 
whether to further support an incumbent administration or to replace it with an opposition 
candidate in a highly personalized manner (Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Nicolau 2002). The 
existence of a second round run-off election for the federal and state Executives, as well as for 
mayoral office in municipalities with more than 200,000 voters, gives the electorate an 
additional opportunity to voice their discontent (Rennó 2011). Since the introduction of 
reelection for one consecutive term through a constitutional amendment in 1997, the 
31 
accountability link between incumbents and voters was further strengthened. Additionally, the 
concurrence of Executive and Legislative elections5 has also been argued to contribute to 
retrospective voting (Hellwig and Samuels 2007). Legislative elections, in turn, are based on a 
system of open list proportional representation (PR)6 with large district magnitude7. Although 
this system has been argued to weaken the accountability link between voter and candidate 
(Melo et al. 2009), at the same time it has allowed Brazilian voters to base their retrospective 
assessment on the personal performance of the representative (Nicolau 2002)8. The large 
number of parties in the Brazilian political environment also contributes to offer the electorate 
a wide array of candidates to choose from both for the Executive and the Legislative. 
Another dimension in which institutional design may condition voters’ ability to exercise 
electoral accountability refers to the role of clarity of responsibility, i.e. how easy it is for 
voters to attribute responsibility for policy outcomes to the relevant actors (Hellwig and 
Samuels 2007; Hobolt et al. 2013; Nicolau 2002). Under high clarity of responsibility, electoral 
accountability is facilitated. In this respect, however, the Brazilian political environment can be 
seen as characterized by relatively low clarity of responsibility. Despite the high concentration 
of powers in the hands of the Executive, separation of powers, coupled with bicameralism (at 
the national level) and federalism, contribute to dispersing power and responsibility within 
governments and across administrative levels (Hobolt et al. 2013; Pereira et al. 2011). This 
situation is the more exacerbated by the extreme fragmentation of the party system, which is 
fostered by very permissive rules regarding the creation of new parties and their access to 
representation in Parliament and to public funding (Power 2000). As a consequence, the party 
elected for the Executive most often holds only a minority share of legislative seats, thus 
                                                          
5
 In Brazil, elections for the Executive and Legislative both at the federal and at the state level occur at 
the same time every four years; elections for the municipal Executive and Legislative are also held 
together, but in two-year intervals from federal and state elections. 
6
 The only exception to the PR system in legislative elections is the application of plurality rule in 
elections to the Senate. 
7
 For the lower House, districts are the 27 units of the federation, including the Federal District, and the 
number of seats for each district varies between a minimum of 8 and a maximum of 70. In the Senate, 
each unit of the federation has three seats. 
8
 Even though less than half of all votes cast in legislative elections are “successful” in winning a seat to 
their selected candidate, those voters whose preferred candidate has not been elected still appear to 
engage in some sort of retrospective voting, using information on the performance of other legislators 
that somehow “stand out” in Parliament to guide their voting decision in the subsequent election 
(Nicolau 2002). 
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creating the need for governments to negotiate broad-based coalitions, sometimes at the 
expense of ideological cohesion, in order to be able to push their agenda through the 
Legislative (Melo and Pereira 2013; Pereira et al. 2011; Power 2000; Taylor 2010).  
The second relevant question regarding the effectiveness of electoral accountability refers to 
whether voters indeed make use of this instrument to punish or reward incumbents. One 
favorable aspect in the behavior of Brazilian voters is the high level of participation in the 
electoral process, largely due to mandatory voting, with average turnout rates above 80% in 
the recent democratic period (Power 2009)9. A number of studies on elections and voting 
behavior in Brazil have demonstrated that retrospective assessments of government 
performance indeed play a strong role in elections for different levels of government (Almeida 
2008; Cavalcante 2015; Lavareda and Telles 2011; Nicolau 2002; Rennó 2011). An early 
example of this behavior was already seen only a few years after re-democratization, when 
Fernando Collor de Mello, the first directly elected president of the current democratic period, 
was impeached by Congress, and the electorate punished those parties and Congressmen that 
had voted against the impeachment by withdrawing support in the 1992 municipal elections 
(Geddes and Ribeiro Neto 1992). Research focusing more specifically on electoral 
accountability against politicians directly accused of corruption also suggests that information 
on corruption disseminated by the media or other institutional channels does have an impact 
on voters’ decision at the ballot box (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Pereira et al. 2011; Rennó 2011; 
Rennó Jr. 2008).  
However, findings from this dissertation and other studies in the literature highlight the 
contingencies associated with the electoral sanctioning of politicians accused of corruption. 
Episodes of stronger electoral accountability appear to be influenced by the level of salience of 
corruption at the moment, such as the recent exposure of a scandal. In 2002, for instance, 
survey data shows that corruption was not among the most salient problems to Brazilians, and 
therefore corruption accusations do not seem to have impacted the electoral outcome so 
strongly; in 2006, on the other hand, when a major scandal erupted shortly before the 
elections, allegations of corruption had much more impact on the electoral outcome and 
accused legislators were punished across the board (Hagopian 2005; Pereira et al. 2011; Rennó 
                                                          
9
 It is important to note that, despite relatively high turnout, there are still high rates of blank or spoiled 
votes (Nicolau 2002, 2015, Power 2000, 2009). 
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Jr. 2008). This impact appears to be limited also by other factors that voters take into account 
in their calculus, such as pre-existing loyalties and their overall assessment of the incumbent 
government’s performance (Figueiredo et al. 2011; Pereira and Melo 2015; Rennó 2011), or 
voter characteristics such as education level (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2014). Moreover, the 
considerable reelection rates of politicians accused of corruption still indicates that part of the 
electorate is willing to overlook corruption charges and put more weight on other criteria 
(Ferraz and Finan 2008; Pereira et al. 2011; Rennó 2011; Rennó Jr. 2008). 
Another potential obstacle to electoral accountability in this context is the presence of 
clientelistic linkages between voters and politicians, especially at the local level. As already 
mentioned above, the Brazilian electoral system creates strong incentives for personalized 
politics and individualistic strategies. For many politicians, electoral success hinges on their 
ability to access resources controlled by the Executive in order to guarantee the provision of 
private goods or locally targeted public goods to their constituencies (Desposato 2006; 
Macaulay 2011; Samuels 2002, 2006a). However, the prevalence of clientelistic linkages over 
programmatic ones appears to have decreased over the years in the recent democratic period, 
and while politicians still have their local bases as the main foundation for electoral support, 
their strategies appear to move away from direct exchanges of private goods towards indirect 
ones based either on local public goods or on broader policy appeals (Lyne 2006). This process 
is geographically uneven, though, with regions where clientelism is still widespread, and others 
where programmatic politics are well-established (Desposato 2006). 
Overall, we see that, regarding this dimension of accountability, the institutional environment 
appears to produce effects both promoting and hindering electoral accountability. 
Nevertheless, voters seem to have effectively used this mechanism as an instrument to reward 
or sanction incumbent politicians on the basis of their performance in office throughout the 
recent democratic period, and in some occasions have even more strongly demonstrated their 
discontent with politicians’ involvement in corruption. At the same time, it is difficult to 
identify the existence of great change over time. It appears that electoral accountability, in 
particular as a response to corruption, comes and goes in waves, according to other 
conditioning factors such as the economic situation or the issues most salient to voters at the 
time. Moreover, clientelism is still a central feature of politics in many regions of the country, 
which may further weaken electoral accountability. 
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Social accountability 
Social accountability also shows positive developments throughout the democratic period. The 
assessment presented here focuses on the two main actors related to this dimension: civil 
society and the media (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006b). Civil society has demonstrated its 
strength on a number of occasions in the past decades. Already under the military regime, 
social movements displayed strong dynamism and capacity for coordination and mobilization 
in opposition to the regime, which culminated in massive protests in favor of direct elections 
on the eve of the democratic transition (Hochstetler 2000). The potential for large mobilization 
in the form of street demonstrations continued into the new period. A clear example was seen 
during the impeachment proceedings against President Collor, when the masses took to the 
streets and were successful in generating pressure over legislators for voting in favor of 
impeaching the president (Hagopian 2005; Hochstetler 2000). More recently, in 2013, mass 
demonstrations again exploded all over the country, first motivated by increases in public 
transportation fares in the country’s largest cities, but quickly the message mutated into an 
expression of generalized dissatisfaction with state inefficiency, corruption and the poor 
quality of public services (Singer 2013). After the uncovering of a massive corruption scandal 
involving the state-controlled oil company Petrobrás in 2014, repeated nation-wide 
demonstrations followed in 2015 and 2016 with a more focused agenda: direct opposition to 
the Workers’ Party (PT) administration and the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff 
(Gohn 2016). 
After re-democratization, important foundations were laid down for new forms of civic 
mobilization and participation, especially through institutionalized loci of interaction with the 
state (Cavalcanti 2006). Traditional social movements from the previous period, which had 
strongly focused on demanding democratization, gave way to new movements and a wide 
range of organizations such as interest associations and NGOs (Hochstetler 2000; Weyland 
2005). Overall, civil society appears to have successfully adjusted to the new political 
environment through the use of new strategies of mobilization, increased advocacy efforts, 
and also close cooperation with governments on several occasions (Hochstetler 2000). One 
example of an innovative sphere for such cooperation is the system of participatory budgeting 
first introduced in the city of Porto Alegre in the late 1980s. This has by now been used in 
many other cities and has established itself as a strong tool of social accountability and a 
positive example from Brazil replicated also in other parts of the world (Grimes 2008; 
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Hagopian 2005). Other participatory structures for increased involvement of civil society in 
policy-making and in monitoring of the public administration exist also in the form of 
government councils at different levels of government (Cavalcanti 2006; Hochstetler 2000). 
The Council for Public Transparency and Anti-Corruption (Conselho da Transparência Pública e 
do Combate à Corrupção), created by the CGU, for instance, housed intense discussions with 
civil society for the drafting of Freedom of Information legislation since 2005, culminating in 
the passing of a law with this purpose in 2012 (Loureiro et al. 2012). Another important trend 
in civil society initiatives to monitor governments is the close cooperation with institutions of 
horizontal accountability, in particular the Public Prosecution Services (MP) (Cavalcanti 2006). 
A key participatory instrument instituted in the 1988 Federal Constitution is the citizen 
initiative to propose legislation, which requires support from 1% of the electorate from at least 
five states as a pre-condition to present a bill to Congress. Following strong mobilization 
efforts, this instrument has been increasingly used by civil society in recent years and has 
successfully led to the enactment of public interest legislation in four occasions; several 
initiatives of this type are currently under analysis in Congress (Beltrão and Vidigal 2013). Two 
of the pieces of legislation that originated from popular initiatives are particularly important as 
instruments in the fight against corruption. The first one is a law created to punish vote-
buying. Led by the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), the mobilization to gather 
support for the bill collected over a million signatures. The initiative was approved in Congress 
in 1999 and has had considerable impact on elections since, with hundreds of politicians being 
removed from office due to vote-buying charges, predominantly at the local level (Melo 2014; 
Taylor 2011). More recently, a citizen initiative also initiated by the CNBB and supported by a 
broad movement of associations was the “Clean Slate” bill, which was passed into law in 2010. 
The law generally precludes individuals with a legal conviction by a collegial court–as a rule, 
this means a confirmation of a conviction after a first appeal10–to run in elections for a period 
of eight years after the conviction (Melo 2014; Taylor 2011). 
Although these examples indicate that an organized civil society is in place and is ready to 
make use of the different instruments that the democratic order has offered them to increase 
their influence over policy-making, it is also true that certain obstacles remain to a more 
                                                          
10
 Exceptions to this are usually cases involving elected officials or cabinet members who, while in office, 
have special standing (foro especial) to be tried by higher instances of the Justice system (Taylor 2011). 
In that case, a conviction by a collegial court could be the first conviction in the case, prior to an appeal. 
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effective impact of these actors on governments’ decisions and legislation. In many cases, 
governments offer great resistance to concrete input from civil society (Cavalcanti 2006). 
Government councils, for instance, are sometimes deliberately underfunded or simply ignored 
by policy-makers; governments may also try to co-opt representatives of social movements 
(Hochstetler 2000). The use of the popular initiative to propose legislation is also hindered by 
the demanding requirements for gathering minimal support–currently, the hurdle is about 1.4 
million signatures–and by the formal procedures to validate the necessary signatures (Beltrão 
and Vidigal 2013). In sum, capacity for mobilization and coordination seems high within the 
organized civil society in Brazil, and there are good channels for participation, but at the same 
time there is still room to foster stronger input from these groups in the policy process. With 
regards to corruption, the public has successfully mobilized in a number of occasions, not only 
to exercise pressure for the political sanctioning of governments involved in corruption 
scandals, but also to directly influence the introduction of anti-corruption legislation. 
The media have also gone through interesting developments in this period. Since the 1980s, 
there has been a strong trend towards modernization, professionalization and increased 
“objective” reporting, thus weakening previous patterns of partisanship observed in the main 
news organizations in earlier periods (Porto 2011). Among the main news media groups, the 
market is quite competitive, diversified and economically autonomous from the state11, 
although some degree of market concentration exists especially with regards to the Globo 
group, the most influential media conglomerate in the country (Hervieu et al. 2013; Melo 
2014; Porto 2011). Despite the existence of broader conditions for independence, there are 
still a couple of factors that leave room for political influence over certain outlets, in particular 
in the case of television and radio. For this type of media, licenses are essentially allocated by 
the federal government, which creates room for politicization of the licensing process (Boas 
and Hidalgo 2011; Porto 2011; da Silva 2000)12. Moreover, the phenomenon of radio and 
television stations owned by local political elites is well-documented in the Brazilian case, in 
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 Smaller media companies, on the other hand, may be more financially dependent on government 
advertisement (Hervieu et al. 2013). 
12
 Indeed, Boas and Hidalgo (2011) provide empirical evidence of this by showing that incumbent city 
councilors are much more likely to have their requests for community radio licenses approved than 
unelected candidates. 
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particular in less developed regions, which also contributes to hamper press freedom (Boas 
and Hidalgo 2011; Hervieu et al. 2013; de Lima and Lopes 2007; Porto 2011; Taylor 2010)13.  
Since relatively early in the new democratic period, the media have performed an important 
role in investigating and disseminating information on corruption cases, and the number of 
exposés of this sort published in the period quickly increased (Geddes and Ribeiro Neto 1992; 
Melo 2014; Porto 2011). Print media has been at the forefront regarding most corruption 
exposés and, despite the relatively low penetration of this type of media, their outreach is 
amplified by their influence on the news agenda of other outlets, such as radio and television, 
which have much higher penetration in Brazilian households (Porto 2011). The new political 
context of more openness and freedom afforded media groups a radically different 
environment with more room for investigative work, but more importantly, a great share of 
reporting on corruption investigations has originated from an ever closer relationship that 
news media have developed with institutions of horizontal accountability; in the opposite 
direction, the media have also significantly contributed to accountability by activating other 
formal accountability channels (Porto 2011).  
 
Horizontal accountability 
Finally, it is important to discuss the environment of institutions of horizontal accountability. In 
this dimension, Brazil’s web of accountability displays several agencies or bodies with 
oversight, investigation and enforcement powers, pertaining to all three branches of 
government and also to the independent Ministério Público (MP), which concentrates 
prosecutorial and investigative functions and works as a fourth branch of government (Melo 
2014; Porto 2011; Power and Taylor 2011; Praça and Taylor 2014; Taylor 2010). 
Under the Executive branch on the national level, agencies such as the CGU and the Federal 
Police have been responsible for great advances in anti-corruption efforts. In particular in the 
case of the CGU, since its establishment in 2003 as an agency centralizing internal control 
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 Although the direct ownership of media outlets by elected politicians while in office is not legally 
permitted, they usually find ways to circumvent this prohibition by transferring management to relatives 
or other associates (Hervieu et al. 2013; de Lima and Lopes 2007). 
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functions at the federal Executive14, there have been considerable efforts to strengthen its role 
in detecting and preventing corruption, turning it into a de facto anti-corruption agency 
(Loureiro et al. 2012). One example is a randomized audit program targeting the use of federal 
funds by municipalities, which has been in place also since 2003 and is the source of most of 
the original data collected for this dissertation. Indeed, empirical studies suggest that the 
program has had a significant effect in reducing corruption at the municipal level (Avis et al. 
2016; Zamboni Filho 2011). In addition to its top-down control activities, the CGU has also 
taken up an important and innovative role in fostering bottom-up monitoring by civil society, 
through the dissemination of information on public administration procedures, the promotion 
of public transparency and capacity building initiatives directed at local actors (Loureiro et al. 
2012). The CGU has also contributed to the diffusion of its institutional model to the sub-
national level (Loureiro et al. 2012), with Comptroller’s Offices or equivalent agencies being 
introduced in almost all of the 26 states (Corbari et al. 2013) and in a number of larger cities. 
The Federal Police (PF) has gone through an even deeper process of institutional development 
in the last years. Formally subject to the Ministry of Justice, the PF used to have a secondary 
role in the investigation of relevant crimes in comparison to the state civil and military police 
forces, and this was also reflected in its more precarious institutional structure (Arantes 2011). 
Since the early 2000s, however, a radical re-orientation of the Ministry of Justice towards 
increased investments and the complete modernization of the PF’s apparatus took place in the 
end of the Cardoso administration (1995-2002), and was pursued even more strongly under 
President Lula (2003-2010); during this period, the PF’s budget and staff increased significantly 
(Arantes 2011; Praça and Taylor 2014). As a result, it has taken a much more prominent role in 
investigating corruption and organized crime through hundreds of special operations in recent 
years; these have contributed immensely to increasing the PF’s visibility and to shaping its 
image in the public opinion (Arantes 2011). 
Other instruments of horizontal accountability exist under the Legislative branch, such as the 
possibility of impeaching the head of the Executive and the establishment of parliamentary 
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 Previously, internal control functions were exercised in a decentralized manner, as attributions of 
separate units within each ministry. Part of those functions were already somewhat centralized under 
the Corregedoria Geral da União, created in 2001, but its transformation into the present CGU in 2003 
came with a wider scope of functions, more powers and a higher status under the Presidency. The 
emergence of the CGU thus represented an important shift towards greater efficiency and 
independence in internal oversight (Loureiro et al. 2012; Praça and Taylor 2014).  
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committees of inquiry (CPIs), illustrating the wide amplitude of formal instruments that 
Legislative bodies may use to check the Executive at all levels of government (Figueiredo 2003; 
Hagopian 2005). In particular, the CPIs can have an important investigative role because their 
scope of action is extremely broad (Figueiredo 2003; Power and Taylor 2011). At the national 
level, several CPIs have contributed to revealing important information on a number of 
corruption scandals. Another positive long-term implication of parliamentary investigations is 
that, since they are often under constant media scrutiny and help maintain high visibility of the 
scandals under their investigation, some important reforms have resulted from their findings. 
After the scandal involving President Collor, for instance, changes in political finance regulation 
and in procurement legislation were introduced; another scandal uncovered in 1993 involving 
malfeasance by members of the Parliamentary Budget Committee led to a deep re-structuring 
of the budget formulation and oversight process inside Congress (Melo 2014; Praça and Taylor 
2014). 
At the same time, both CPIs and impeachment procedures are essentially led by a political 
institution, and are consequently affected by the calculations of the actors involved and the 
political balance of power (Arantes 2011; Melo 2014; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Power and Taylor 
2011; Taylor 2010; Taylor and Buranelli 2007). More specifically, due to the dynamics of 
Executive-Legislative relations, such instruments may be weakened in practice, and occupants 
of Executive office that manage to secure sufficient legislative support may become practically 
immune to sanctions through these channels (Figueiredo 2003). As an example, several 
scholars have argued that the impeachment of President Collor was fundamentally driven by 
his inability or outright refusal to manage political relations with the traditional elite 
represented in Congress; added to the pre-existing inclination of those politicians to turn 
against a president that had violated the “rules” of the political game, the public pressure that 
arose after the corruption scandal involving his administration made the outcome inevitable 
(Pereira et al. 2011; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Samuels 2006; da Silva 2000). Similarly, majority 
government coalitions may use different strategies to simply block or sabotage the work of 
CPIs that threaten the government’s interests. Indeed, although a few CPIs in Congress in the 
recent democratic period were relatively successful and uncovered important evidence 
regarding corruption, the general effectiveness of this instrument of accountability to the 
Legislative has been limited, since the majority of CPIs is either never installed or fail to 
produce a final report (Figueiredo 2003).  
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These instruments may also be used by Congress to investigate and punish its own members. 
Several corruption scandals involving Members of Parliament have indeed resulted in some of 
them facing expulsion, or resigning in fear of this more drastic type of sanction that also results 
in a temporary suspension of political rights (Pereira et al. 2011; Power 2000; Taylor and 
Buranelli 2007; Weyland 2005). However, episodes where legislators have cooperated to save 
their peers despite severe corruption accusations are not uncommon, especially when internal 
voting on the expulsion is made secret (“Conselho de Ética Da Câmara Absolve 59% Dos 
Deputados Desde a Sua Criação” 2009; Pereira et al. 2011)15. 
Also linked to the Legislative branch are the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU), responsible for 
overseeing the Federal government’s finances, and the State Courts of Accounts, which 
oversee the use of public funds by state and municipal governments. Their legal mandate 
includes relatively broad audit powers and one of their main attributions is making an 
assessment of the accounts presented yearly by the administrative bodies (e.g. state agencies, 
municipal governments) under their respective jurisdictions, and making a recommendation to 
the Legislative to approve, approve with reservations or reject those accounts (Figueiredo 
2003; Hidalgo et al. 2016; Melo et al. 2009; Speck 2011)16. The ultimate call on whether to 
endorse those assessments lies with the respective Legislative body, but such 
recommendations have a considerable weight nonetheless and, in the case of municipalities, 
can only be overruled by qualified majorities in the Legislative (Speck 2011). They may also 
imply other political costs, as politicians with accounts rejected by the Legislative become 
ineligible for candidacy for a period of eight years17. 
Although legal sanctions remain outside the scope of action of these audit bodies, they can 
directly impose a number of other relevant punishments, including: (a) financial sanctions, 
such as fines or the repayment of lost funds by public officials considered responsible for 
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 At the national level, secret voting in such cases was only abolished in December 2013 through a 
constitutional amendment and a change in the Congress internal bylaws (“Câmara Aprova Mudança No 
Regimento Pelo Voto Aberto” 2013). At the local level, each State Assembly or Municipal Council can 
autonomously determine whether voting for the expulsion of members is to be secret or not. 
16
 The Courts of Accounts’ functions were further expanded after the introduction of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law in 2000, after which the courts were re-structured and modernized in order to 
effectively monitor compliance with the new law across the federation (Loureiro et al. 2009). 
17
 Originally, this sanction was valid for a period of five years, but this time frame was extended by 
amendments introduced with the “Clean Slate” bill. 
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irregularities, (b) blacklisting of public contractors for a period between three and five years, 
and (c) a ban from civil service for a period between five and eight years (Speck 2011). These 
wide range of political and civil sanctions that may derive from Courts of Accounts’ decisions 
shows that they are, at least in principle, not toothless as agencies of oversight. Nevertheless, 
the main challenge is guaranteeing the effective enforcement of those sanctions. One problem 
refers to the time frame in which these courts usually manage to conclude their assessments, 
which can take several years, thus delaying the imposition of definitive sanctions and the 
activation of other accountability channels through the Justice system (Hidalgo et al. 2016; 
Melo 2014; Taylor and Buranelli 2007). Moreover, in the case of financial sanctions or 
ineligibility for elected office, those “convicted” by Courts of Accounts have been very 
successful in using litigation against their decisions before the actual Justice system to avoid 
facing those penalties (Hidalgo et al. 2016; Melo 2014; Speck 2011). Probably as a result of 
these shortcomings, auditing bodies such as the TCU have increasingly resorted to other types 
of sanctions in the last years, such as bans on contracting or from civil service, which they can 
unilaterally enforce (Speck 2011). 
In recent years, new instruments for strengthened cooperation between the TCU and Congress 
have provided for significant improvement in the oversight of large government projects by 
those institutions. These are closely monitored by the TCU and, if irregularities are identified, 
the Court notifies the Budget Committee in Congress to immediately halt disbursements 
related to the project in question, thus preventing further damage while the irregularities can 
still be remedied; this new procedure has also ensued a reaction by the Executive, which now 
urges the TCU to speedily reassess the projects in order to get clearance for further 
disbursements, instead of employing strategies to delay its decisions (Speck 2011).  
In formal terms, the several Courts of Accounts in Brazil have a considerable degree of 
functional autonomy, with independence in its internal management and secured budget 
allocation for their activities18. Independence is strengthened by the fact that they are headed 
by a collegial structure of councilors with life-long tenure and are well-protected against 
removal from office (Hidalgo et al. 2016; Melo et al. 2009; Speck 2011). Furthermore, they 
usually have a professionalized and specialized technical bureaucracy that performs the main 
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 At the state level, however, there is considerable variation in terms of the share of the state budget 
allocated to finance the audit courts (Melo 2014; Melo et al. 2009). 
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auditing functions (Melo 2014). However, a key weakness with regards to these institutions’ de 
facto independence from the political forces of the day refers to the system of appointment of 
councilors (Taylor and Buranelli 2007). 
Several authors have highlighted that the structure of appointments allows the Executive and 
the Legislative to appoint members to the Courts that are politically aligned with them, who 
could therefore show leniency towards political allies while exercising their oversight 
functions; interestingly, the level of political influence actually exercised by politicians varies at 
the sub-national level (Figueiredo 2003; Loureiro et al. 2009; Melo et al. 2009; Paiva and Sakai 
2014; Speck 2011). Indeed, some studies have corroborated these arguments by showing that 
the majority of councilors appointed to these courts are former politicians or relatives of 
politicians (Loureiro et al. 2009; Paiva and Sakai 2014), that councilors appointed through 
more politicized channels tend to be more biased in their functions than their more 
professionalized counterparts (Hidalgo et al. 2016), and that characteristics of the local 
political environment, such as the level of political competition, influence the performance of 
the courts of accounts in different states (Melo et al. 2009). 
The Judiciary also plays an essential role in the web of accountability institutions, and has 
established itself as a truly independent branch in the recent democratic period, as 
exemplified by several occasions in which the country’s higher courts have acted against the 
government’s interest (Melo 2014; Melo and Pereira 2013; Power and Taylor 2011). This 
branch is also characterized by a very professionalized bureaucracy, selected on a meritocratic 
basis and paid competitive salaries (Melo 2014). Nevertheless, at the sub-national level, 
significant regional variation in terms of funding and efficiency is observed across the lower 
courts, which are based in the different states of the federation; at this level, courts also tend 
to be sometimes less autonomous than their federal counterparts, and a stronger degree of 
political influence by the State Executive may exist (Macaulay 2011; Melo 2014). 
The functioning of the courts has become a main bottleneck for the effective exercise of 
horizontal accountability and rule of law in Brazil. This is partly explained by excessive 
formalism and outdated rules of procedure allowing seemingly endless possibilities of 
recourse, which in turn cause unreasonable delays until a final decision can be reached by the 
judges (Taylor 2011). As a result, well-off defendants, i.e. members of the political and 
economic elites who are able to afford more competent legal counsel are the ones who most 
profit from these deficiencies and often succeed in escaping punishment, which brings about 
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(justified) perceptions of injustice and impunity (Hagopian 2005; Melo 2014; Taylor 2010, 
2011; Taylor and Buranelli 2007). This has been confirmed by surveys in the 1990s showing 
that only a minority of Brazilians believe that all are equal before the law (Hagopian 2005), and 
in later surveys we still see that most Brazilians do not trust the Justice system to effectively 
punish criminals (Rennó et al. 2010). 
However, recent developments may contribute to changing this view in the country. A large 
judicial reform implemented since 2004 is helping reduce the inefficiency of the courts, and 
the creation of a National Justice Council (CNJ) has represented an important move towards 
increased internal oversight and rationalization of procedures across the different components 
of the Justice system (Macaulay 2011; Taylor 2011). At the national level, the country finally 
witnessed in 2010 the first criminal conviction of a sitting Congressman by the Supreme 
Federal Court (STF) (Praça and Taylor 2014; Taylor 2011). In 2012, the spectacle of the six-year 
long Mensalão process, with a total of 37 defendants, finally came to an end with the 
conviction of 25 people also by the STF, including a former Chief of Staff of President Lula and 
leaders of several political parties, who were then sent to jail (Melo and Pereira 2013; Praça 
and Taylor 2014; Zampier 2012). Most recently, the extensive investigations conducted under 
the Car Wash operation (Operação Lava Jato) have so far led to the imprisonment of dozens of 
politicians, public officials and executives of government contractors, many of which already 
face harsh first-level convictions (Richter 2016). 
The Public Prosecution Service (MP) has also established itself as an independent and 
professionalized enforcement body, with strong powers granted under the 1988 Constitution 
(Melo 2014; Porto 2011; Taylor and Buranelli 2007). In an international comparative 
perspective, it stands out from other prosecutorial bodies due to its independence from other 
branches of government and its explicit role in also defending the collective interest of the 
society (Arantes 2011; Cavalcanti 2006). As a result, an internal culture of the MP as the 
ultimate “protector” of society became deeply rooted among public prosecutors, which has 
contributed to great initiative on their part to fight corruption and misconduct in the public 
administration (Arantes 2004, 2011)19. 
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 This role of the MP is largely endorsed by high levels of public trust shown in several opinion surveys; 
at the same time, this so-called “political voluntarism” has raised concerns about this institution’s 
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While legal action against corrupt politicians at the federal level has rarely produced any 
concrete sanctions, state prosecutors seem to have been more successful in pursuing charges 
against mayors accused of misusing public funds, and hundreds of convictions have ensued, 
even already in the late 1990s (Arantes 2011; Cavalcanti 2006; Hagopian 2005). In particular, 
prosecutors have made ample use of a legal innovation in the Brazilian system, namely the 
Administrative Improbity Law, enacted in 1992, which provides for civil prosecution against 
politicians accused of malfeasance and can result in sanctions that include removal from office, 
suspension of the defendant’s political rights for up to 10 years and reimbursement of financial 
losses to the public coffers (Arantes 2011). Nevertheless, despite this activism among 
prosecutors, an abysmally low number of lawsuits results in definitive sentences, mostly as a 
consequence of the slow Justice system (Arantes 2011; Taylor 2011; Taylor and Buranelli 
2007). 
In general, we see remarkable improvements in the functioning of horizontal accountability 
due to a series of important reforms in the last years. These have been in great part the result 
of a learning process motivated by multiple corruption scandals that identified key institutional 
weak links, but also fruit of a series of incremental changes, through the introduction of new 
procedures and institutional routines as well as increased interaction between different 
bureaucracies, which slowly set in motion a sort of endogenous dynamic of institutional 
change (Melo 2014; Praça and Taylor 2014). Moreover, the dynamics of the political 
environment in the country have produced incentives for strengthening the independence of 
mechanisms of checks and balances, such as the Judiciary and the MP (Melo and Pereira 2013). 
A positive aspect is that Brazil’s oversight and enforcement institutions are underscored by 
modern principles, such as meritocratic recruitment and high levels of professionalism, which 
should in theory contribute to their effectiveness. On the other hand, a number of challenges 
end up diminishing their impact. One central issue is the wide array of agencies with 
overlapping functions, which often results in inter-agency competition and lack of coordination 
across the numerous bodies that are in charge of government oversight and corruption control 
(Macaulay 2011; Melo 2014; Power and Taylor 2011; Taylor and Buranelli 2007). In some 
areas, such as criminal investigations conducted jointly by the MP and the Federal Police, with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
increasing political appeal, when it is not subject to any form of political accountability (Arantes 2004, 
2011). 
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oversight by the courts and sometimes with further support from other federal agencies, 
cooperation efforts have improved in the past years (Arantes 2011), but as a rule the maze of 
different institutions would require more fine-tuning across the respective responsibilities and 
scopes of action in order to bring about significant gains in efficiency to the accountability 
system as a whole (Power and Taylor 2011; Taylor and Buranelli 2007). 
Another problem are the obstacles to these agencies’ insulation from political influence: 
although institutions such as the Judiciary and the Prosecution services function with more 
independence, the mechanisms of accountability linked to the Legislative branch are still 
subject to the political machinations between the Executive and the Legislative, which 
generates a considerable degree of bias in how they operate. Finally, a key challenge to 
effective accountability is the internal variation observed across organizations at different 
levels of the public administration. While substantial advances have been observed at the 
national level, significant threats still exist with regards to the autonomy of institutions of 
horizontal accountability at the sub-national level, where the potential for politicization is 
higher and the level of public scrutiny by society and the media is reduced (Macaulay 2011); 
clear disparities across accountability institutions in the different states also show that they 
may be more vulnerable to the influence of local elites in some regions than in others (Melo 
2014; Melo and Pereira 2013).  
 
In sum, this broad panorama of the three dimensions of accountability reveals a generally 
positive picture, where mechanisms of vertical accountability, especially in the case of social 
accountability, appear to function relatively well and have seen improvements throughout the 
recent democratic period. In the case of horizontal accountability, there have also been several 
positive developments in recent years, which may have contributed to weakening the 
widespread perception of impunity. However, we see that these improvements seem to 
concentrate at the national level, whereas mechanisms of accountability at the sub-national 
level sometimes still show limited insulation from the influence of local elites, either through 
clientelism, the capture of local media or political influence over institutions of oversight. This 
is particularly relevant for the analyses conducted as part of this dissertation, which focus on 
the municipal level in Brazil. Against this background regarding the challenges that may hinder 
accountability at the local level, the empirical work developed in this study seeks to contribute 
to shedding more light on whether electoral, social and horizontal accountability can still be 
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successfully exercised in this environment, and the extent to which these mechanisms fulfill 
the promise of helping curb corruption in the long term. 
  
47 
  
PART I 
48 
 
  
49 
Democracy and corruption: exploring the causal mechanisms1 
 
Abstract 
Democracy has been highlighted, theoretically and empirically, as a main factor associated to 
both cross-national variation in corruption and changes in corruption patterns over time. This 
paper critically reviews a number of hypotheses and empirical findings that have been 
presented on the relationship between these two phenomena, pointing out that most studies 
have only scratched its surface, examining it at a high level of aggregation. An argument is 
made about the need for a more disaggregated perspective of democracy in order to better 
capture the essential causal mechanisms for an effect of democratic institutions on corruption, 
emphasizing the role of accountability in explaining this effect. A discussion of different 
dimensions of accountability is introduced as a useful framework for this purpose. 
 
In the past two decades, corruption has become one of the main concerns in the international 
political agenda, in particular due to mounting evidence of its detrimental effects in terms of 
economic development and social welfare (Holmberg et al. 2009; Mauro 1997). Despite 
increasing efforts to tackle this problem in different contexts, recent studies have emphasized 
its elusive and persistent nature: on one side, assessments of countries’ performance in 
controlling corruption show very little improvement in the last years (Kaufmann et al. 2009; 
Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2013), and on the other, many evaluations point out that most anti-
corruption policies promoted in developing countries have been largely ineffective (Heeks and 
Mathisen 2012; Heilbrunn 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2014; Persson et al. 2013). 
A few streams of the literature have addressed this generally pessimistic picture in different 
ways, but two in particular have attempted to understand the very foundations of this 
phenomenon. One of them has focused on understanding the underlying causes of corruption, 
and has gained greater momentum with the development of various aggregate corruption 
indicators at a cross-national level since the mid-1990s. This literature has mainly relied on a 
broad definition of corruption as the misuse or abuse of public power for private gain (Rose-
                                                          
1
 An earlier version of this paper was published in December 2014 with the title “Democratization and 
corruption: the state of the art”, as a deliverable for the research project ANTICORRP, co-funded by the 
European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme (http://anticorrp.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/D1.1_Part2_Democratization-and-corruption.pdf). 
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Ackerman 1999; Treisman 2000). In this line of research, historical, cultural, economic and 
political factors have been explored as potentially explaining the large variation of corruption 
levels observed across countries (see Treisman 2007 for a review). 
Another more recent stream of research, to some extent critical of the first, has sought to 
conceptualize and understand not the determinants of corruption per se, but of its opposite. 
Focusing on the concept of good governance more broadly, this literature is mainly interested 
in explaining how a handful of societies have historically managed to achieve a governance 
regime characterized by a low corruption equilibrium and by the predominance of a norm of 
ethical universalism and impartiality in the treatment of citizens by the state (Mungiu-Pippidi 
2006, 2015). These studies thus take a more societal and historical institutional approach to 
understanding this phenomenon, and generally define corruption in terms of a violation of 
those norms of impartiality and universalism in the exercise of public authority (Mungiu-
Pippidi 2006, 2015; Rothstein and Teorell 2008). 
In both of these streams, democracy has been highlighted, theoretically and empirically, as a 
main factor associated to both cross-national variation in corruption and changes in corruption 
patterns over time. The literature on causes of corruption has found a strong association 
between more advanced and consolidated democracies and lower levels of corruption (Kolstad 
and Wiig 2016; Pellegata 2012; Serra 2004; Treisman 2000, 2007). Works from the historical 
institutional literature have also discussed the role of democratization and increased political 
pluralism in a society’s transition to a “good governance” regime characterized by a low 
corruption equilibrium (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, 89; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011, 29)2. 
This paper offers a critical and systematic assessment of this literature, showing that existing 
research has only scratched the surface of the relationship between democracy and 
corruption, leaving several questions partly unanswered and unexplored. In particular, most 
studies examine this relationship at a high level of aggregation and propose multiple, and at 
times contradictory, causal mechanisms through which an effect of democracy on corruption 
could take place. As a consequence, the extensive empirical literature has explored a number 
of contrasting hypotheses on the nature of this relationship, offering some insightful findings, 
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 At the same time, however, this line of research has also shown that some countries where a low 
corruption equilibrium was achieved reached this under reforms promoted by absolutist regimes, long 
before the introduction of representative democracy under universal suffrage (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). 
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and other less conclusive ones. Moreover, at a conceptual level the debate on the link 
between these two phenomena is still fuzzy, and a clear discussion of what is understood by 
both the dependent and the independent variables is often lacking in a large part of the 
scholarly work on this issue. In order to address some of the gaps identified in the surveyed 
literature, an argument is made about the need for a more disaggregated perspective of 
democracy in order to better capture the essential causal mechanisms for an effect of 
democratic institutions on corruption, emphasizing the role of accountability in driving this 
effect. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the main hypotheses and findings 
present in the relevant literature, succeeded by a discussion of the related conceptual issues 
and gaps; subsequently, a conceptual framework of dimensions of accountability is presented 
as a tool to analyze the relationship between democracy and corruption; finally, the conclusion 
points to open questions and challenges ahead for future research on this topic. 
 
Theory and empirical findings: a review of the literature 
In the literature on democracy3 and corruption, a number of hypotheses have been put forth 
about how the former should affect the latter. This section summarizes the main theoretical 
arguments and the empirical evidence associated with different hypotheses, in order to 
provide an overview of what is known so far and what remains unclear based on existing 
research. 
 
The linear effect hypotheses 
The simplest hypothesis discussed in the literature claims that democracy should lead to lower 
corruption, or in other words, that it has a linear negative effect on corruption. This rather 
optimistic expectation derives from the very philosophical and normative ideals of democracy, 
                                                          
3
 This discussion in the literature refers both to mechanisms associated to a process of democratization, 
thus with the establishment of certain democratic institutions in a political regime, and to other linked 
to a process of democratic consolidation over time. In order to maintain a uniform terminology and 
avoid confusion while referring to these distinct processes, the term “democracy” is used throughout 
the text to include both these developments. 
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based on principles such as equality, justice, citizenship, openness and accountability, i.e. 
values that are antithetical to corruption (Morris 2009). It can also be traced back to theories 
of democratic representation, which portray representative democracy as a system where 
rulers are systematically induced to act according to the interests of the citizenry (Przeworski 
et al. 1999). As corruption, by all definitions, implies actions that benefit private interests at 
the expense of the collective interest, true representation would in theory preclude corrupt 
acts. More specifically, democracy should induce representation on the part of elected officials 
because voters can ultimately threaten to remove them from office, should they act in ways 
detrimental to the public interest (Przeworski et al. 1999)4. 
This hypothesis is also linked to the public choice literature, which has explored how the 
introduction of elections and political competition changes the incentive structure of 
politicians (Montinola and Jackman 2002). Under the assumption that politicians are self-
interested and care about retaining office, incumbents would anticipate sanctioning by voters 
and therefore act in a way representative of their interests and refrain from corruption 
(Adsera et al. 2003; Andvig et al. 2001; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Pellegata 2012). 
Moreover, electoral competition would give the opposition an incentive to expose their 
adversaries’ involvement in corruption (Andvig et al. 2001; Kolstad and Wiig 2016; Lederman 
et al. 2005; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Seldadyo and de Haan 2006)5. 
Additionally, democratic freedoms and transparency should contribute to reducing the 
information asymmetry between voters and office holders and are thus expected to foster 
voters’ ability to monitor the government (Kolstad and Wiig 2016; Lederman et al. 2005; 
Montinola and Jackman 2002; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000). Finally, the adoption of 
mechanisms of checks and balances associated with democratic regimes is expected to restrict 
the ability of government officials to engage in corruption (Kolstad and Wiig 2016; Lederman 
et al. 2005; Seldadyo and de Haan 2006). 
A second hypothesis on the effect of democracy on corruption claims that the duration of 
democratic regimes is negatively associated with corruption. This is linked to the argument 
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 Nevertheless, several contributions in the volume edited by Przeworski et al. (1999) argue that the 
retrospective sanctioning of incumbents by voters does not always take place. 
5
 Kunicová and Mattes (2006) develop a model to show that this is not always the case, however, 
because competitors may collude, share rents or alternate in power. 
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that democracy implies, in the long term, the consolidation of democratic norms that foster a 
rejection of corruption by the citizenry, which should also contribute to reinforcing social 
monitoring of the government (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000). Additionally, a longer experience 
with democracy contributes to more solid and established mechanisms of accountability that 
are expected to constrain corruption (Lederman et al. 2005; Pellegata 2012). 
Although the theoretical discussion around the first hypothesis refers to the effect of 
democratization and implies that democratic regimes are less corrupt in comparison to non-
democratic ones, recent empirical analyses have to a large extent used continuous indicators 
of democracy or the strength of democratic institutions, thus essentially testing for the effect 
of different “degrees” of democracy and comparing corruption levels not only between 
democracies and non-democracies, but also across what may be construed as different stages 
of democracy. Such studies present rather mixed findings, with results often varying according 
to different measures of democracy or the co-variants controlled for in the models. 
Some authors fail to find a statistically significant relationship between democracy and 
corruption. Goldsmith (1999), for instance, examines this hypothesis for a cross-section of 34 
low- and medium-income countries and finds no statistically significant effect of democracy–
measured with Freedom House’s freedom indicator–on corruption, once per capita income is 
controlled for. Treisman (2000) also tests for the effect of democracy on corruption as part of a 
more comprehensive model of determinants of corruption. In cross-sectional analyses of 
different samples, varying from 34 to 64 countries, he similarly finds the estimated effect of 
democracy–both measured as a dummy variable of democratic status in 1995 and as the 
Political Rights index from Freedom House–to be not statistically significant when taking into 
account a series of other potential explanatory variables, including economic development, 
trade openness, legal tradition, Protestantism, colonial past, among others. 
Other scholars have found some evidence of a linear negative of democracy on corruption, but 
this is not always robust. Paldam (2002) estimates the effect of democracy on corruption for a 
cross-section of almost 100 countries, taking into account the impact of cultural areas6 and 
economic factors (e.g. per capita, economic growth, income inequality) as well. He finds that 
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 The countries in the sample are divided across six cultural groups: Western Europe, Latin America, 
former Communist countries, Africa, Oriental countries, and a residual group with remaining countries 
(Paldam 2002). 
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the effect of democracy is sensitive to model specification, once economic factors are 
controlled for. In a 2007 paper that essentially replicates his initial analysis with more recent 
data and much larger samples (up to 162 countries), Treisman (2007) does find significant 
results, but they are not robust to changes in the democracy indicator7. Sandholtz and Koetzle 
(2000) examine the same relationship for a cross-section of 50 countries, also using Freedom 
House’s freedom indicator for democracy, and find a negative association between corruption 
and the strength of democratic institutions, but it is mostly significant at the 10%-confidence 
level, while controlling for economic freedom, average income, trade, Protestantism and age 
of the democratic regime. Adsera et al. (2003) also estimate this effect in a more sophisticated 
analysis, with panel data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for the period 1980-
1995 (averaged for each 5-year period) for more than 100 countries, and find results not to be 
robust to changes in the model specification8. Bohara et al. (2004) introduce an alternative 
measure of democracy that emphasizes political participation over time9 and find stronger 
democracy to be significantly associated with lower corruption both in cross-section and panel 
analyses. Finally, Lederman et al. (2005) similarly use panel data to conduct their analysis, also 
based on the ICRG corruption index for the 1984-1999 period, and they do find a significant 
negative effect of democracy–measured as a binary variable–on corruption, both for ordered 
probit10 and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, while controlling for a series of cultural, 
policy-related and development factors and other political institutional characteristics. 
However, when they replicate this analysis for a cross-section of 70 countries with corruption 
data from the World Bank for 1999, the effect of democracy on corruption becomes 
insignificant. 
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 Alternatively to Freedom House’s Political Rights index, Treisman (2007) uses the Polity IV Democracy 
indicator. 
8
 These authors estimate the effect of democracy on corruption together with a variable called free 
newspaper circulation, which is measured as an interaction between the level of democratic liberties 
and the newspaper circulation in the respective countries (Adsera et al. 2003). The authors do not 
discuss the effect of collinearity between the two variables and how it may reduce the significance level 
of the effect of democracy. 
9
 Based on Dahl’s discussion of the main dimensions of polyarchy, these authors create a measure of 
compound democracy, generated as “the cumulative sum of the product of participation and 
competition for each country for each year using yearly participation (turnout/population ratio) and 
competition (100 minus percent vote for largest party) data collected by Vanhanen (1990)”, with 1950 
as the starting date. 
10
 This method of estimation is justified by the fact that the ICRG corruption measure varies discretely, 
and not continuously, between 0 to 6 (Lederman et al. 2005). 
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Evidence supporting the second hypothesis, on the other hand, appears to be more robust11. 
Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) also test a variable of the length of democracy in their sample of 
countries, and find this to have a significant effect on corruption levels at the 10%-level in most 
of their models. Treisman (2000) finds no effect of a variable measuring years of democracy for 
his sample of countries, but does find a statistically significant negative effect of a dummy 
variable for whether the country has been a democracy uninterruptedly from 1950 to 1995. 
Lederman et al. (2005) also consider the effect of democratic stability–measured as the time of 
uninterrupted democratic experience–on corruption levels, and find it to have a significant 
negative association with corruption throughout the different models estimated. Pellegata 
(2012) also finds supportive evidence for the effect of cumulative democratic experience on 
corruption, uninterrupted or not, for a cross-section of 112 countries. Even stronger support 
for this hypothesis is presented by Serra (2004), who conducts an Extreme-Bounds Analysis of 
16 determinants of corruption for a sample of 62 countries, and finds the negative effect of 
uninterrupted democracy–measured as a dummy variable for the period 1950-1995–to be one 
of the five determinants to remain robust to different model specifications12. 
 
The non-linear effect hypothesis 
Other studies have proposed that democracy has a non-linear effect on corruption, whereby it 
first results in increasing corruption and only in the long term, at a more advanced stage, does 
it help reduce corruption levels. Two different sets of theoretical explanations can be 
associated with this idea. The first one implies that the non-linear effect is explained by a 
lagged negative effect of democracy on corruption, i.e. the mechanisms through which 
democracy helps curb corruption take a long time to be set in motion. One of the arguments 
behind this proposition is that, at early stages of democracy, the mechanism of electoral 
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 At the same time, there are a few case studies that explore some counter-examples of this thesis (e.g. 
India) and question the assumption that a longer experience with democracy is naturally associated with 
deeper democracy (von Soest 2013; Sun and Johnston 2009). 
12
 Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) is a strong test of the robustness and sensitivity of explanatory 
variables through a series of estimations changing the composition of the set of control variables 
included. If the coefficients of the variable of interest remain statistically significant in the same 
direction from its extreme upper bound (its highest value plus twice its standard error) to its extreme 
lower bound (its lowest value minus twice its standard error), the variable is considered to be robust to 
specification changes. In the analysis conducted by Serra (2004), the other four explanatory variables 
found to be robust are economic development, political instability, Protestantism and colonial heritage. 
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control is still weak and is not able to guarantee effective accountability between voters and 
politicians (Pellegata 2012). It is also argued that top-down control exercised by authoritarian 
governments over the economic and political spheres contributes to suppress corruption to 
some extent, but once these forms of control collapse after the transition to democratic rule, 
other mechanisms such as accountability structures and checks and balances are not yet fully 
consolidated, which leads to an increase of corruption in the short term (Andvig et al. 2001; 
Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Saha et al. 2014). 
The second set of explanations, on the other hand, relies on the notion that different 
developments associated with democracy may have contradictory effects on corruption (Blake 
and Morris 2009; Rose-Ackerman 1999). This view similarly considers that the aforementioned 
mechanisms of control take time to consolidate and to produce the expected negative effect 
on corruption. At the same time, though, it challenges the argument that elections have 
predominantly positive effects on corruption. Instead, it claims that electoral competition and 
the “uncertainty” associated with it create both opportunities and incentives for politicians to 
subject to increasing pressures from business or to engage in electoral corruption through 
vote-buying, clientelism and illegal party-financing in order to maximize voter support (Blake 
and Morris 2009; Moran 2001; Rose-Ackerman 1999)13. Eventually, once solid mechanisms of 
checks and balances, increased transparency and a free press are in place, this may be 
counterbalanced and surpassed by an effect in the opposite direction (Goldsmith 1999; Kolstad 
and Wiig 2016; Sung 2004). 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2006, 2015) also discusses the non-linear effect of democracy on corruption, 
but offers an alternative explanation. In her model, the transition from authoritarian, 
patrimonial regimes to incipient democracies rarely represents a challenge to the fundamental 
social norm of particularism and unequal treatment that governs these regimes. Instead, the 
introduction of political competition contributes to breaking the former monopoly of power of 
the ruling elite, only to allow other elite groups to compete for state rents14. In this situation of 
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 The political machines described by Scott (1972) illustrate this dynamics. Similarly, documented cases 
of illegal party financing and clientelistic networks even in more advanced democracies (Della Porta and 
Mény 1997) may be seen as evidence of this. 
14
 The economic literature on rent-seeking also discusses how political liberalization in the beginning 
opens up access to rent-seeking activities and leads to an increase in the number of rent-seekers 
(Mohtadi and Roe 2003). 
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“competitive particularism”, corruption increases, and democracy only brings about a 
reduction of corruption once the introduction of elections is followed by normative changes 
that weaken social acceptability of particularism and push for stronger accountability and 
universalism (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, 89–90). 
The non-linear effect hypothesis was largely supported by earlier case studies on new 
democracies after the so-called Third Wave of democratization, showing that democratic 
transition was followed by an apparent increase in corruption in several countries (Geddes and 
Ribeiro Neto 1992; Harriss-White and White 1996; Mohtadi and Roe 2003; Moran 2001; Rock 
2007; Weyland 1998; Whitehead 2002)15. Rock (2007) mentions examples from Indonesia and 
Thailand, where the democratic transition led to the collapse of centralized corruption 
networks and to increased corruption by local political actors. Sidel (1996) also discusses how 
local bossism appeared to have re-emerged in Thailand and the Philippines after 
democratization16. Finally, studies on the re-democratization of Latin American countries after 
military dictatorships also point to evidence of an increase in corruption, especially in the 
realm of political financing and clientelism (Little 1996; Whitehead 2002)17. A more recent 
study on the impact of democracy on corruption in Mexico also corroborates this hypothesis. 
Focusing on the changes that took place in the country’s political environment after the 
alternation in power in 2000, when the former hegemonic party Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) lost the presidential elections and stepped down after more than seven 
decades of dominance, Morris (2009) finds that democracy has brought about new 
opportunities for corruption through state capture, new forms of clientelism and campaign 
finance. 
The studies mentioned above have contributed with qualitative evidence of increased 
corruption in a number of younger democracies, but they largely concentrate on a short time 
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 A large part of these studies makes reference to numerous corruption scandals that came to light a 
few years after the democratic transitions they examine (Whitehead 2002). However, due to the lack of 
straightforward measures of corruption, it is impossible to distinguish whether such cases represent in 
fact an increase of corruption or merely of its visibility, due to increased press freedom, for instance 
(Montinola and Jackman 2002; Weyland 1998). 
16
 A similar structure is described by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) as the “industrial organization” of 
corruption, illustrated by examples from post-Communist Russia, India and some African countries. 
17
 It is important to notice that several of these studies also attribute the perceived increase in 
corruption in those countries to economic liberalization and new opportunities for corruption linked to 
processes of deregulation and privatization, for instance (Whitehead 2002). 
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horizon after democratic transition, covering mostly the first decade after the regime change. 
Therefore, none of them illustrates fully the hypothesized non-linear nature of the effect of 
democracy on corruption as predicted by the theoretical arguments previously discussed, in 
the sense that no “turning point”, to the effect that corruption eventually is reduced as a 
consequence of stronger democratic institutions, is documented for those cases. More recent 
comparative studies testing this hypothesis for a larger sample of countries, on the other hand, 
have offered more consistent evidence of a non-linear association between democracy and 
corruption. 
Montinola and Jackman (2002) were the first to find statistical evidence of a quadratic 
relationship between democracy and corruption examining two cross-sections of 51 and 66 
countries, respectively, while controlling for size of government, per capita income, oil 
exporting countries and regional dummies. They found non-democratic states to be slightly 
less corrupt than partial democracies, and a negative association between levels of democracy 
and corruption to exist only for countries where democratic institutions are stronger. Treisman 
(2007) partly supports these findings, but notes that the marginal effect of advances in 
democracy on corruption at intermediate levels of democracy is erratic and inconsistent. Bäck 
and Hadenius (2008) explore a similar relationship and, while they focus on the effect of 
democracy–measured as a composite indicator including both Freedom House and Polity 
democracy indices–on state capacity, the dependent variable is also operationalized with 
corruption indicators18. Similarly, they find evidence for this non-linear effect for a panel of 125 
countries over a period of 19 years, with a positive effect of democracy on corruption at low 
levels of democracy and a negative effect at high levels of democracy, while controlling for per 
capita income, openness to trade and British colonial heritage. Pellegata (2012) also tests and 
finds statistical support for this non-linear effect. Rock (2007), in turn, tests this hypothesis in 
panel regressions with samples between 75 and 104 countries, considering alternative 
measures of democracy, including one corresponding to the duration of democracy and 
another multiplying measures of duration and strength of democratic institutions–both based 
on Polity IV data. He finds a significant non-linear effect for the duration of democracy and for 
the combined measure. Saha et al. (2014) also test the non-linear effect of different 
components of democracy on corruption for a panel of 100 countries, and find evidence of 
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 Their variable state capacity is measured by combining ICRG’s Bureaucratic Quality and Control of 
Corruption indices. 
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heterogeneous effects, with stronger effects for higher levels of democracy19. Finally, Sung 
(2004) tests other functional forms for this relationship in a sample of 103 countries and finds 
statistical evidence for a cubic relationship between democracy and corruption, although this 
is more difficult to interpret in substantive terms. 
What is intriguing in these studies is that they have also shown that the negative effect of 
democracy on corruption comes about rather at higher democracy levels, thus after countries 
are more advanced in their democratic consolidation. This is in a way corroborated by findings 
of a negative association between the “age” of a democratic regime and its level of corruption, 
discussed above. These empirical findings thus suggest that a negative effect of democracy on 
corruption is observed only after a country passes a certain threshold of consolidation of its 
democratic institutions. 
 
The conditional effect hypotheses 
Finally, some researchers have attempted to explain the non-uniform effect of democracy on 
corruption by arguing that it is in fact dependent on other factors. Charron and Lapuente 
(2010) subscribe to the classic political economy assumption that democracy leads politicians 
to become more responsive to citizens’ demands, but argue that those demands vary 
according to the level of economic development in a society. In poorer societies, people’s 
preferences are likely to favor immediate consumption instead of future consumption. 
Therefore citizens would be more likely to demand the provision of goods through clientelistic 
exchanges and patronage, instead of the allocation of public resources to improve 
administrative capacity and the provision of public goods in the long term. In richer societies, 
on the other hand, citizens would be more likely to pressure rulers to invest in improving 
quality of government and reducing corruption, because they are more able to afford the short 
term costs of policies in this direction (Charron and Lapuente 2010, 451). The empirical 
analysis conducted by the authors for a panel of 127 countries finds evidence of the 
hypothesized interaction effect, with a negative effective of democracy on their indicator of 
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 The authors use Freedom House’s Political Rights, Civil Liberties and Press Freedom indices to develop 
indicators of narrow and broad democracy, where the former includes only the Political Rights index, 
and the latter consists of all three dimensions. They also use the combination of Civil Liberties and Press 
Freedom as a measure for Rule of Law. Moreover, the effect of each measure on corruption is also 
tested individually. 
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quality of government–also a combination of ICRG’s Bureaucratic Quality and Control of 
Corruption, as used by Bäck and Hadenius (2008)–at lower levels of per capita income, and a 
positive effect at higher levels of per capita income. They also control for alternative 
hypotheses, including the one for an effect of the duration of democracy and for a quadratic 
relationship between democracy and corruption, and find no evidence to support them. 
A more recent study by Jetter et al. (2015) also finds support for this hypothesis, although their 
theoretical explanation for the conditioning effect of income is a bit different: democracy 
opens up access to rent-seeking activities to a larger part of society; below a threshold per 
capita income level–estimated at about US$ 2000 (in 2005 US$)–, individuals have low income 
prospects in the productive sector, and therefore have more incentives to engage in 
corruption whereas at higher income levels, they can profit from sufficient income in other 
economic activities unrelated to the state. 
Other authors have proposed that the effect of democracy on corruption is also non-linear, but 
varies with the degree of media freedom existent in a society20. Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2012) develop a formal game-theoretical model where higher quality of democratic 
institutions21 contributes to reducing corruption, and this effect is potentialized under 
increased media freedom. In their model, voters choose between “good” and “bad” politicians, 
where the former act in people’s best interest and the latter in their own self-interest. The role 
of media freedom is to improve voters’ knowledge of corrupt behavior by the incumbent, 
allowing them to update their belief of the incumbent’s type and accordingly make their voting 
decision for the next term. The empirical tests to the model’s predictions, taking into account 
data for 126 countries from 1980 to 2008, find strong support for the complementary effect of 
democracy and media freedom on corruption. 
Similarly, Kalenborn and Lessmann (2012) test the joint effect of democracy and press freedom 
on corruption levels for a large sample of countries, both in cross-section and panel 
regressions. They argue that both a free press and democratic elections are necessary for 
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 Evidence of a significant independent negative effect of press freedom on corruption have also been 
presented in the literature on determinants of corruption (Adsera et al. 2003; Brunetti and Weder 2003; 
Treisman 2007). 
21
 In the authors’ definition, high quality democratic institutions imply that the incumbent is likely to 
stay in office when supported by the people, and unlikely to stay in office without popular support 
(Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2012). 
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voters to effectively exercise accountability against corrupt politicians, as the former provides 
for detection of corrupt behavior and the latter for punishment by voters. In accordance with 
the principal-agent framework, they discuss that a free press has mainly the role of reducing 
the information asymmetry between voters and politicians. As Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2012), they also find empirical evidence to support the conditional effect of democracy and 
press freedom on corruption. 
Yet another strand of research considers that the effect of democracy may be conditional on 
the institutional design of democratic regimes, i.e. “the devil is in the details” (Morris 2009; 
Persson and Tabellini 2004; Rose-Ackerman 1999). This stream in the literature is mainly 
concerned with explaining variation in corruption outcomes across democracies, and examines 
how contrasting institutional features of democracies affect corruption levels. The theoretical 
arguments behind these analyses usually emphasize two potential effects of certain political 
institutions: (a) they may influence the ability of voters to hold corrupt politicians accountable, 
and (b) given institutional setups may be more effective in constraining corrupt behavior by 
those in power. However, competing arguments are presented about how and in which 
direction different institutional characteristics bring about these effects (Kunicová 2006). 
One of the factors discussed in the literature refers to executive-legislative relations, more 
specifically to the effect of presidentialist and parliamentarist forms of government. This 
theoretical debate is full of controversies. Theoretical models suggest that Presidentialism 
should be associated with less corruption, as it favors accountability by allowing voters to 
exercise direct control over the Executive. Additionally, its strong separation of powers would 
contribute to restricting opportunities for rent extraction in the government, by providing 
strengthened checks and balances between the Executive and the legislature (Persson and 
Tabellini 2004). Similarly, it is argued that the increased number of veto-players under 
Presidentialism should reduce discretionary power and, consequently, corrupt behavior 
(Kunicová 2006). At the same time, other authors argue that Presidential systems in practice 
often result in considerable concentration of power in the hands of the Executive, despite 
separation of powers, and therefore may be associated with more corruption. Together with 
fixed terms in office, this would in practice reduce oversight of the Executive, thus contributing 
to less accountability and more corruption (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005). Finally, there 
are claims that higher centralization of power under Parliamentarism is conducive to stronger 
centralized, top-down accountability, and thus less corruption (Gerring and Thacker 2004). 
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Empirical evidence on these arguments are quite limited and inconclusive. Persson and 
Tabellini analyze a sample of 60 democracies, using various estimation techniques, and find 
that Presidentialism to be significantly associated with higher corruption (Persson and Tabellini 
2004)22. Blume et al. (2009) replicate their analyses on a larger sample, with 31 additional 
countries, and with alternative classification of presidentialist and parliamentarist regimes, and 
find the negative effect of Presidentialism on corruption not to be robust to alternative 
measures of both the dependent and the independent variable. Gerring and Thacker (2004), 
on the other hand, find that Parliamentarism is significantly associated with less corruption, in 
a sample of over 100 democracies and partial democracies and controlling mainly for per 
capita income, energy dependence, democracy, Protestantism and legal origin. 
A second institutional factor that is considered to affect corruption outcomes is the electoral 
system. A number of studies has examined how different electoral rules may affect voters’ 
ability to hold corrupt politicians accountable at the ballot box (Kunicová 2006; Persson et al. 
2003), and three main mechanisms are discussed. Firstly, different systems may create 
stronger or weaker accountability links between voters and incumbents. It is argued that 
plurality systems, where voters vote on specific candidates, favor electoral accountability, as 
there is a direct accountability link between incumbents and their constituency and reelection 
is more dependent on performance in office (Kunicová 2006; Persson et al. 2003). In systems 
based on proportional representation (PR), on the other hand, voters vote on party lists 
determined by the parties, thus establishing a weaker accountability link between the voters 
and the individual candidates. This is most extreme in the case of closed lists, where the rank 
of elected candidates is decided internally by each party. For open lists, differently, it may be 
argued that electoral accountability not necessarily weakened as with closed lists, because 
voters are also able to vote for specific candidates and influence the rank of elected candidates 
(Kunicová 2006; Persson et al. 2003). 
Secondly, different electoral systems may create different levels of political competition, thus 
affecting the range of alternatives that voters have to choose from when they are dissatisfied 
with incumbents. These effects are hypothesized to work in the opposite direction as the 
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 Their analysis makes a distinction between “good” and “bad” democracies and finds the opposite 
association between Presidentialism and corruption among good democracies. This classification of 
countries is based on the level of constraints on the Executive and freedom of political participation, 
measured according to indicators from Polity IV and Freedom House (Persson and Tabellini 2004). 
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previous arguments, however. In this debate, proportional representation is believed to 
increase political competition due to reduced entry barriers to new parties and candidates, 
especially by inducing larger district magnitude, which in turn should contribute to electoral 
accountability by offering voters more options of honest candidates (Kunicová 2006; Persson 
et al. 2003). 
Thirdly, electoral rules, by affecting the level of competition, impact the incentives of 
competitors and voters to monitor the behavior of incumbents, and thus indirectly affect the 
amount of information that voters may have at their disposal about how incumbents have 
behaved in office. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) propose this line of thought, arguing 
that increased political competition may also have a negative effect on electoral 
accountability: in a two-party system, the opposition has more incentive to expose corruption 
by the incumbents because access to power depends on defeating them; under a higher 
number of parties, on the other hand, the chances of each individual party coming to power on 
its own is reduced, and the perspective of forming coalitions with the incumbent in the future 
may limit the incentives of exposing corrupt behavior. 
The empirical evidence for the effect of different electoral rules on corruption do not offer 
clear-cut answers on which system is most advantageous for controlling corruption. Persson et 
al. (2003) test the effect of certain electoral rules on corruption on a sample of 80 
democracies–classified according to Freedom House’s ratings–, both in cross-section and panel 
analyses, and find that voting on individual ballots (such as in plurality systems) and larger 
district magnitude are robustly associated with lower corruption. Blume et al. (2009) confirm 
these findings in their extended analysis. However, these features are not usually 
implemented together: plurarity systems are often coupled with low-magnitude districts, and 
PR is mostly combined with larger district magnitude. Therefore, comprehensive electoral 
reforms could have counteracting effects on corruption, depending on how these 
characteristics are designed (Persson et al. 2003). Moreover, there could be interaction effects 
across different characteristics of electoral systems that should be explored further (Kunicová 
2006). 
Finally, the literature also considers the effect of federalism on corruption outcomes. 
Federalism has been argued to affect corruption mainly through the effects of decentralized 
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government, but there are claims that it may contribute to either increased or reduced 
corruption (Lessmann and Markwardt 2009; Treisman 2000)23. This controversy is present in 
discussions on how federalism impacts the structure of public service provision. If different 
levels of government have some kind of monopoly over the provision of particular or 
complementary services, this may lead to excessive bribing by officials across those levels; if 
there is competition in the provision of services, on the other hand, this may drive bribery 
down (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Moreover, sub-national governments could be more prone 
to corruption due to limited control by centralized enforcement agencies and increased 
pressure from local interest groups (Kunicová 2006; Lessmann and Markwardt 2009; Rose-
Ackerman 1999; Treisman 2000). At the same time, however, there are claims that corruption 
may be lower in federal structures, as sub-national governments can be better monitored and 
held accountable from below due to more proximity to local constituencies (Gerring and 
Thacker 2004). 
The empirical evidence has so far failed to clarify these controversies. Goldsmith (1999) and 
Treisman (2000) tests both hypotheses and finds evidence that federalism is significantly 
associated with more corruption. However, a later replication of these tests by Treisman 
(2007) in a larger sample no longer finds a statistically significant relationship. Gerring and 
Thacker (2004) apply the opposite concept of unitarism–conceptualized as a combination of 
non-federalism and unicameralism–and find it to be significantly associated with lower 
corruption. Adsera et al. (2003), on the other hand, find federalism to significantly reduce 
corruption. Finally, Bohara et al. (2004) also include federalism in their analysis, but find no 
significant relationship with the corruption indicator. 
 
A note on mutual causality 
As the several hypotheses and theoretical formulations discussed above illustrate, the 
relationship between democracy and corruption is one of high complexity. One main issue of 
concern in this literature is, naturally, if causality runs both ways between these two 
phenomena. In fact, there are several claims that corruption has detrimental effects on 
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 There is another stream in the literature that looks specifically at the effects of fiscal and 
administrative decentralization on corruption, but this analysis differs somewhat from the one on 
federalism (see Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006 for a review). 
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democracy. Johnston argues that competitive political processes can be undermined by 
corruption (2005, 28), and other authors mention corruption as one of the biggest obstacles 
and threats to democratic consolidation (Diamond et al., 1999, 1; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, 86). 
Mungiu-Pippidi et al. highlight how corruption, in the form of clientelism and patronage, 
“subverts democracy” (2011, 12). As Warren puts it, “corruption […] breaks the link between 
collective decision-making and people’s powers to influence collective decisions through 
speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy” (2004, 328). In essence, 
“Corruption […] violates norms of openness and equality that would seem to be central to 
democracy” (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, 31). The literature on consequences of corruption 
also points to its detrimental effects on democratic legitimacy (Andvig et al. 2001; Seligson 
2002). 
This issue has, indeed, important methodological implications for the empirical analysis of the 
effect of democracy on corruption, especially in the case of the numerous quantitative 
analyses that have been conducted, as their results may be biased if the danger of reverse 
causality is not taken into account. For this reason, many researchers have made use of 
different strategies to minimize this problem. 
Pellegata (2012), for instance, argues in favor of a concept of democracy based on electoral 
competition only, arguing that indicators based on this narrower concept, in contrast to more 
substantial notions of democracy, limit the potential for endogeneity when examining the 
effect of democracy on corruption. However, this rationale is questionable, if we take into 
consideration that corrupt practices such as vote-buying and clientelism are likely to affect the 
electoral dimension of democracy as well. 
Other authors have relied on statistical techniques such as the use of lagged measures of 
democracy (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Treisman 2007) or estimation with instrumental 
variables to circumvent the issue of reverse causality. However, in particular the identification 
of good instruments for democratic institutions, required for the latter type of analysis, is very 
challenging, as highlighted by Treisman (2007). Kalenborn and Lessmann (2012), for instance, 
use latitude and dummy variables for Europe and Central Asia and Scandinavian legal origin as 
instruments for democracy, but their choice of instruments is not grounded in detail. Rock 
(2007) also uses latitude and share of Protestant population as instrumental variables for 
democracy. There are issues particularly with Protestantism, which has been pointed by the 
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literature as having an independent effect on corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013; Treisman 
2000, 2007). 
Kolstad and Wiig (2016) similarly employ instrumental variable analysis in their estimation of 
the effect of democracy on corruption, but devise their instrument for democracy based on 
the democratic peace thesis, i.e. an indicator of whether a country has been at war with 
another democracy between 1946 and 2009. These authors find evidence of a stronger 
negative effect of democracy on corruption than in models where potential endogeneity is not 
corrected for, suggesting that the causal effect may have been underestimated in previous 
studies. They also find evidence consistent with heterogeneous effects of democracy on 
corruption, with a stronger negative impact observed for more mature (i.e. older) democracies 
and for countries at higher levels of democracy–measured with the Polity IV and the Freedom 
House indicators–, thus in line with the non-linear effect hypothesis. 
These brief remarks on the complexity of the causal links between democracy and corruption 
aim to stress that, although the extensive comparative literature on this subject has 
contributed much to advancing our knowledge on the issue, there are still no absolute 
foolproof strategies to examine this question empirically. 
 
Limitations of existing research and some conceptual issues 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the literature on democracy and corruption offers 
insights on a complex relationship, where multiple hypotheses and causal pathways for an 
effect of the former on the latter are discussed. Despite considerable research on this topic, 
however, a critical assessment of the existing literature shows that a number of open 
questions remain regarding this relationship. 
A first point of concern for the empirical analysis of this relationship is the matter of 
endogeneity, due to a likely feedback effect of corruption on democracy. This problem is still 
poorly addressed in the literature, and remains ignored in some of the studies surveyed. There 
are analyses that have attempted to address this problem through the employment of more 
sophisticated statistical techniques, but some of the solutions offered are not fully convincing. 
This is likely to remain one of the main challenges for the study of a causal relationship 
between these two phenomena. 
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Secondly, what seems to emerge rather strongly in the latest research is that democracy and 
corruption appear to be associated in a non-linear way. A number of plausible explanations for 
this pattern can be found in the literature, but so far the empirical evidence remains 
inconclusive on whether this might be due to a lagged effect of democracy, to the need for 
democratic regimes to cross a certain threshold of consolidation of their institutions, to the 
conditioning role of other factors (e.g. economic development, press freedom etc.) or to 
contradictory effects of different processes associated with democratization itself. Moreover, 
these different hypotheses allude to distinct mechanisms, associated with several dimensions 
of democracy, and how they should trigger a causal effect on corruption levels, but the 
empirical literature has largely overlooked how the multidimensional character of democracy 
is relevant for its impact on corruption levels, making use mainly of composite measures of 
democracy. Therefore, the existing empirical literature fails to shed further light into the black 
box of which mechanisms are in fact at work and how different dimensions of democracy 
concretely affect corruption outcomes in a political system. 
Finally, the existing literature on democracy and corruption suffers from considerable 
conceptual gaps. Both democracy and corruption lack universally accepted definitions, and the 
respective academic literature on each of these topics includes extensive conceptual debates. 
In the case of democracy, for instance, definitions vary along a wide spectrum of attributes 
that are considered necessary to characterize a regime as democratic. A minimalist definition 
of democracy may require only the selection of rulers by competitive elections (Przeworski 
2003); other less thin procedural conceptions establish additional criteria, such as the 
existence of full suffrage and minimal civil liberties (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Coppedge 2005; 
Dahl 1971). At the same time, there are more substantive conceptions of democracy that refer 
not only to procedures, but also to effective social and political outcomes of democratic 
regimes. Recent discussions in this direction have articulated the concept of quality of 
democracy, which considers to what extent the “goals” of an ideal democracy–e.g. popular 
sovereignty, political equality–are achieved in specific democratic regimes (Diamond and 
Morlino 2005). In the case of corruption, similarly, numerous issues regarding the scope of the 
concept–e.g. public vs. private sector corruption, legal vs. illegal corruption, universal vs. 
culture-specific concepts etc.–continue to be under debate (e.g. Heidenheimer and Johnston 
2002; Johnston 1996, 2014; Kaufmann and Vicente 2011; Kurer 2005). 
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Despite such controversies, it is interesting to notice that existing scholarly work on the 
relationship between democracy and corruption rarely engages in a clear conceptual 
discussion of either. Different studies employ distinct definitions and, at times, 
conceptualizations of democracy and corruption are implicit at best. In particular in the case of 
democracy, only a handful of studies deliberately discuss the conceptual approach taken and 
which indicators most adequately correspond to the particular concept applied (Bohara et al. 
2004; Pellegata 2012; Rock 2007; Saha et al. 2014).  
It is clear that democracy is still an “essentially contested concept” (Collier and Levitsky 1997; 
Coppedge 2005), and a single, consistent definition is unlikely to emerge. Nevertheless, the 
study of how democracy impacts corruption would benefit from a more consistent conceptual 
framework on how this relationship functions, and this is essentially still lacking in the present 
literature. More importantly, this gap in current research also has considerable implications for 
empirical analyses on the subject, given the associated difficulties of establishing reliable and 
valid measures for such a blurry concept. In fact, a large part of existing research appears to be 
more driven by the convenience offered by the wide country and time coverage of some 
aggregate indicators of democracy than by conceptual clarity and concerns with validity24. 
Moreover, in the particular case of democracy and corruption, concepts may overlap 
depending on how these two phenomena are conceptualized. Therefore, some essential 
questions regarding appropriate definitional and empirical approaches for these variables have 
only been superficially touched upon by the existing literature. 
In order to address some of the gaps and inconsistencies discussed above, this paper proposes 
an alternative conceptual framework for the analysis of the relationship between democracy 
and corruption. This framework seeks to make a contribution to a better understanding of how 
democracy affects corruption by highlighting the role of different components of democracy in 
                                                          
24
 Freedom House’s Freedom Index and Polity IV’s indicator of democracy are among the most 
commonly used measures of democracy, and are often used as alternative indicators or combined into a 
single measure in specific studies, even though they lie on distinct conceptions of democracy. While 
Polity IV measures institutionalized democracy according to the competitiveness and openness of 
executive recruitment, constraint on Chief Executive and competitiveness of political participation 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm), Freedom House’s measure is more comprehensive 
and includes a civil liberties dimension. An additional problem with Freedom House’s indicator that is 
virtually ignored in most studies is that its Political Rights dimension includes a component called 
Functioning of Government, which explicitly considers the absence of corruption as a sub-indicator 
(http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/checklist-questions-and-guidelines). For a 
critical assessment of different democracy measures, see Munck and Verkuilen (2002). 
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this relationship and by establishing a stronger focus on the causal mechanisms discussed in 
the literature for this effect. This strategy offers an essential advantage, since it takes a 
disaggregate approach to understanding the role of democratic institutions in the scope of this 
relationship, highlighting specific features of democracy that are, according to a series of 
theoretical arguments, expected to have a causal effect on corruption, and thus by-passes the 
labyrinth of broader conceptualizations of democracy. The next section elaborates the 
proposed framework in detail. 
 
An alternative framework: the dimensions of accountability 
The framework proposed here addresses the conceptual gaps discussed above by taking a 
disaggregated understanding of democracy and bringing together the various theoretical 
arguments presented in the literature about the mechanisms through which democracy is 
expected to impact corruption. This perspective has been rarely used in the existing literature 
(Bohara et al. 2004; Lederman et al. 2005; Saha et al. 2014), and it offers a few advantages to 
avoid some of the pitfalls that have been pointed out in the previous section. In order to 
introduce this framework, a brief summary of the causal mechanisms discussed in the 
literature is offered to highlight the dimensions of democracy that have so far been considered 
as plausibly affecting corruption. The objective here is not to engage in a comprehensive 
conceptualization of democracy per se, as the mechanisms discussed are certainly not 
exhaustive with regards to all relevant dimensions and attributes of democracy, but to offer a 
solid framework for those dimensions that are portrayed in the literature as most relevant for 
the relationship between democracy and corruption. 
The most prominent arguments discussed in previous scholarly work refer to the electoral 
competition component of democracy, i.e. the selection of rulers through free and fair 
competitive elections. This dimension is discussed as having a negative effect of corruption 
through two main mechanisms: a) by empowering voters to sanction corrupt politicians in the 
next elections; and b) by motivating the opposition to expose corrupt behavior by their 
competitors. There is a controversy, though, regarding the effect of electoral competition on 
corruption, as some authors also argue that it may at the same time create certain incentives 
for corruption, or only allow new rent-seekers to compete for state resources. 
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Other claims highlight the role of democratic freedoms of information, association and 
expression, also linked to the emergence of a free press, in contributing to the monitoring of 
governments by the citizenry and the consequent reduction of corruption in society. 
Furthermore, the importance of institutional mechanisms of control to put a check on the 
government is discussed. Finally, a normative dimension of democracy is also included in this 
debate, with regards to the consolidation of democratic norms that crystallize the belief 
among the citizenry that corruption is antithetical to democracy and the common interest. 
The framework proposed here interprets these four dimensions as directly or indirectly 
associated with the dimensions of accountability discussed in the literature on democratic 
accountability. In the extensive and long-living conceptual debate on democracy, 
accountability has in fact been highlighted by some authors as being one of democracy’s most 
important components (Schmitter 2007) and a core feature of representative democracy 
(Morlino 2007, 130), being thus one of the elements that distinguishes liberal representative 
democracies from other types of regime (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006b). Accountability 
implies “[…] subjecting power to the threat of sanctions; obliging it to be exercised in 
transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its acts” (Schedler 1999, 14). Schedler associates the 
first part of this definition with a dimension of enforcement, and the second and third parts 
with a dimension of answerability. 
It is important to make a distinction between this understanding of accountability and other 
meanings that appear in the literature. Accountability here refers to the existence of concrete 
mechanisms (formally institutionalized or not) through which public office holders can be 
called to provide an account of their actions and be sanctioned for misconduct25. This differs 
from other more normatively loaded conceptualizations of accountability that portray it in 
association with a sense of individual responsibility or moral obligation, or even as a synonym 
of responsiveness (Mulgan 2000). This distinction is what allows us to focus on how the 
existence and functioning of those mechanisms, in particular the possibility of sanctions, may 
affect corrupt behavior. 
                                                          
25
 Although the predominant view in the literature emphasizes sanctions as a core element of 
accountability (Kenney 2000; Mulgan 2000; Schedler 1999), there are also other opinions that do not 
consider the possibility of sanctions as a necessary attribute for an accountability relationship (Bovens 
2006; Philp 2009). 
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Several types of accountability have been proposed in the literature (Bovens 2006), but 
particularly important is the contribution of O’Donnell (1994, 1999) with his discussion of the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions of accountability. According to O’Donnell, 
“Elections, social demands that usually can be articulated without suffering state coercion, 
and regular coverage by the media of at least the more visible of these demands and of 
apparently wrongful acts of the public authorities are dimensions of […] ‘vertical 
accountability’.” (1999, 30) 
Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, 
“[…] is the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually 
willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or 
impeachment in relation to actions of omissions by other agents of the state that may be 
qualified as unlawful.” (O’Donnell 1999, 38) 
More specifically, these agencies undertake actions  
“[…] with the explicit purpose of preventing, cancelling, redressing and/or punishing actions 
(or eventually non-actions) by another state agency that are deemed unlawful, whether on 
grounds of encroachment or of corruption.” (O’Donnell 2003, 35) 
The vertical dimension of accountability can also be divided into two components. When it is 
exercised through elections, this represents electoral accountability (O’Donnell 1999). 
However, O’Donnell also acknowledges the role of social demands and monitoring by the 
media as part of vertical accountability. Peruzzotti and Smulovitz have called this component 
“social accountability”, defined as “[…] a nonelectoral yet vertical mechanism of control of 
political authorities that rests on the actions of an array of citizens’ associations and 
movements and the media” (2006b, 10). 
It becomes clear from this discussion that these three sources of accountability vary with 
regards to their degree of institutionalization and formalization. In the case of electoral and 
social accountability, the two components of vertical accountability, the answerability side of 
accountability may take a more informal nature, in the sense that the demand for 
transparency and justification for acts taken by the government can materialize not only 
through formal channels of inquiry that may be available to individuals, media and civil society, 
but also through popular pressure. With regards to the sanctioning aspect of accountability, on 
the other hand, electoral accountability involves a formal channel through which voters may 
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collectively “punish” a corrupt incumbent, whereas social accountability involves only 
reputational sanctions, which may nonetheless be of considerable weight to politicians (Grant 
and Keohane 2005; Philp 2009). In the case of horizontal accountability, on the other hand, 
both answerability and sanctioning are linked to formal institutional channels and procedures. 
Taking into consideration these dimensions of accountability, it is possible to directly link them 
to the four main dimensions of democracy and the related causal pathways through which 
they are expected to affect corruption, according to the literature. In other words, 
accountability emerges as a kind of “common denominator” of those theoretical explanations, 
and we can interpret the effect of democracy on corruption as being essentially associated 
with the consolidation of vertical (electoral and social) and horizontal accountability26. 
Electoral competition, for instance, is directly associated with the electoral component of 
vertical accountability27, by providing the citizenry with a means of removing corrupt 
politicians from office, and by motivating the opposition to expose information that enables 
voters to exercise electoral accountability. Democratically safeguarded rights to expression, 
association and information are in turn connected to the social component of vertical 
accountability, as they provide for the monitoring of government by an organized civil society 
and a free press. Institutional mechanisms of control, in the form of checks and balances and 
separation of powers, for instance, are a direct manifestation of horizontal accountability, as 
they often institutionalize channels through which the Legislative and the Judiciary may hold 
rulers accountable for misconduct. Finally, democratic norms can also be associated to all 
dimensions of accountability more generally and indirectly, in the sense that they foster and 
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 Recent conceptual work on democracy has highlighted this connection between defining attributes of 
democracy and these dimensions of accountability. Møller and Skaaning (2010), for instance, consider 
electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law to be the three key attributes of democracies, and 
claim that they can be tied together via the concept of accountability and its vertical and horizontal 
dimensions: “Vertical accountability entails interactions between rulers and the ruled, in particular the 
bottom-up control of the former by the latter via elections as well as restrictions on the top-down 
exercise of power via fundamental rights and the absence of judicial arbitrariness. Horizontal 
accountability has to do with interactions between branches of the state, in particular via the separation 
of powers”(Møller and Skaaning 2010, 275). 
27
 In this discussion, electoral accountability is linked to the theoretical arguments for a negative effect 
of electoral competition on corruption. Empirical applications of this framework would thus required 
that claims regarding a positive effect of elections on corruption levels be taken into account through 
the operationalization of other variables capturing those mechanisms, such as clientelism and campaign 
financing. 
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enable their consolidation and effectiveness once democratic principles become embedded in 
social norms. 
In fact, several authors in the surveyed literature on democracy and corruption implicitly or 
explicitly talk about mechanisms of accountability when describing the theoretical foundations 
of their analysis. Lederman et al. (2005) even operationalize it with indicators of political 
competition, the existence of checks and balances and freedom of the press, which correspond 
roughly to the three dimensions discussed above, but they do not use the vertical and 
horizontal accountability terminology. Bäck and Hadenius (2008) talk about the effect of 
democracy on corruption through dimensions of control from above and below, where the 
latter is a clear reference to what has been described as vertical accountability by other 
authors. Kolstad and Wiig (2016) also refer to democracy as a combination of horizontal and 
vertical accountability, but do not elaborate this in detail. This structure similarly resonates 
with empirical analyses stressing the role of media freedom and civil society as explanatory 
factors of corruption (Adsera et al. 2003; Brunetti and Weder 2003; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013). 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) also applies a more general model of corruption that highlights the role 
of legal and normative constraints as forces to control corruption, where these may also be 
seen as having parallel with horizontal and social accountability, respectively. Additionally, a 
number of studies alludes to how these different dimensions may impact, or reinforce, one 
another (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2012; Grimes 2013; Kalenborn and Lessmann 2012; 
Mainwaring and Welna 2003; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006a; Zhang 2016). 
This discussion can also be directly related to long-standing theoretical approaches to the 
study of corruption, based on a principal-agent model. This perspective highlights the agency 
relationship between voters and elected officials, whereby the former, in the role of principal, 
entrust the latter, as agents, with power to make decisions on behalf of their interests, in 
order to achieve a set of preferred outcomes determined by the principal (Kitschelt et al. 2009; 
Lancaster and Montinola 1997; Rose-Ackerman 1978). Corruption thus constitutes a violation 
of the obligation taken by the agent to act according to the principal’s interests. The general 
principal-agent framework has been applied by several authors in the analysis of corruption 
and anti-corruption policies (Klitgaard 1988; Klitgaard et al. 2000; Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-
Ackerman 1999). From this model’s perspective, strengthening accountability by reducing the 
information asymmetry between principal and agent is a key element to fighting corruption, 
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and can be achieved through active and investigative media, increased transparency in the 
public administration, and improved detection and punishment of corruption. 
The framework discussed here aims to re-define an effect of different dimensions of 
democracy on corruption as corresponding mainly to an effect of electoral, social and 
horizontal mechanisms of accountability. This structure helps to address some conceptual and 
empirical gaps observed in the literature on democracy and corruption. Firstly, this approach 
lies on a clear conceptualization of democracy that puts accountability as a central element, in 
line with several contributions in the democracy literature, but at the same time providing for 
a nuanced discussion of its components and their respective consequences. Secondly, this 
framework allows us to examine more closely the individual impact of these components on 
corruption and to directly test the functioning of several mechanisms that are discussed in the 
literature, instead of only assuming their existence and effectiveness. In contrast to existing 
analyses based on aggregated indicators of democracy, this enables us to advance in 
understanding how and why democracy may affect corruption and in disentangling the effects 
of different mechanisms. Finally, efforts to document concrete indicators of effective electoral, 
social and horizontal accountability are an important contribution to innovation in the 
measurement of democracy and to providing more body to the concept of accountability, 
which has so far remained very abstract in the literature. Certainly, an attempt to develop such 
indicators also implies significant empirical challenges, especially for the purpose of 
comparative analyses, but some resources for initial endeavors in this direction already exist. 
Unfortunately, it must be acknowledged that redirecting the analysis of democracy and 
corruption towards a focus on dimensions of accountability cannot circumvent the issue of 
endogeneity referred to earlier. All three dimensions of accountability can theoretically be 
affected by corruption in ways that jeopardize their effectiveness in producing the 
hypothesized negative effect on corrupt behavior. Therefore, empirical approaches making use 
of this framework should take that issue into account and devise strategies to minimize this 
obstacle for causal inference. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to demonstrate that the literature on democracy and corruption offers 
insights on a complex relationship, where multiple hypotheses and causal pathways for an 
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effect of the former on the latter are discussed. However, a solid conceptual foundation for 
the analysis of the potential mechanisms proposed is still missing. Insights from the literature 
on dimensions of accountability were discussed as potentially offering a framework to study 
this relationship in a more consistent way, by considering the impact of effective mechanisms 
of vertical (electoral and social) and horizontal accountability on corruption. 
The link between accountability and corruption is less trivial than it may appear, though. 
Considering the different dimensions of accountability poses interesting questions to the 
relative relevance of each dimension in contributing to reducing corruption in a democratic 
system. Are all of them necessary for control of corruption, or are some more important than 
others? Historical case studies of older democracies where a lower level of corruption is 
observed show that the biggest strides to reaching a low corruption equilibrium took place 
before the introduction of universal suffrage (Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011; Rose and Shin 2001; 
Rothstein 2011), for instance, which suggests that electoral accountability may not be 
necessary after all.  
Moreover, although the effect of electoral accountability remains a strong assumption in the 
literature, it still has to be examined empirically. A large part of the studies on the electoral 
effects of corruption scandals suggests that voters are not always likely to punish corrupt 
incumbents by removing them out of office, even in established democracies (see Jiménez and 
Caínzos 2004 for a review). At the same time, there are a few examples where voters appear 
to have sanctioned more strongly politicians accused of corruption (Chang et al. 2010; Ferraz 
and Finan 2008; Pereira et al. 2011). Therefore, the conditions under which electoral 
accountability is effectively exercised by voters against corrupt politicians still needs further 
examination. Similarly, additional research on the workings of horizontal and social 
accountability is required. 
At the same time, some studies also suggest that these three dimensions of accountability may 
interact with one another (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2012; Kalenborn and Lessmann 2012), 
but thorough analyses on how they may be associated are still scarce in the literature (see 
Mainwaring and Welna 2003 for a few contributions). Kunicová and Mattes (2006), for 
instance, argue that the effect of electoral competition has limitations, and that the “iron fist” 
of independent monitoring, either by other institutions, the press or civil society, is essential to 
motivate politicians to refrain from corruption. Therefore, there is much to learn about 
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whether the different dimensions of accountability complement or substitute each other in 
some cases, with regards to their impact on corruption. 
Furthermore, the analysis of these issues also implies empirical challenges in the 
documentation of good indicators of effective accountability, as to allow the systematic 
analysis of its effect on corruption. This adds to the already acknowledged challenges of 
devising better indicators of corruption to start with. 
In sum, several questions still need to be addressed for a better understanding of whether and 
how effective electoral, social and horizontal accountability may contribute to lowering 
corruption. This, of course, does not solve the larger puzzle of understanding what makes 
institutional mechanisms of accountability effective in the first place, but hopefully looking at 
the relationship between democracy and corruption from this perspective will help generate 
new insights for better-targeted and more effective anti-corruption policies. 
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Measuring political corruption from audit results: a new panel of 
Brazilian municipalities1 
 
Abstract 
Comparative research on corruption has always faced challenges on how to reliably measure 
this phenomenon. Indicators based on perceptions of or experience with corruption are the 
most common approaches, but these methods have also faced criticism regarding limitations to 
their conceptual and measurement validity. More recently, a number of scholars have sought 
to develop alternative, more objective measures of corruption. Following this line of research, 
this paper relies on audit reports from Brazilian municipalities to construct a concrete indicator 
of political corruption. The data collection exploits the setup of randomized multiple audit 
rounds to construct a unique panel of 140 municipalities, covering five administrative terms 
between 1997 and 2013. A first empirical application of the data is presented, testing the 
potential deterrent effect of electoral accountability on future corruption levels. 
 
Comparative research on corruption has always faced challenges on how to reliably measure 
this phenomenon. Given the generally obscure and secretive nature of corrupt transactions2, 
devising ways to quantify its occurrence is no easy task and usually involves some trade-offs. A 
prominent approach in the last two decades has been the development of aggregate 
perception-based indices, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) and the World Bank’s control of corruption measure, both publically available since the 
mid-1990s3. Indeed, cross-national comparative work on corruption has profited immensely 
from the availability of those indicators for a wide range of countries, which has contributed to 
an upsurge of studies in this field in recent years. However, such data sources have also 
encountered considerable criticism from scholars and practitioners alike: the aggregation of 
                                                          
1
 This article has been published online in the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research in 
February 2016, and in print in Volume 22, Issue 3, pp. 477–498 (September 2016). 
2
 This is naturally associated with the fact that corruption acts are most often illegal, but recent 
discussions have highlighted the existence of legal forms of corruption, understood as "abuses of public 
office or entrusted power for private gain", in explaining different patterns of corruption across 
countries (Kaufmann and Vicente 2011). The political influence of economic actors exercised through 
legal campaign financing is a good example of this (Johnston 2005). 
3
 These indices are largely based on the perceived frequency of corruption reported in different surveys 
of country experts, business people and citizens (Treisman 2007). 
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different sources leads to some conceptual imprecision, and the subjective nature of the 
indicators makes them vulnerable to other factors that may bias people’s opinions on how 
prevalent corruption is, resulting in that they may not accurately reflect the extent to which 
corruption is concretely occurring (Abramo 2007; Escresa and Picci 2015; Knack 2006; 
Treisman 2007). 
The latter argument against indicators of perceived corruption finds support in several 
analyses comparing them to alternative measures based on reported experience with 
corruption, usually drawn from surveys with citizens and business people, showing that these 
two types of corruption indicators indeed correlate poorly with one another in many cases 
(Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2010; Seligson 2006; cf. Charron 2015)4. One possible 
explanation for this divergence is that they are actually capturing different things: experience-
based surveys most often refer to direct experience with petty bribery in public services, and 
aggregate indicators may include perceptions of political corruption as well (Treisman 2007). 
On the other hand, there are claims that perception-based surveys may be considerably biased 
by respondents’ beliefs and characteristics (Olken 2009; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2010). 
At the same time, although experience-based measures may be less affected by opinion bias, 
they are likely to suffer some degree of response bias and underestimate corruption, since 
respondents tend to be reticent in admitting their involvement in a corrupt transaction 
(Escresa and Picci 2015; Kraay and Murrell 2013). Moreover, responses might not be fully 
comparable if individuals from different countries interpret questions differently (Treisman 
2007). 
In face of the drawbacks associated with those two approaches, scholars have sought to 
develop more objective measures of corruption, which can more precisely capture the 
concrete occurrence of corrupt transactions and at the same time offer stronger conceptual 
consistency by relying on narrower conceptualizations of this phenomenon. A few efforts in 
this direction have been made through different and innovative sources of data, such as micro-
surveys, expenditure-tracking or audit results (Brollo 2010; Escresa and Picci 2015; Ferraz and 
Finan 2008; Golden and Picci 2005; Olken 2007; Reinikka and Svensson 2006), but ensuring 
                                                          
4
 Another study that puts into question the validity of perception-based indicators is the analysis by 
Olken (2009), who finds discrepancies between corruption perceptions and a more concrete measure of 
corruption, based on an estimate of missing expenditures in the implementation of road projects in 
Indonesian villages. 
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sufficient case coverage for large-scale comparative analyses, especially at a cross-national 
level, remains a fundamental challenge to such approaches. As a result, most of the studies 
exploring such types of indicators resort to data at the sub-national level. 
This paper seeks to further contribute to this literature by presenting a novel data set of 
selected Brazilian municipalities. It draws on the results of a randomized federal audit program 
to compose an original panel of corruption levels covering up to five administrative terms 
during the period 1997-2013 in 140 municipalities. The data compiled aim to add to the 
repertoire of concrete corruption indicators in two main aspects. Firstly, it makes use of an 
existing and reliable source for longitudinal corruption data, which has not yet been explored 
in previous studies5. Secondly, it is based on information reflecting the occurrence of a specific 
type of corruption that is particularly difficult to measure empirically, namely political 
corruption, broadly understood as “[…] the behavior of public decision-makers where 
preferential treatment is provided to individuals and where narrow interests are advanced at 
the expense of the interests of broader segments of society” (Lambsdorff 2007, 82). 
Despite its limitation to a single country and the difficulty of replication in other settings, the 
data described here present several advantages when contrasted to other approaches to 
measuring corruption previously applied. They provide a “hard” corruption indicator that is not 
subject to some of the biases that may affect perception-based measures and 
experience/victimization surveys. Moreover, by exploiting information at the sub-national 
level they offer great potential for comparison across a large number of units. This has 
important advantages relative to cross-country comparisons, as sub-national entities share 
important commonalities at the macro-level that would otherwise need to be controlled for in 
a cross-national setting. At the same time, the sub-national level in Brazil presents 
considerable variation across municipalities on several different dimensions that may be 
correlated with corruption and to a large extent are comparable to variation on a cross-
national level. Finally, the randomized character of the audit program also makes it possible to 
avoid some potential pitfalls associated with selection bias in the sample, and the fact that all 
audits are conducted by the same external agency strengthens comparability across 
municipalities. 
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 Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) and Brollo (2010) have compiled corruption indicators from audit 
reports originating from the same audit program in Brazil, but did not employ the same panel structure. 
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The article is structured as follows: the next section describes the data sources, the procedure 
for data collection and the resulting data set; this is followed by an application of the data set 
in an empirical exercise analyzing the impact of electoral accountability on future corruption 
levels, and the final section concludes. 
 
Data collection and description 
In 2003, the Federal Comptroller’s Office (CGU) launched a large-scale program to audit the 
application of federal funds transferred to municipalities. Brazilian municipalities have, as a 
rule, very large portions of their budget financed through governmental transfers6. These 
finance a highly decentralized policy implementation system, either through so-called 
voluntary transfers, related to permanent federal programs in areas such as health and 
education and received as fixed monthly installments, or through specific co-financing grants 
for infra-structure and other large investment projects. Therefore, this level of the public 
administration gains particular relevance as a main locus for basic public service delivery in the 
country. In such a context, the CGU audit program emerged as a very promising initiative to 
complement other mechanisms of control and substantially improve monitoring of how public 
funds are used at the local level7. 
The municipalities to be audited are selected through a lottery system. Since it was introduced, 
the program has audited around 2000 municipalities in a universe of about 5,600 Brazilian 
municipalities, selected in a total of 40 lottery draws. Each lottery typically selects 60 
municipalities under a population threshold of 500,000 inhabitants8, with a pre-defined 
                                                          
6
 Based on data published by the National Treasury Department (STN) for 2012, a mean of 86% of 
municipal revenue comes from intergovernmental transfers (from both federal and state levels), and the 
share of transfers from the federal government reaches 48% on average. 
7
 As a rule, the jurisdiction for external oversight regarding municipal administrations lies with state-
based Courts of Accounts, which are responsible, among other things, for assessing and passing opinion 
on yearly financial and managerial reports submitted by each municipality. However, their effectiveness 
in performing this control function is often weakened by factors such as delays in the analysis of such 
reports, the limitation of audits to formal aspects and a considerable degree of politicization in the 
appointment of the Courts’ members, which reduces their independence as watchdogs (Arantes et al. 
2005; Loureiro et al. 2009; Weitz-Shapiro et al. 2015). 
8
 Earlier lottery rounds had slightly different rules, and the number of municipalities selected gradually 
increased from only 5 in the first edition to 26 in the second, 50 from the third to the ninth rounds, and 
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number of municipalities to be selected from each of the 26 states9, in order to keep some 
degree of proportionality. Once a municipality is selected, it is excluded from the pool for the 
three subsequent draws. The exact timing of the lottery is not previously known and is 
announced by the CGU only shortly prior to its taking place. 
For the compilation of the panel data set described here, the data collected focus on a sub-
sample of 227 municipalities that have been selected in at least two audit rounds, which offers 
the possibility to estimate corruption levels for those cases for at least two time periods. The 
time span considered includes the audits conducted until 2013, thus covering the first 38 audit 
rounds. Table 1 illustrates the distribution of audit rounds by year since the beginning of the 
program. 
 
Table 1. Number of audits by year 
Year Number of audits 
2003 7 
2004 7 
2005 5 
2006 3 
2007 3 
2008 2 
2009 3 
2010 3 
2011 2 
2012 2 
2013 1 
 
As the data collection effort described was undertaken with the objective of analyzing the 
relationship between corruption and electoral accountability, certain conditions considered 
necessary for the occurrence of electoral accountability were taken into account to further 
                                                                                                                                                                          
finally 60, which has been the standard since then. Also, the population threshold was 250,000 or 
300,000 in earlier rounds, and was eventually increased as well. 
9
 An exception is made with regards to one group of five less populated northern states, from which a 
total of two municipalities from two different states is selected in each round. 
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delimit the sample for which the corruption indicator was ultimately compiled10: (a) at least 
one election for municipal office took place between audits, and (b) the mayor in power during 
audit 1 ran for reelection–a narrow interpretation of electoral accountability–or, when this 
was not the case11, either a candidate from the same party, from a coalition party12, a relative 
of the mayor13 or a member of the administration (typically a cabinet member) was presented 
as candidate for succession–a broader interpretation of electoral accountability. Based on 
these criteria, 140 possible cases were identified to be included in the data set14. Although 
these constitute only a small portion of all Brazilian municipalities, this final sample still 
preserves some main characteristics in terms of the regional distribution, population size and 
development levels across the municipalities considered, with only small deviations when 
compared to the full universe of cases (see Table 17 in Appendix A), thus making it reasonably 
representative of the larger population of Brazilian municipalities. 
For those selected municipalities, a measure of corruption was extracted from the 
irregularities identified in the respective audits. Detailed audit reports describing the individual 
irregularities found by the auditors in each municipality are available on the CGU website15. 
These generally reflect the lack of formal compliance with federal regulations in the 
application of transferred funds, unsatisfactory quality in public service provision or the 
ineffectiveness of institutionalized social monitoring mechanisms. What is of particular interest 
for the development of a corruption indicator is the fact that the auditors often uncover cases 
of non-compliance that signal favoritism or even outright fraud in the use of public resources. 
                                                          
10
 The coding of the material is a relatively cumbersome process and, due to time and resource 
constraints, it was not possible to collect the data for the municipalities that did not fulfill these criteria. 
11
 In Brazil, mayors are elected for a four-year term and are allowed to run for only one consecutive 
term after that. They may run again only after a hiatus of four years in which another mayor has been in 
power. 
12
 This criterion could only be applied in the case of elections until 2004, as after that no data was 
available on electoral coalitions.  
13
 It is not uncommon in Brazilian municipalities for local politics to be marked by the dominance of 
certain political dynasties that remain in power for longer periods of time. In such cases, incumbent 
mayors that cannot be reelected often present a relative or even their spouse as a candidate to 
continue their “legacy” in office. 
14
 A few other cases were excluded in which audit 1 took place before an election, but its results were 
released only shortly before or after election day, since the relevant information about corruption could 
not have reached voters. Cases in which the relevant election had only one registered candidate were 
also disregarded. 
15
 http://sistemas.cgu.gov.br/relats/relatorios.php 
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Therefore, such violations can be seen as reflecting actual cases of corruption involving the 
municipal administration, and can be used as a measure to capture meaningful variation of 
corruption prevalence in the different municipalities audited.  
Following previous work that has used concrete indicators of corruption retrieved from the 
same sources (Brollo 2010; Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011), the data constructed here are based 
on the coding of irregularities related to procurement fraud, diversion of public funds, and 
over-invoicing as corruption violations. This emphasizes instances that may be characterized as 
political corruption, as the cases described generally involve decisions and administrative acts 
at higher levels of the local administration. Indeed, in several cases the involvement of cabinet 
members or mayors themselves is explicitly mentioned in the reports. Also for the subject of 
the empirical analysis presented later, this conceptualization of corruption is considered as 
more relevant for the study of a deterrent effect of electoral accountability on corruption. 
The coding procedure thus consisted of classifying the numerous situations described as 
irregularities by the auditors as pertaining (or not) to the three broader categories mentioned 
above. This step also used as initial reference the types of occurrences considered in the 
coding of corruption violations by Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) and Brollo (2010) 16. Cases of 
procurement fraud include, apart from instances of evident simulation or manipulation of 
tenders, situations in which procurement regulations were circumvented to avoid the required 
competitive awarding procedures (e.g. use of less competitive procedures when more 
competitive ones are legally required), restrict competition among potential bidders (e.g. 
excessive eligibility criteria, restricted publication of the call for bids) or favor particular 
suppliers and service providers (e.g. award to companies that did not fulfill all tender 
requirements, evidence of pre-selected winning bidders). Situations in which companies 
owned by members of the administration or their relatives were awarded public contracts 
were also considered as violations in this category, since this indicates favoritism as well17. 
                                                          
16
 Dozens of specific concrete situations exemplifying each category were identified in the coding. As 
they are not always explicitly related to the occurrence of corruption in the audit reports, the coding 
process included an inductive component as well, through which the different occurrences described by 
the auditors were considered as associated with corruption violations when at least part of the reports 
characterized them as linked to suspicions of fraud, favoritism, diversion or marked-up prices. A detailed 
list with all the types of occurrences considered in the classification of corruption violations can be 
obtained from the author. 
17
 Due to the conflict of interest associated with such cases, procurement legislation in Brazil (Law 
8666/1993) explicitly prohibits the hiring of companies owned by public officials employed in the 
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Instances of diversion of funds encompass, besides obvious embezzlement by authorities, 
cases where the provision of purchased goods or hired services did not take place or could not 
be confirmed/documented, the destination of payments could not be identified (e.g. payments 
without documented justification, irregular withdrawals from bank accounts) or evidence of 
fraud in payments or in the documentation of expenditures (e.g. forged/doctored invoices or 
receipts) was found. Over-invoicing refers largely to cases where goods were purchased or 
services hired at prices above market level, or when the municipal administration paid for 
higher amounts than what was actually delivered. 
The main corruption indicator computed for each municipality is based on a simple count18 of 
all individual instances of corruption identified in the audit reports, according to the 
classification listed above. It is important to highlight that the coding of corruption occurrences 
did not necessarily follow the same structure of the individual items as presented in the audit 
reports. This is because the documents are sometimes structured in a way that an item 
describing the findings actually includes information on multiple corruption instances of the 
same type, such as with cases of procurement fraud, where the irregularity described is often 
seen in several tenders conducted in a given program. Also, auditors may describe situations 
involving the combination of corruption situations from the different coding categories. The 
manipulation of procurement procedures is often associated with over-invoicing or fake 
invoices, for instance. In such cases, each instance was counted separately, in order to avoid 
measurement error and more accurately reflect the extent of corruption found in the 
municipality. This coding decision introduces some differences between the indicator 
estimated here and similar indicators used in earlier studies19.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
respective hiring agency, with the understanding that this implies potential access to privileged 
information and favoritism. Analogously, the jurisprudence of the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) has 
applied the same understanding to consider illegal the hiring of companies owned by relatives of public 
officials as well. 
18
 Previous studies (Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011) included the share of funds linked to corruption 
violations in the total amount of audited funds as an alternative measure of corruption. This was also 
calculated for the sample considered in this study, but was not used due to reliability and measurement 
error concerns, given that many of the reports do not include this information while describing some of 
the irregularities. 
19
 Ferraz and Finan (2011), for instance, find the mean number of irregularities per municipality to be 
around 2.5, and Brollo (2010) estimates 1.8 as the mean number of violations in her sample. The data 
collected for the present study, on the other hand, finds the mean number of corruption violations for 
all audited periods at 8.4. 
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Naturally, one potential caveat regarding the measurement validity and reliability of an audit-
based corruption indicator is related to limitations in the auditors’ ability to uncover such 
corruption cases, and whether this systematically varies across the observations in the sample. 
On the one hand, it is certainly the case that auditors are not able to identify all corruption 
instances that may have occurred in a given administration, therefore some degree of 
measurement error is unavoidable in this context. On the other hand, even if the indicator 
presented cannot capture the full extent of corruption in the municipalities examined, two 
factors contribute to strengthening its validity as a means for comparison across the units in 
the sample. Firstly, all audits are conducted by auditors from the same external agency, 
managed by the federal government. Even though they are stationed at the respective state-
based offices of this agency, they are recruited through a national examination procedure, 
thus guaranteeing a good degree of comparability in their qualifications. Secondly, the 
methods and resources applied by the auditors in verifying the use of federal funds in the 
different municipalities follow the same standards and guidelines, and do not focus only on 
formal compliance with federal legislation, but also include a more thorough investigation of 
the administrative procedures conducted in the municipality. Taken together, these factors 
contribute to increase our confidence in the comparability of the indicator across the different 
municipalities. 
In order to take full advantage of the longitudinal characteristic of the data, the coding 
procedure takes as reference the four-year administrative terms partially or fully covered by 
the different audits. The resulting data set consists of a panel including five administrative 
periods: 1997-2000 (prior to the audit program, but partly covered by the audits in some 
municipalities), 2001-2004, 2005-2008, 2009-2012 and 2013-. The time periods are coded in 
two ways: chronologically and relative to the occurrence of audit 1, in order to take into 
account that the audits occurred at different points in time and with different intervals 
between each audit in the different municipalities. This is done as follows: the period in which 
audit 1 took place receives a value of 0 (T(0)); periods prior to this reference period are coded 
with negative sequential numbers going back in time, and the subsequent periods are coded 
also sequentially with positive values. This relative coding is used to define the sample used in 
the empirical application presented later. 
As the reports often refer to more than one administrative term, some periods are covered by 
more than one audit. Therefore, for each period the corruption level calculated is the sum of 
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all violations associated with that period uncovered in the different audits. For each of the 140 
municipalities, the corruption measure produced thus includes an estimate for at least two of 
the five possible periods, resulting in a total of 437 observations in the data set as a whole. 
Table 2 displays the distribution of these observations across the five time periods. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of observations with audit coverage across time periods 
Time period Narrow sample Broad sample 
  Observations % coverage Observations % coverage 
1 (1997-2000) 33 32% 53 38% 
2 (2001-2004) 92 90% 129 92% 
3 (2005-2008) 98 96% 134 96% 
4 (2009-2012) 78 76% 107 76% 
5 (2013- ) 13 13% 14 10% 
Total 314  437  
 
Two additional variables were coded from the reports, in order to capture variation in the 
range and temporal scope of audited programs. For each audit, a number of service orders 
were issued corresponding to specific federal programs and projects for which funds were 
transferred to the municipal administration. This information was computed in the data set for 
each period considered and, similarly to the corruption data, the number of service orders 
issued for different audit rounds but covering the same administrative period was combined. 
Regarding the time scope, each audit tends to focus on the two previous years, but funds 
related to some projects executed in earlier years are often also audited. Data on the time 
scope of the audits were included in the data set as the number of years in each period that 
was covered by any of the audits20. Since each administrative period has four years, this 
variable ranges from 0 to 4. 
These two indicators are considered essential for inferential purposes about the corruption 
levels observed in the different municipalities. Intuitively it is to be expected that the larger 
the scope of the audit work, the higher the likelihood that the auditors will find corruption 
violations, all else being equal. This is confirmed for the full sample across all audited periods, 
                                                          
20
 The coding for this variable was based on the time periods mentioned in association with each of the 
service orders covered in the reports, complemented by data from Portal da Transparência 
(http://transparencia.gov.br/convenios/) on co-financing grants implemented in the municipalities. 
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where the number of corruption violations correlates at 0.42 with the number of service 
orders and at 0.37 with the number of years covered by the audit in each period. In fact, in the 
econometric models explored later these two variables are among the most robust predictors 
of corruption levels, even after the inclusion of the independent variable of interest and 
several additional controls. 
 
Data description 
A more detailed look at the resulting indicator provides interesting insights about the 
prevalence of local corruption in Brazil. Considering the individual observations in the data set 
for each period covered by any of the audits conducted in the different municipalities, in only 
71 out of the 437 (16.2%) no single corruption violation was identified. However, if we look at 
the different periods per municipality, all 140 municipalities had at least one corruption 
violation uncovered in any of the periods for which the data was collected. This indicates that 
political corruption, at least in the form of the three categories of violations considered for 
composing the indicator, is a very widespread phenomenon at this level of the public 
administration in Brazil. 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the number of corruption violations per period for all 
437 observations in the data set. As we can see, there is considerable variation in the level of 
corruption identified, with the number of violations ranging between 0 and 60. At the same 
time, the indicator is heavily skewed toward lower values, with a mean of approximately 8.4 
and a median of 5 violations, and about two thirds of the observations present values below 
the mean. 
Considering the three different categories of violations included in the indicator, procurement 
fraud is by far the most common type, with an average 5.1 violations, whereas diversion of 
funds and over-invoicing have a mean of 1.8 and 1.5 violations, respectively. This certainly 
results from the coding decision of counting individual procurement procedures as separate 
corruption violations, but it also reflects a substantive characteristic of how such corruption 
practices occur in Brazilian municipalities: cases of procurement irregularities appear to be 
often associated with the replication of the same corruption “techniques” across several 
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tenders conducted in a given municipality21, revealing some sort of learning effect in corrupt 
administrations22. Even though instances of procurement fraud are the most numerous, in the 
majority of municipalities–91 of the 140 in the sample–all three types of corruption violations 
were found across the different periods, also reflecting that different forms of corrupt 
practices are usually combined in order to extract rents from the municipal administration. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of the number of corruption violations per period 
 
  
                                                          
21
 Interestingly, this is not necessarily limited to single municipalities, and in a few cases the replicated 
“techniques” indicate the functioning of more organized corruption schemes extending to several 
municipalities or even regions. In the sample at hand, for instance, a similar practice of procurement 
fraud with restricted competition in the award of school transportation services, combined with blatant 
over-invoicing in the contract amounts, is visible in almost all the municipalities in the state of Ceará. In 
another state, Rio Grande do Norte, one of the audit reports makes explicit mention to a parallel 
investigation that uncovered an accounting firm responsible for fabricating documents of simulated 
tenders with fake firms in multiple municipalities. An even larger case of fraud in the purchase of 
ambulances, which became know nationwide in 2006 as the Sanguessugas (“Leeches”) scandal, was 
uncovered after the CGU audits found evidence of fraud in tenders favoring the same group of 
companies in municipalities of several states. 
22
 Actually, this learning effect is not restricted to cases of procurement fraud. A similar replication 
pattern can be observed in many cases with the other kinds of violations as well, where the same 
corruption practices are often used in the application of funds from different programs. 
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We can also observe some regional differences in the level of corruption found across 
municipalities. Brazil’s 26 states are divided into five main regions: North (N), Northeast (NE), 
Southeast (SE), South (S) and Center-West (CO). This division reflects a number of essential 
geographic, demographic and cultural differences, in addition to different patterns in social-
economic indicators (see Table 18 in Appendix A). Since several of these factors may be related 
to the occurrence of corruption, similar discrepancies appear when we compare the extent of 
corruption across all five regions, as illustrated in Table 3. The mean number of corruption 
violations is the highest in the Northeast–which is also the poorest and least developed region 
in the country–, with 11.6 violations, significantly higher than the sample mean at the 95% 
confidence level. The northern region also presents higher levels of corruption on average in 
comparison to the full sample. The Southeastern and Southern regions, which include the most 
economically developed areas in Brazil, display much lower numbers of corruption violations–
4.0 and 3.3, respectively–, and these are statistically significantly distinct from the means 
observed in the North and Northeast. 
 
Table 3. Corruption violations by region 
Region Municipalities Observations Mean corruption violations 95% confidence interval 
North 21 66 9.5 6.6 12.3 
Northeast 63 197 11.6 9.9 13.4 
Southeast 23 69 4.0 2.7 5.3 
South 20 60 3.3 2.3 4.2 
Center-West 13 45 6.0 3.9 8.1 
Total 140 437 8.4 7.4 9.4 
 
These regional corruption patterns, to the extent that they are paralleled by regional 
differences in the level of development as well, constitute a first indication for the construct 
validity of the corruption measure presented here, as the variation that it reflects across the 
sampled municipalities appears to corroborate a negative association between corruption 
levels and development indicators already identified in the cross-national literature (e.g 
Treisman 2000, 2007). Analyzing this more systematically, we see that the number of 
corruption violations identified for each observation in the data set indeed presents a 
statistically significant negative correlation with some development indicators, such as 
municipal GDP per capita, municipal HDI and literacy rate (see Table 19 in Appendix A). This 
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holds for both the absolute number of violations and its log transformation. If we extract the 
variation in the corruption indicator that is explained by the audit scope indicators, this same 
correlation (though somewhat weaker in the case of the municipal HDI) is still observed. Given 
that no alternative corruption measures for Brazilian municipalities are available for further 
verification of the indicator’s validity, the association with these other factors in the expected 
direction contributes to offer additional support that the corruption measure presented here is 
likely capturing real corruption variation at the sub-national level in Brazil. 
As reflected in this brief description of the corruption data collected, the context of Brazilian 
municipalities offers valuable variation for comparative analyses not only in the extent to 
which corruption occurs, but also in terms of other relevant factors characterizing the different 
regions and individual municipalities. This variation is explored in the next section in an 
application of the data set, where the potential role of electoral accountability as a deterrent 
to corrupt behavior is analyzed. 
 
Electoral accountability as a deterrent to corruption: an empirical application 
As a first application of the data set described above, the empirical exercise presented in this 
section seeks to estimate the effect of electoral accountability on future levels of corruption. 
Several studies have examined the impact of democracy on corruption (Bäck and Hadenius 
2008; Lederman et al. 2005; Pellegata 2012; Saha 2008; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000; Serra 
2004; Sung 2004; Treisman 2000), and electoral accountability emerges as the main causal 
mechanism described to explain a consistently negative association between stronger and 
older democratic institutions and lower corruption levels: the anticipation of punishment by 
voters at the ballot box should induce incumbent politicians to be more responsive towards 
voters’ interests and refrain from corruption. 
Direct empirical evidence on whether we can indeed observe the predicted deterrent effect of 
electoral accountability on corruption is still limited, and the emerging literature presents 
ambiguous results. Some studies find indirect evidence supporting the mechanism described 
above, i.e. the potential for electoral accountability in the future seems to be associated with 
lower corruption in the present (Bobonis et al. 2012; Ferraz and Finan 2011). However, 
whether this effect is sustainable over time and indeed contributes to explain the apparent 
long-term benefits of democratization on corruption levels remains unclear, and the existing 
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comparative literature has so far failed to find evidence to corroborate this argument (Bobonis 
et al. 2012; Crisp et al. 2014). 
The empirical analysis developed here attempts to further examine the impact of electoral 
accountability on future corruption with the newly collected data on Brazilian municipalities. 
The Brazilian local context offers a good setting for studying this question. Due to mandatory 
voting, political participation at the local level is strong and turnout rates have remained above 
80% in the last municipal elections. Moreover, studies on voter behavior in Brazil have shown 
that voters’ decisions at the local level are strongly driven by the retrospective evaluation of 
the incumbent mayor, with issues and political alliances at the state and national levels having 
limited influence in the outcome of municipal disputes (Almeida 2008; Lavareda and Telles 
2011). Therefore, this particular environment appears to offer favorable conditions for the 
exercise of electoral accountability by voters. 
The analysis presented below tests the following hypothesis:  
H1: Future levels of corruption will be lower in municipalities where the previous 
mayor/administration involved in corruption was voted out of office. 
As already implied in the formulation above, the operationalization of electoral accountability 
is drawn from actual electoral results and seeks to reflect whether mayors whose 
administration had corruption violations uncovered in audit 1 were effectively sanctioned by 
voters in the subsequent election. Based on electoral records from the Superior Electoral Court 
(TSE), for each period this variable takes a value of 0 if the previous incumbent 
mayor/administration was successful in the reelection bid and a value of 1 if they were 
defeated by a challenger. As an alternative indicator for a robustness check, the change in vote 
share obtained by the former mayor/administration relative to the previous election was also 
used. 
In addition to the main independent variable of interest, the empirical analysis controls for 
other factors that may exercise confounding effects on corruption. Basic municipal 
characteristics such as municipal area, the year the municipality was founded, total population, 
percentage of urban population, percentage of literate population and municipal GDP are 
available from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). Alternatively, a 
municipal Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) office based on 2000 and 2010 Census data is considered as a measure of 
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development. Its education component is used as another measure for educational 
attainment. The presence of radio stations in the municipality was also included as a proxy for 
voters’ access to information (Ferraz and Finan 2011). Regional dummies are considered to 
control for remaining unobserved regional discrepancies23. Other variables attempt to capture 
variation in the level of rents available in each municipality: percentage of intergovernmental 
transfers and the percentage of natural resource royalties in total municipal revenue, both 
calculated as period averages based on yearly data available from the STN; period averages of 
GDP growth (calculated based on yearly data published by IBGE); and the share of municipal 
employees selected exclusively through direct appointments, as a proxy for patronage through 
the use of public positions as resources for corruption. 
Additional political factors are also taken into consideration: the mayor’s margin of victory, as 
a proxy for the level of electoral competition, the share of seats held by the mayor’s party in 
the local legislative chamber, whether mayors are in their first or second consecutive term, 
and the amount of campaign funds raised by the mayor in power in the previous election. 
Finally, mayor-specific characteristics such as gender and education, their level of political 
experience and whether they are affiliated to the party in the federal government are also 
considered as potential confounders. 
The sample used in the analysis below considers 130 of the 140 municipalities included in the 
data set. This slight reduction in sample size is due to the application of an additional criterion 
to define the sample, namely the identification of corruption violations in audit 1, since this is 
assumed as a pre-condition for the occurrence of electoral accountability based on the 
availability of corruption information from the pre-electoral audit. Two alternative samples are 
used in the estimations: a “narrow” sample including 93 municipalities with mayors running 
for reelection, and a “broad” sample of all 130 municipalities with both incumbent mayors and 
successor candidates disputing the municipal Executive24. The summary statistics for all the 
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 More importantly, regional fixed-effects may also capture unobserved cultural differences that cannot 
be accounted for by the other indicators available. 
24
 The latter is based on a broader interpretation of electoral accountability where politicians may face a 
longer time horizon, and even if incumbent mayors themselves are not directly eligible for reelection, 
they still have a stake in their party’s or political group’s remaining in power. Therefore, they may still 
face some incentives to refrain from corruption in order to improve the chances of that group’s securing 
another term in office. 
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observations available for the sample and all the variables included in the models are 
presented in Table 20 in Appendix A. 
The analysis was conducted with a pooled cross-section regression including all available time 
periods after audit 1, i.e. after period T(0). The objective here is to verify whether future levels 
of corruption are substantially lower in municipalities that have experienced effective electoral 
accountability in the previous period25. Table 4 presents the results for both the narrow and 
the broad samples with different model specifications, including distinct groups of controls. 
The dependent variable used in the estimation was log-transformed, given that the original 
variable is heavily skewed, creating difficulties for estimation through linear regression26. 
The coefficient for the effect of electoral accountability is mainly negative, as expected by the 
hypothesis formulated, with the exception of the fully specified model for the broad sample. 
However, in none of the models is the estimated effect statistically significant at conventional 
confidence levels. A verification of variance inflation factors for the electoral accountability 
variable shows that these estimates are not explained by inflated standard errors due to high 
collinearity. These results thus show no support for statistically significant lower corruption 
outcomes in municipalities where accountability is more effective. 
  
                                                          
25
 An alternative approach to estimating the effect of electoral accountability on corruption over time 
would be to observe the change in corruption levels across periods. However, this would be associated 
with endogeneity problems, because corruption in the period before the election is expected to be 
affected ex ante by the probably of electoral accountability in the future. The use of future corruption 
levels, i.e. corruption after the occurrence of accountability as a dependent variable has the objective of 
minimizing endogeneity concerns, since future corruption is posterior to the occurrence of electoral 
accountability and arguably does not affect it ex ante. 
26
 The same models presented in Table 4 were also tested with the original (not log-transformed) values 
for corruption violations. However, even with robust estimation the observed residuals in all models are 
not normally distributed, as generally assumed in linear regression. Moreover, all models do not pass a 
Ramsey test for omitted variables, which indicates that there are problems with model fit regarding the 
functional form. In addition to linear regression, Poisson and negative binomial regression with the 
original variable were tested as well, given the count nature of the corruption indicator. Nevertheless, 
those models were also found to offer an inadequate fit, with the exception of the negative binomial 
model with the broad sample, the only one to indicate a correct link function for the data structure. In 
any case, none of these models show a statistically significant effect of electoral accountability on 
corruption. The results for the fully specified models are reported in Table 21 in Appendix A. 
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Table 4. Regression models with log number of corruption violations as dependent variable 
 
Narrow sample Broad sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
EA previous mayor -0.213 -0.137 -0.245 -0.193 -0.0743 0.226 
 
(0.185) (0.182) (0.232) (0.138) (0.122) (0.198) 
       Observations 95 94 94 156 154 154 
R-squared 0.241 0.505 0.639 0.309 0.530 0.598 
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Mayor controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. 
Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include 
region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal 
revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of 
foundation, log % of municipal employees directly appointed, log municipal area, GDP growth and local 
radio presence. Mayor characteristics include, gender, education level, previous political experience, 
affiliation to federal government party, margin of victory, legislative support, log campaign revenue and 
term in office (only in models 4-6). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
In order to check the robustness of these results, an analysis of dfbetas was conducted for the 
fully specified models, and some very influential observations with dfbetas above one standard 
error were identified. However, even after their exclusion from the models, the results are not 
substantially altered, and electoral accountability continues to display no statistically 
significant effect on future corruption levels. A separate robustness check was conducted 
replacing the binary measure for electoral accountability with an alternative indicator, namely 
the change in vote share experienced by the incumbent mayor/administration in the previous 
period. Similarly, these models also fail to present evidence for a deterrent effect of 
accountability on future corruption. The results of these additional analyses are shown in Table 
22 and Table 23 in Appendix A. 
Based on this empirical exercise, we thus conclude that the data at hand do not offer support 
to the hypothesized negative effect of electoral accountability on future corruption levels. The 
results echo previous studies that also failed to find evidence for a sustained effect of electoral 
accountability on corruption over time (Bobonis et al. 2012; Crisp et al. 2014), at least in the 
short term.  
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Conclusion 
This paper aims to make a contribution to the empirical literature on corruption by introducing 
an original panel data set of political corruption in Brazilian municipalities, based on 
information resulting from a randomized audit program conducted by the federal government 
in Brazil. The data collected explore a rich source for longitudinal corruption information to 
compose a concrete corruption indicator reflecting variation in the occurrence of corruption at 
the municipal level in Brazil. In doing so, the paper follows previous researchers that have 
made an effort to develop objective measures of corruption as an alternative to perception- 
and experience-based approaches relying on cross-national survey data, in particular by 
exploring novel sources of corruption information at the sub-national level. 
The data collection effort described here also sought to address another central issue related 
to the measurement of corruption, namely the need for measurement strategies that take into 
account the existence of diverse forms of corruption. Together with more refined and nuanced 
conceptual discussions on different types of corruption, the development of corruption 
indicators capturing more specific manifestations of this phenomenon is an important step to 
generate increased inferential leverage in the analysis of a number of empirical questions that 
remain open in the existing literature. This matter is of the utmost relevance in the study of 
corruption and its causes and consequences, in particular considering that different types of 
corruption may be explained by different mechanisms and may have different implications for 
society. 
In the case of the data gathered in this study, for instance, the indicator compiled focuses on 
the occurrence of some types of political corruption that were found to be prevalent in the 
context at hand. Based on the audit material used to produce the indicator, the corruption 
violations considered encompass situations that at least implicitly–and also often explicitly–
involve decisions from occupants of higher office in the respective municipal administrations. 
The empirical application presented in the previous section sought to take advantage of the 
higher conceptual congruence between the corruption measure developed and theoretical 
arguments about how corruption levels are expected to be affected by incentives of political 
actors, in order to re-examine a recurring hypothesis on the deterrent effect of electoral 
accountability on corrupt behavior. Similarly, this indicator could be further explored for more 
sound analyses of how several other factors may impact or be impacted by corruption 
measured specifically in relation to the behavior of political officials. 
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The data presented here also illustrate some of the advantages of relying on sub-national units 
for comparative purposes (Snyder 2001). The richness of the data on Brazilian municipalities 
makes the setting explored in this analysis a favorable universe of cases for the study of the 
relationship between corruption and a number of other factors for which reliable indicators 
are available from different sources27. Additionally, at the same time that the sub-national 
comparison helps strengthen the internal validity of the analysis by holding some factors 
constant at the macro-level, the considerable degree of variation found on several dimensions 
across the municipalities in the sample is to a large extent similar to that observed on a cross-
national setting, which to a certain degree contributes to also improve the external validity of 
the results for other contexts and levels of analysis. Moreover, the Brazilian case exemplifies 
how the occurrence of corruption may vary significantly within a single country, and how the 
collection of corruption data at the sub-national level may be extremely informative for 
furthering our understanding of this phenomenon beyond the lens of cross-national 
comparisons alone. 
Finally, this data make an effort to incorporate a temporal dimension in the measurement of 
corruption by exploring a data source that offers potential for more refined panel analyses in 
the future. Naturally, these data still have a limited time frame, and the empirical exercise 
developed above could only take into account a relatively short time horizon in examining the 
impact of one potential determinant of corruption levels. Nevertheless, even in the presence 
of such constraints the use of panel data in this line of research could offer stronger inferences 
on the causes of this phenomenon and produce new insights with policy relevance in the field 
of anti-corruption interventions. Even though there are important challenges regarding the 
availability of longitudinal data on corruption, especially for the elaboration of objective 
measures, further steps to explore and generate indicators allowing the analysis of corruption 
patterns over time are much needed to complement other existing survey-based indicators. 
Along with the other issues mentioned above, this remains an essential part of the agenda for 
future scholarly work in this field. 
                                                          
27
 The recent literature on corruption in Brazil has seen the emergence of a number of studies exploiting 
the availability of the audit-based corruption data in the examination of the relationship between 
corruption and several other factors. A few examples include studies on the impact of e-government 
(Vieira 2012), participatory mechanisms of oversight (Vieira 2014), increased government transfers 
(Brollo et al. 2013) and gender (Brollo and Troiano 2015) on corruption and mismanagement at the 
municipal level. 
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Accountability as a deterrent to corruption: new data from Brazilian 
municipalities 
 
Abstract 
Democracy has been highlighted in the comparative empirical literature as a strong 
determinant of corruption, explained mainly by the expected effect of different accountability 
mechanisms as deterrents of corrupt behavior. Although some authors point to an association 
between those mechanisms and lower corruption levels, there is little evidence on whether this 
effect subsists over time. This paper exploits the setup of multiple audit rounds conducted in 
randomly selected Brazilian municipalities to further assess the effect of accountability on 
future corruption levels. It aims to contribute to the emerging empirical literature on this field 
by employing a unique panel of 130 municipalities including a corruption measure compiled 
from the audit results and original indicators of effective electoral, social and horizontal 
accountability. Difference-in-differences and panel estimations are used, as well as alternative 
identification strategies to handle a potential endogeneity bias associated with the estimated 
effect of electoral accountability. In line with a few recent studies, we do not find any robust 
evidence that effective accountability contributes to lower future corruption. 
 
Democracy has been highlighted in the comparative literature as an important determinant of 
corruption. Numerous studies have found longer democratic experience and stronger 
democratic institutions to be consistently associated with lower levels of corruption (Bäck and 
Hadenius 2008; Lederman et al. 2005; Pellegata 2012; Saha et al. 2014; Sandholtz and Koetzle 
2000; Serra 2004; Sung 2004; Treisman 2000). Three main arguments are most commonly 
raised to explain this negative association between the two phenomena. The first and most 
prominent mechanism described refers to electoral incentives: as incumbents anticipate being 
punished by voters at the next election, they are induced to refrain from corrupt behavior in 
order to increase their chances of reelection. Secondly, the role of democratic freedoms of 
information, association and expression in enabling the monitoring of governments by society 
is discussed, in particular linked to the emergence of a free press. Thirdly, the role of control 
institutions that serve to put a check on the government is emphasized as well. 
These three causal pathways can be interpreted as directly linked to different dimensions of 
accountability discussed in the literature on democratic accountability. Accountability implies 
“[…] subjecting power to the threat of sanctions; obliging it to be exercised in transparent 
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ways; and forcing it to justify its acts” (Schedler 1999, 14). Particularly relevant here is the 
discussion of O’Donnell (1994, 1999) on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
accountability. The vertical dimension has two components: when exercised through elections, 
it is referred to as electoral accountability (O’Donnell 1999), and when manifested through 
social demands and monitoring by the media, it can be considered as “social accountability” 
(Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006a). Horizontal accountability, in turn, refers to 
“[…] the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually 
willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or 
impeachment in relation to actions of omissions by other agents of the state that may be 
qualified as unlawful.” (O’Donnell 1999, 38) 
Although the arguments linking these three forms of accountability to corruption are common 
in the literature, direct empirical evidence on whether they indeed produce the predicted 
effect on corruption outcomes is still limited, and the few studies that have examined this 
question raise doubts about their efficacy in deterring corrupt behavior. In the case of 
electoral accountability, the still emerging literature shows ambiguous results: while some 
studies find that the threat of punishment by voters is associated with less corruption in some 
cases (Bobonis et al. 2012; Ferraz and Finan 2011), others show findings in the opposite 
direction (Pereira et al. 2009) or suggest that this effect is not sustained over time (Bobonis et 
al. 2012; Crisp et al. 2014). For horizontal accountability, some evidence for an effect of judicial 
independence (Camaj 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011) and increased external control (Avis et 
al. 2016; Olken 2007; Zamboni Filho 2011) exist, but this may also be weakened in the long run 
if actors can adapt their behavior to less detectable forms of rent-seeking (Olken 2007). Finally, 
the case for a significant impact of social accountability seems to be stronger in the case of 
media presence and freedom (Adsera et al. 2003; Brunetti and Weder 2003; Ferraz and Finan 
2011; Grimes 2013), but less conclusive regarding the monitoring role of civil society (Olken 
2007), which may be conditional on the existence of a favorable institutional context (Grimes 
2013). 
Building upon this line of research, this paper further explores whether the different 
accountability mechanisms suggested in the literature can be empirically associated with lower 
levels of corruption. One of the aims proposed here is to contribute to a more systematic 
analysis of how these dimensions independently and simultaneously impact corruption. This 
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angle of analysis has been seldom explored1 and is particularly relevant in light of arguments 
regarding how these dimensions of accountability may affect one another (Mainwaring and 
Welna 2003; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006a), which raises questions about potential 
confounding effects of the different dimensions of accountability if they are not adequately 
modeled. Additionally, the analysis focuses on whether effective accountability affects future 
corruption levels, i.e. whether its deterrent effects are sustainable over time, taking as 
background the overarching discussions and findings about the long-term impact of democracy 
on corruption. For this purpose, the empirical strategy exploits the unique setup of multiple 
randomized audits conducted in Brazilian municipalities. Finally, the paper seeks to make an 
empirical contribution by further developing a concrete measure of corruption based on audit 
results, complemented by original data on the functioning of accountability at the local level in 
Brazil. 
The next section of this paper reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on 
accountability and corruption. The subsequent parts describe the methodological approach 
and the data collection and present the empirical results. The final section concludes and 
discusses the implications for further research. 
 
Theory and previous empirical evidence 
The connection between accountability and corruption can be derived mainly from the 
political agency literature, with a strong focus on how electoral accountability creates 
incentives for political actors in office to be more responsive to voters’ preferences (Manin et 
al. 1999). The general theoretical framework is based on an agency relationship between 
voters and elected officials, whereby the former, in the role of principal, entrust the latter, as 
agents, with power to make decisions on behalf of their interests (Kitschelt et al. 2009; 
Lancaster and Montinola 1997; Rose-Ackerman 1978). 
Under the assumptions that politicians seek to maximize their own utility and that this may 
often conflict with the interests of the electorate, the information asymmetry between the 
                                                          
1
 One recent exception is a study by Avis et al. (2016), which attempts to disentangle the corruption-
reducing effects from elections and from non-electoral mechanisms such as external audits and legal 
sanctions. 
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two allows the former to betray their representative mandate and pursue their own interests 
without the knowledge of voters. Corruption thus constitutes an example of how agents can 
violate their obligation of acting according to the principal’s interests, and in connection with 
this framework is commonly conceptualized as the misuse of public or entrusted power for 
private gain (Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1999). At the same time, elections give voters 
an opportunity to replace corrupt incumbents, which in turn should give politicians incentives 
to refrain from corruption while in office in order to avoid losing their position in the next 
elections.  
What determines agents’ decisions to pursue their own interests instead of the electorate’s is 
a calculation of the probability of facing the potential costs of corruption against the benefits 
that it would bring (Andvig et al. 2000). In all its forms, the sanctioning component of 
accountability mechanisms implies potential costs that may offset those benefits. In the case 
of electoral accountability, this entails the risk of losing office, should information on the 
malfeasance of agents become available to voters (Andvig et al. 2001; Kolstad and Wiig 2016; 
Lambsdorff 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1999). 
The logic of a deterrent effect through social and horizontal accountability mechanisms is very 
similar. Although social accountability does not involve strict formal sanctions, the watchdog 
role of civil society and the media may involve reputational costs for politicians (Grant and 
Keohane 2005; Philp 2009). Moreover, social accountability agents can contribute to electoral 
accountability by exposing information on wrongdoing that potentially influences voter 
behavior, and to horizontal accountability by activating formal mechanisms and institutions to 
redress abuses by office holders (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006a, l. 148). Horizontal 
accountability, in turn, can lead to formal penalties for office misconduct, ranging from 
administrative sanctions to criminal sentences. Thus the anticipation of costs from these 
different mechanisms of accountability, and an assessment of their respective probabilities, 
can all produce similar incentives that serve to ex ante discipline politicians and constrain 
corruption. 
In recent years some empirical studies have sought to identify more concretely the effect of 
these mechanisms on corruption. Ferraz and Finan (2011) look specifically at the impact of 
electoral accountability by indirectly modeling the effect of reelection incentives on corruption 
in Brazilian municipalities. A common prediction derived from political agency models is that 
the deterrent effect of electoral accountability should be present only when reelection 
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incentives exist, i.e. this mechanism should not impact incumbents facing term limits. The 
authors compare corruption levels2 across municipalities with first- and second-term mayors, 
as the latter cannot run for reelection in the Brazilian system. They find on average 27% less 
corruption under first-term mayors, and these results are robust to different specifications, 
indicators and alternative explanations. Pereira et al. (2009) conduct a similar test of this 
hypothesis, also using concrete measures of corruption derived from audits conducted by the 
State Audit Court of Pernambuco. In their sample of 184 municipalities from that state, 
however, they find that first-term mayors engage in more corruption than their lame-duck 
counterparts, contradicting the deterrence hypothesis. 
Bobonis et al. (2012) also analyze the impact of electoral accountability indirectly, using the 
release of information on corruption before and after an election to capture this effect. They 
exploit the setting of an audit program for municipalities in Puerto Rico to verify whether 
incumbent mayors that have their municipality audited in the period before an election have 
incentives to engage in less corruption than mayors whose municipalities are audited only 
after the election3. The main assumption is that voters’ behavior can be affected by the audit 
results only if they are disclosed before the election. They find that the pre-electoral disclosure 
of audit results is associated with 67% less corruption. 
These findings relate to the static, ex ante effect of accountability, i.e. how the expectation of 
punishment by voters in the future affects incumbents’ present behavior. A different approach 
examines the effect of electoral accountability on future levels of corruption. Although this 
perspective is seldom explicitly discussed in the political agency literature, we can interpret the 
dynamic effect of accountability on corruption as related to how political actors adjust their 
behavior in the face of changes in the probability of sanctioning over time. By observing the 
effective functioning of accountability mechanisms in the present, these actors can reassess 
their expectation on being sanctioned in the future. In this way, the same mechanism 
functions repeatedly over time, only with updates in the probability of sanctions taking place. 
                                                          
2
 Similar to a previous study (Ferraz and Finan 2008), they use original concrete corruption indicators 
derived from municipal audit reports. 
3
 The research design is made possible by the structure of the audit program, which relies on a pre-
determined ordering of the municipalities that will be audited. This should allow mayors to predict 
whether they will be audited before the next elections or not. 
104 
The study by Bobonis et al. (2012) also tests whether this is the case in the Puerto Rican 
context. As the centralized audit program has been implemented since 1987, each municipality 
in the country has been audited several times, which provides the authors with sufficient 
longitudinal data for the analysis. Interestingly, however, they find no effect of the pre-
electoral release of audit results on corruption levels in the subsequent administrative term. 
The authors interpret this as evidence that corrupt incumbents try to improve their reputation 
by refraining from corruption before an election, thus mimicking the behavior of non-corrupt 
politicians, in order to reap higher rents in the next term in office. 
A more recent article by Crisp et al. (2014) also tries to capture this effect indirectly through a 
measure of electoral volatility. These authors postulate that electoral accountability of corrupt 
politicians should generate increased electoral volatility, once voters move their support to 
other parties. This should in turn contribute to reducing corruption in the future, as voters 
signal to politicians that their threat of sanctioning bad incumbents is real. They estimate a 
reciprocal relationship between electoral volatility and perceptions of legislative corruption for 
249 elections in 74 democracies and partial democracies. The authors find that stronger 
perceptions of corruption do indeed lead to more electoral volatility, but no statistically 
significant effect of electoral volatility on future corruption levels is identified. They attribute 
this to two possible explanations: (a) high electoral volatility may lead the disciplining 
mechanism to break down, as politicians interpret it as a sign that their chances of retaining 
office are slim regardless of their behavior, thus having incentives to extract more rents while 
still in office, and (b) even if politicians do change their behavior as a result of electoral 
accountability, this could become visible in voters’ perceptions of corruption only after some 
time lag. 
A few other studies offer insights on the impact of the other accountability dimensions on 
corruption outcomes. A very influential article by Olken (2007) studies the effect of increased 
oversight, both in the form of top-down audits–representing a form of horizontal 
accountability–and bottom-up monitoring–an example of social accountability–, on corruption 
levels in road construction projects in Indonesian villages. In an experimental design, 
municipalities were randomly selected to be informed that the implementation of the project 
would be audited, thus increasing the probability of audit from 4% to 100%. Additionally, two 
experiments were conducted to assess the effect of increased social monitoring: (a) the 
distribution of invitations to the village’s “accountability meeting”, where officials give an 
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account of how public resources have been used, and (b) the distribution of comment forms 
together with the invitations, in order to allow villagers to anonymously give information on 
the account given at the meeting. The author found that the amount of missing expenditures 
was lower by 8 percentage points in villages that were informed about a future audit. At the 
same time, nepotism seemed to increase in jobs related to the project, suggesting that one 
form of corruption may have been substituted for with another. The social monitoring 
treatments, on the other hand, had no significant effect on missing expenditures, even though 
they were successful in increasing participation at the accountability meetings. 
Zamboni Filho (2011) takes a similar experimental approach to estimate the impact of a 
randomized auditing program targeting Brazilian municipalities. In a given round of audits, 120 
municipalities were selected to be informed that, among them, 30 would be audited in the 
following year. Given that the usual probability of a municipality’s being selected in the 
program was between 3% and 6%, the municipalities selected for the experiment faced an 
audit probability around 20% higher. The audit results from the 30 municipalities that had 
been previously informed about a higher probability of facing an audit, i.e. the treatment 
group showed a significantly lower number of procurement irregularities, and a lower share of 
less competitive procurement procedures, in comparison to the 30 municipalities randomly 
selected and assigned to the control group in the same audit round. 
A recent contribution by Avis et al. (2016) offers so far the most solid body of evidence 
suggesting a deterrence effect from horizontal accountability. Also using data from the 
Brazilian audit program to test for its long-term effect on corruption, they exploit the fact that 
some municipalities were audited more than once throughout the duration of the program. 
They find that municipalities being audited for a second time present 8% less corruption 
violations than those facing their first audit. Moreover, they present evidence of spillover 
effects, as municipalities with an audited neighbor also display lower corruption. This is 
conditioned on the presence of local media, though. The authors point also to an indirect 
effect of the audits on horizontal accountability in the form of legal sanctions, showing that the 
occurrence of an audit also brings about a statistically significant increase in the probability of 
a mayor’s facing legal action due to corruption allegations. Finally, they conduct a series of 
simulations to disentangle the mechanisms that might be driving the reduction in corruption 
observed in their sample and are able to demonstrate that the lower levels of corruption 
appear to be driven by non-electoral mechanisms, associated either to an increase in the 
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perceived probability of being audited in those municipalities that have been audited in the 
past, or by the increased probability of facing legal consequences of corruption. 
Ferraz and Finan (2011) also consider alternatively that the presence of prosecutors and radio 
stations may condition the effect of reelection incentives on their corruption estimates. The 
presence of prosecutors would imply a higher probability of legal procedures against the 
mayor, thus increasing the likelihood of horizontal accountability. Similarly, the presence of 
local radio would represent a larger probability of revealing corruption to voters. The authors 
predict that the difference in corruption between municipalities with first-term and second-
term mayors should be lower in the presence of either prosecutors or local radio. They find 
evidence supporting these hypotheses, but they only examine them in separate models. They 
also find a significant independent negative effect of local media on corruption levels. 
Finally, the comparative literature on determinants of corruption includes a number of cross-
national studies providing additional evidence for the impact of factors associated with social 
and horizontal accountability on corruption. In the case of social accountability, different 
measures of press freedom (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Camaj 2013) or media penetration (e.g. 
free newspaper circulation (Adsera et al. 2003), internet access (Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011)) 
have been found to be significantly associated with lower corruption. Freedom of association 
(Camaj 2013) and higher civil society density (Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011) also appear to be 
linked to lower corruption, although in the latter case the effect may depend on minimal levels 
of political competition, transparency and press freedom (Grimes 2013). For horizontal 
accountability, some evidence for an association between judicial independence (Camaj 2013; 
Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011) and lower corruption levels exists. Brunetti and Weder (2003), on 
the other hand, also consider the role of rule of law as an indicator for checks and balances 
and solid legal institutions, but fail to find any significant connection between that variable and 
corruption.  
The analysis conducted here seeks to contribute to this existing knowledge by examining the 
different accountability dimensions more systematically, accounting for potential 
simultaneous effects of the distinct mechanisms of accountability. Moreover, differently than 
some of the studies reviewed above, this study seeks to implement direct measures of 
accountability, which are expected to capture more closely the extent to which the 
mechanisms in question are really effective and not just potential. A similar effort is made 
regarding the indicator for the dependent variable, which follows on the contribution of other 
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studies employing concrete measures of corruption from audits, instead of measures of 
perceived corruption more commonly used in comparative contexts. The details on the 
empirical strategy and the data collected for the estimation procedures are described in the 
next section. 
 
Empirical strategy and data collection 
The empirical analysis presented here seeks to estimate the effect of accountability on future 
levels of corruption, taking into consideration mechanisms of electoral, social and horizontal 
accountability. As already discussed, the functioning of accountability mechanisms is expected 
to produce a deterrent effect on corrupt behavior based on the threat of sanctions. Therefore, 
corruption levels at a certain point in time are influenced by politicians’ expectation of 
punishment in the future. At the same time, the concrete functioning of accountability 
mechanisms informs politicians about the probability of sanctioning, allowing them to update 
their expectations and adapt their behavior accordingly. Therefore, in contexts where 
accountability mechanisms are seen to be effective, we should expect political actors to 
update the expected probability of sanctioning upwards4 and refrain more from corruption in 
the future. Based on this dynamics, we should see a reduction in corruption over time where 
accountability mechanisms are more effective. 
In order to test this hypothesis, this study conducts a comparative analysis with data on 130 
Brazilian municipalities. The choice of setting was motivated mainly by the availability of 
concrete corruption data from a randomized municipal audit program conducted by the 
Federal government since 2003. These municipalities constitute a sub-sample of all 
municipalities audited until 2013, and they have all been targeted by at least two audits during 
the period in question. This allows us to estimate corruption levels for these municipalities for 
at least two time periods. 
                                                          
4
 This argument would probably not apply in contexts where the probability of effective accountability is 
already very high. However, the analysis conducted here considers the context of a relatively young 
democracy where accountability mechanisms can be understood as undergoing a process of 
consolidation, which makes this assumption more plausible. 
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The selected setting offers some other advantages as well. Firstly, random selection of 
municipalities in the audit program eliminates selection bias in the conduction of the audits. 
Secondly, all audits were conducted by the same external agency, thus ensuring comparability 
across audit results in different municipalities. Thirdly, the possibility of employing a concrete 
measure of corruption is an important resource for research in this field, as an alternative to 
commonly used perception indicators, and it also allows us to focus on instances of political 
corruption, which are more relevant for the relationship between accountability and 
corruption5. Finally, the sub-national level in Brazil offers great richness of data for other 
relevant variables that potentially affect both corruption and the occurrence of accountability, 
and at the same time holds constant other country-specific characteristics that would need to 
be taken into account in a cross-national comparison. 
The following sub-sections discuss in more detail the sample selection, data sources and the 
coding procedures used. All variables are described in Table 29 in Appendix B. 
 
Sample selection and coding procedure for the corruption data 
The sample used in the analysis was defined according to the availability of audit information 
from a randomized audit program instituted by the Brazilian Federal Comptroller’s Office 
(CGU) since 20036, and it includes municipalities selected in at least two audit rounds until 
2013. For this period there are 227 municipalities that fit this criterion. However, since 
electoral accountability can materialize only at specific points in time, the actual sample of 
analysis was further restricted to those cases where it could have concretely occurred, given 
the following conditions: (a) at least one election for municipal office took place between 
audits, and (b) either the mayor in power during audit 1 ran for reelection–a narrow 
interpretation of electoral accountability–or, when this was not possible7, a successor 
                                                          
5
 Broader perception-based measures often do not distinguish corruption involving higher political 
offices from low-ranking officials, which would not be ideal for the analysis in question, since the latter 
are less likely to be affected by some of the accountability mechanisms described. 
6
 For more detailed background information on the program, see Mondo (2016). 
7
 In Brazil, incumbent mayors are only allowed to run for one consecutive term at a time. 
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candidate was presented–a broader interpretation of electoral accountability8. In the latter 
case, the following types of candidates were identified as successors: candidates from the 
same party, from a coalition party9, a relative of the mayor10 or a member of the 
administration (e.g. a cabinet member). 
Based on these criteria, 140 municipalities were identified as potential cases. Finally, the 
identification of corruption violations in audit 1 was used as an additional criterion, since it is 
considered as a pre-condition for some measures of accountability applied, which are 
conceptualized to reflect the concrete occurrence of sanctions. This results in a final sample of 
93 municipalities with mayors running for reelection (referred to as the “narrow” sample) and 
130 municipalities with both incumbent mayors and successor candidates disputing the 
municipal Executive (referred to as the “broad” sample). 
For the selected municipalities, a measure of corruption was derived from irregularities 
described in the respective audit reports. Following previous studies that have employed 
corruption data from CGU municipal audit reports as well (Brollo 2010; Ferraz and Finan 2008, 
2011), the indicator compiled for this study includes irregularities related to procurement 
fraud, diversion of public funds, and over-invoicing as instances of corruption11. This 
emphasizes situations that may be construed as cases of political corruption, understood as 
“[…] the behavior of public decision-makers where preferential treatment is provided to 
individuals and where narrow interests are advanced at the expense of the interests of 
                                                          
8
 The adoption of a broad interpretation of electoral accountability allows for a larger alternative sample 
of cases, but it also implies different assumptions about the incentives faced by incumbent politicians. In 
the narrow interpretation, only first-term mayors are subject to electoral accountability. This is 
associated with political agency models structured as a finite two-period game where the incumbent’s 
action in period 1 is followed by an election where voters decide either to keep or to replace the 
incumbent, and the election winner is in a “lame-duck” situation in period 2, where no accountability 
incentives are present (Ashworth 2012; Besley 2006; Fearon 1999). However, this model structure 
overlooks the possibility that politicians face a longer time horizon, and even if incumbent mayors 
themselves are not directly eligible for reelection, they still have a stake in their party’s or political 
group’s remaining in power. Therefore, it is also reasonable to consider electoral accountability from the 
perspective of an infinitely repeated game where an incumbent party or political group subjects a 
candidate to the approval of the popular vote for continuing in office (Ferejohn 1986), which 
corresponds to the broader interpretation of electoral accountability. 
9
 Data on coalitions are found in election records only until 2004. Therefore, for later elections this type 
of successor could not be identified. 
10
 Political “dynasties”, with several generations of politicians maintaining power in the hands of the 
same family for a long period, are relatively common at the local level in Brazil. 
11
 For a more detailed description of the coding procedure, see Mondo (2016). 
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broader segments of society” (Lambsdorff 2007, 82). As argued earlier, an indicator capturing 
this type of corruption should be more appropriate for analyzing the deterrent effect of 
accountability. 
The corruption indicator computed is based on the total number of corruption violations–
pertaining to the three categories mentioned above–found by the auditors in each 
municipality, taking into account all audits conducted in that municipality. In order to translate 
the information from the repeated audits in each municipality, covering different time periods, 
into a panel data set, the corruption violations identified were then assigned to the respective 
four-year administrative term in which they took place, according to the timing information 
provided in the reports and complementary information from official databases on federal 
transfers. The resulting data set encompasses five administrative periods: 1997-2000 (prior to 
the audit program, but partly covered for some municipalities), 2001-2004, 2005-2008, 2009-
2012 and 2013- . For each period, the corruption level measured thus corresponds to a count 
of all violations found associated with that period; if the period in question was covered in 
more than one audit, the corruption violations found in different audits were added to 
compose the value computed for that period. 
Given that the corruption indicator collected represents only the number of violations 
identified in the audits, it is important to take into account that this is likely to be influenced by 
the scope of the audits, both in terms of the time period covered and of the range of 
administrative procedures analyzed by the auditors. Indeed, there is considerable variation on 
those two dimensions across the different audit reports. Therefore, two variables were also 
coded from the reports in order to account for this variation in the subsequent analyses: the 
total number of service orders issued for the auditors12, also assigned to each time period 
included in the data set, and the number of years in each period–ranging from 0 to 4–that was 
covered by any of the audits. 
One important reservation that must be made about the collected data regards the corruption 
information extracted from the subsequent audits, i.e. the second and, in some cases, third 
audits conducted in the sampled municipalities. According to information provided in response 
                                                          
12
 Each service order largely corresponds to a specific federal program or co-financing grant to be 
audited, for which funds were transferred to the municipality during the time considered in the audit. 
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to an inquiry sent to the regional CGU offices13, which are responsible for all on-site audit work 
in each state, the scope of later audits conducted in municipalities that had already been 
selected through the program takes into account the results of the previous audits. In 
particular, areas where irregularities were identified before are included in the scope of the 
next audit for further investigation, and the audit protocol followed in subsequent audits tends 
to be more thorough and detailed.  
An implication of this procedure for the analysis developed here is that the results between 
the different audits conducted in the same municipality are not fully independent from each 
other. Moreover, the fact that the occurrence of irregularities in the previous audits is 
associated with a more careful examination by the auditors in the next audit indicates that 
municipalities with more corruption violations in the first audit face a higher probability of 
detection of new violations in subsequent audits. This could thus introduce some degree of 
measurement bias in the indicator. However, there are reasons to believe that the potential 
bias should be limited. Firstly, the correlation between the results of the first and second 
audits for the sample at hand is not so strong, with a Pearson coefficient of 0.25. Secondly, the 
temporal dimension of the panel data set employed is structured not according to the 
different audits that took place in each municipality, but based on four-year administrative 
periods. Therefore, the corruption violations found in each audit were assigned to the 
respective administrative periods in which they occurred, which contributes to dissipating the 
possible bias emerging from a higher detection probability in later audits. 
Finally, it is important to reflect upon the implications of this potential bias for the inference 
made from the analysis. In this respect, the main possible distortion introduced in the auditing 
procedure would be a relative “inflation” of corruption violations in later periods14. As a 
consequence, it might be more difficult to observe whether corruption is decreasing as a 
                                                          
13
 High-level officials from the offices in Amazonas, Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul clarified some of the 
criteria used to define the scope for the audits conducted under the CGU program. As a rule, the central 
office would occasionally establish priority areas, but an important part of the selection criteria for the 
programs to be audited included a risk assessment considering the amount of funds transferred, the 
program’s relevance and the observed propensity for irregularities. In the case of municipalities selected 
more than once through the program, this risk assessment factored in the results of the previous audit 
as well. 
14
 Actually, the increased likelihood of detecting corruption in later audits would allow auditors to find 
an amount of corruption violations closer to the reality; the real distortion would then be that the level 
of corruption observed in the first audit would be artificially low in comparison. 
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consequence of effective accountability, thus making it more difficult to confirm the 
deterrence hypothesis. Therefore, the main danger would be a type II error, where the analysis 
might fail to reject the null hypothesis. At the same time, however, it stands to reason that a 
more thorough audit in the second time the municipality is selected will only be able to find 
more corruption than previously detected if corruption has not decreased, i.e. if no deterrence 
effect took place. Logically, the auditors, no matter how careful they look, cannot find more 
corruption where there is not more corruption to be found. As a consequence, the potential 
bias in the estimation of the effect of interest in the analysis conducted here is arguably 
decreasing as the “true” deterrence effect becomes stronger. Based on all these 
considerations, the potential bias in the indicator should a priori not pose major obstacles to 
the empirical analysis, and its more concrete implications will be again assessed in light of the 
statistical results presented in the next section. 
 
Accountability measures and data sources 
The indicators for the three dimensions of accountability considered in this study seek to 
capture, whenever possible, the extent to which those mechanisms of accountability are 
effective in generating sanctions against corrupt politicians. However, there are some 
challenges in finding measures that adequately reflect this. 
The operationalization of electoral accountability is the most straightforward and more closely 
reflects whether mayors whose administration was associated with corruption violations 
uncovered by the audits were effectively sanctioned by voters. Based on electoral records 
from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), we look, for each period, whether the mayor running 
for reelection–in the case of the narrow sample–or presenting a successor candidate–in the 
case of the broad sample–in the previous period succeeded in securing a new term. If yes, 
electoral accountability is considered as absent, which is coded with a value of 0, and if the 
previous incumbent mayor/administration was voted out of office, the variable is coded with a 
1. Alternatively, the change in vote share of the incumbent mayor/administration relative to 
the previous election was also considered. 
The operationalization of horizontal accountability takes into account three main sanctioning 
mechanisms that Brazilian mayors can face, which are considered to be particularly relevant 
for their calculations of risks associated with corruption. The most clear-cut of these is the 
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imposition of legal sanctions. Mayors may be criminally prosecuted for malfeasance in office, 
when characterized either according to corruption-related provisions of the Penal Code or as 
so-called “responsibility crimes”, applicable to holders of Executive office at different levels of 
the public administration. Additionally, they may be subject to civil prosecution under the 
Administrative Improbity Law for actions resulting in undue private advantage or enrichment 
through public office, either for themselves or for other private actors. This type of civil 
procedure can lead to penalties such as the return of lost or diverted funds to municipal 
coffers and the suspension of political rights for up to 10 years, which imposes a particularly 
high cost on politicians’ career prospects. Secondly, mayors are required to submit a yearly 
report of municipal accounts and expenditures to the respective State Court of Accounts, and 
to the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) in the case of federal funds received. In case these 
institutions reject the accounts due to grave administrative irregularities–and the decision is 
later ratified by the Legislative–, office holders may also become ineligible to run for political 
office for eight years. Finally, mayors accused of malfeasance or unlawful actions may face an 
impeachment procedure conducted by the local Legislative body. The consequence in this case 
is immediate removal from office and the replacement by the deputy mayor elected on the 
same ticket. 
For the two latter cases, the concrete occurrence of sanctions can be more easily captured. In 
the case of legal penalties, on the other hand, there are fundamental empirical challenges in 
operationalizing the sanctioning dimension of horizontal accountability. A strict notion of a 
definitive sanction would require that mayors face an irreversible conviction by the courts. 
However, in order to successfully capture the causal mechanism of deterrence that is 
hypothesized, the mayor(s) in power in each administrative period would need to have 
observed the conviction of the former mayor prior to that period, so that the level of 
corruption found under their administration can reflect a behavioral response to having 
observed that punishment. For the Brazilian context in general, this is not a realistic 
expectation, given that legal procedures often take several years and this time frame is too 
short for a final conviction to take place in most cases. Therefore, the measure used in the 
analysis applies a less strict criterion, which considers horizontal accountability as occurring 
when the previous mayor has faced criminal or civil prosecution associated with corruption-
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related charges prior to the administrative period in question15. Even though this does not 
necessarily reflect the occurrence of definitive legal sanctions, it is taken as a sign that 
horizontal accountability is more effective than where such procedures have not been 
initiated. 
For the coding of the horizontal accountability variable, a search with the names of the mayor 
in power in the previous period was conducted on the databases of both the Federal and the 
respective State courts, in order to identify ongoing or closed criminal and civil proceedings 
(restricted to those related to administrative improbity) in which they appear as defendants. 
Complementary information from the associated court rulings was considered to ensure that 
the lawsuits in question were linked to corruption-related actions and not other crimes or 
irregularities16. In the case of Courts of Accounts, a similar search was conducted on databases 
of previous rulings by those instances to check whether the accounts for any of the years in 
the period in question had been rejected or disapproved. Impeachment cases were coded 
through the identification of changes in power across different data sources: municipal profiles 
published by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), mention in official 
documents and Court of Accounts proceedings and media reports. The final coding received a 
value of 1 when the mayor in the previous period was prosecuted, impeached or had the 
accounts rejected, otherwise the variable received a value of 0. 
For social accountability, two separate indicators were considered to operationalize distinct 
facets of this dimension. The main limitation faced here is that none of the available measures 
concretely reflects the extent to which civil society and media actors effectively monitor and 
expose corruption in the local administration. The only available measures thus cannot 
completely fulfill the goal of capturing effective social accountability, but are considered as 
important indicators that certain conditions are in place for social accountability to be 
effectively exercised. 
                                                          
15
 In cases in which only the latter part of an administrative period was covered by the audits, the coding 
considered the occurrence of prosecution up until that point in time. For instance, if in a given 
municipality in the period 2005-2008 the audits cover projects implemented only in 2007 and 2008, the 
time reference for the coding of horizontal accountability was the occurrence of sanctions until the year 
before that, i.e. 2006. For the coding of sanctions by the Courts of Accounts, the same time frame of 
reference was applied. 
16
 In the cases in which insufficient information on the substance of the case was available, the lawsuit 
was disregarded for coding purposes. 
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The first indicator reflects the presence of local media in each municipality. Following previous 
related studies, emphasis was put on the presence of local radio stations17. This is also a binary 
variable reflecting whether at least one local radio station is present in the municipality. The 
coding of the variable was based on information from IBGE municipal profile surveys18. The 
second indicator is the number of private non-profit associations registered in each 
municipality, as previous studies have also applied a similar measure for comparative purposes 
at the cross-national level (Grimes 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011) This data is available also 
from IBGE with estimates for 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Unfortunately, a change in the 
methodology of classification of non-profit organizations since 2008 creates some problems 
for comparability across all data points. Nevertheless, data for 2006 was later adapted and 
published according to both methodologies. Two variables were created based on the data 
estimated according to the old and the new methodologies, each with two data points for 
each municipality. From the old methodology, the values from the 2002 and 2006 studies were 
input for the periods 2001-2004 and 2005-2008; from the new methodology, 2006 and 2010 
data were respectively assigned to the periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2012. For the others 
periods, data was coded as missing.  
These measures for different accountability mechanisms should, at least to some degree, 
capture how effectively electoral, horizontal and social accountability de facto work in the 
different municipalities. They seek to make a contribution to new approaches for measuring 
this characteristic of democratic regimes, in comparison to other indicators of accountability 
that take into consideration only the formal existence of certain institutional mechanisms. The 
data collected here for Brazilian municipalities indeed illustrate how actual variation on the 
functioning of different dimensions of accountability may emerge even in an environment 
where formal institutional uniformity based on national-level regulation exists.  
                                                          
17
 This has been argued to be a more relevant source of political information than printed media in the 
Brazilian context, given the relatively low level of education and literacy in the country (Brollo 2010; 
Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011). 
18
 Between 1999 and 2012, IBGE has conducted almost on a yearly basis (with the exceptions of 2003 
and 2007) nation-wide surveys with municipal administrations in order to collect a wide range of data 
on all municipalities. The surveys from 1999, 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2012 include information on the 
existence of some local media outlets and were used as the main source for this variable. 
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Municipal and mayor-level covariates 
The empirical analysis described in the next section also includes a number of other variables 
that may have confounding effects on corruption. Municipal characteristics such as population, 
percentage of urban population, literacy rate, log municipal GDP, municipal area and the year 
the municipality was founded were taken from IBGE data. A municipal Human Development 
Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) office is also 
considered as an alternative measure of development, as well as its education component as 
another indicator for educational attainment. Finally, regional dummies are used to control for 
any remaining unobserved regional discrepancies19. Mayor attributes considered include 
gender, education, political experience and affiliation to the party in the federal government, 
all coded from the TSE candidate registry for all elections since 2000. 
Variation in the level of rents available is also discussed in political agency models as a relevant 
factor influencing political actors’ decision to engage in corruption. Moreover, the availability 
of resources is likely to impact mayors’ electoral prospects as well. In order to capture that 
potential confounding effect, two indicators related to municipal finances were used: the 
percentage of intergovernmental transfers20 and the percentage of natural resource royalties21 
in total municipal revenue, both calculated as period averages based on yearly data available 
from the National Treasury Department (STN). Additionally, the level of GDP growth 
experienced in the period is also considered as a relevant control variable potentially affecting 
the level of rents. Period averages were calculated based on yearly data published by IBGE. 
Finally, the share of municipal employees selected exclusively through direct appointments22 is 
                                                          
19
 Brazil is divided into five main regions: North (N), Northeast (NE), Southeast (SE), South (S) and 
Center-West (CO). This division reflects a number of essential geographic and demographic differences, 
and also different patterns in social-economic indicators, but may capture cultural differences as well. 
20
 Additional resources in the form of intergovernmental transfers are mentioned in the literature as 
impacting both the electoral performance of incumbents and the level of corruption observed in 
Brazilian municipalities (Brollo et al. 2013; Litschig and Morrison 2010). 
21
 The impact of natural resources has also been considered in some cross-national analyses of 
determinants of corruption (Montinola and Jackman 2002; Treisman 2000, 2007). Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence suggest that cases of corruption are common in oil-producing municipalities in Brazil (Caselli 
and Michaels 2009). 
22
 As a general rule, public positions in the local bureaucracy in Brazil are filled by competitive 
examinations. Management and advisory positions, however, may be filled through direct 
appointments. In such cases, appointees are either existing public employees selected through the 
examinations, who then receive a sort of promotion, or individuals from outside the bureaucracy. The 
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taken as an additional proxy for the use of public positions as sources of rents and/or political 
support. This reflects patronage and clientelistic practices that may be associated with 
corruption. The data for this variable were calculated based on information extracted from 
IBGE municipal profiles in 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2013, where information on the number of 
employees in the municipal administration is presented. 
Political factors that potentially reduce the constraints to corrupt behavior were also taken 
into consideration. The level of electoral competition, for instance, may be negatively related 
to corruption: mayors who face more competition should be more inclined to refrain from 
corruption, since the risk of losing office in the next elections is higher. For each period, this 
was operationalized as the margin of victory obtained by the mayor in power in the previous 
election. Legislative support, calculated as the share of seats held by the mayor’s party in the 
local legislative chamber, was considered as an indicator of other political constraints that may 
impact corrupt behavior. Whether mayors are in their first or second consecutive term was 
also considered in the analysis, as political agency models often predict that term-limited 
mayors should have fewer incentives to refrain from corruption than first-term mayors23. 
Additionally, the amount of campaign funds24 raised by the mayor in power in the previous 
election is taken into account, as political finance may influence corruption by creating more 
pressure on politicians to repay campaign donations with political favors when in power (Blake 
and Morris 2009; Moran 2001; Rose-Ackerman 1999). At the same time, campaign funds have 
been shown as positively associated with the reelection chances of candidates in Brazil (Jucá et 
al. 2016; Rennó Jr. 2008), and are likely to affect voter behavior by increasing the visibility of 
candidates.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
data used here considers only the latter case. Office holders usually have considerable discretion in 
creating and allocating such positions, and this is illustrated by the considerable variation observed 
across Brazilian municipalities: although the mean share of exclusively appointed officials is around 10%, 
this figure may extend to more than 70% in some cases. 
23
 For the narrow sample, it is not necessary to account for this effect, since this difference is already 
captured by the electoral accountability indicator itself (except in the few cases where there was a 
change in power). In the case of the broad sample, the assumption is that this lame-duck effect does not 
fully apply, but incumbents may still face stronger incentives when they are themselves running for 
reelection. 
24
 This information is originally available from TSE, but the data used in the analysis were extracted from 
project Às Claras (http://www.asclaras.org.br/@index.php), maintained by the non-profit organization 
Transparência Brasil, which presents the TSE data in a structured and searchable format for all 
candidates in national and local elections from 2002 to 2012. 
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Estimation procedures and results 
 
Data description 
The sample used in the analysis presents substantial variation in all the main variables of 
interest. This is true also for the additional control variables, especially the municipal 
characteristics that define some contextual aspects related to the cases at hand. This 
constitutes another advantage of working with a sample of Brazilian municipalities, because 
the within-country diversity offers a setting that to a large extent mimics cross-national 
variation, therefore offering considerable potential for external validity of the findings and 
applicability beyond the sub-national level. Table 24 in Appendix B shows the summary 
statistics for all the variables considered in the analysis. 
The data set compiled is structured as a panel of 140 municipalities and five four-year time 
periods corresponding to different consecutive administrative terms. This amounts to a total of 
700 observations. However, since there isn’t complete audit coverage of all these periods in all 
municipalities, Table 24 refers only to the observations for which there is corruption data, i.e. 
the periods that were at least partly covered by any of the audits conducted in the respective 
municipalities. Nevertheless, the statistical analyses focus only on the observations for the 130 
municipalities in which corruption violations were found in audit 1. 
In addition to the chronological coding of the time periods, another variable was created to 
identify each period relative to the occurrence of audit 1 in each municipality, as the audits 
occurred at different points in time and with different intervals in the different municipalities. 
For this variable, the period in which audit 1 took place receives a value of 0 (T(0)) with 
subsequent periods after that coded sequentially with positive values (e.g. T(1), T(2)). Similarly, 
periods prior to T(0) are coded with negative numbers going back in time (e.g. T(-1), T(-2)). 
Figure 3 illustrates this structure with examples from two municipalities. As already mentioned 
in the previous section, for the periods in which different audits overlap, the corruption 
estimate includes data from both audits. This relative coding is used later to describe the time 
periods of interest in the estimation procedures applied. 
  
119 
Figure 3. Timing of audits in the data set period structure 
 
Note: The red vertical dotted lines represent the period divisions. The periods 
at the bottom of each diagram indicate the relative coding of each period 
with regards to the occurrence of audit 1 (A1). The black lines indicate the 
temporal scope of audit 1 (A1) and audit 2 (A2), with the year on the left-
hand side representing the beginning of the period covered by the audit, and 
the end of each line depicting the year in which the respective audit took 
place, and therefore the end of its temporal scope. 
 
The estimation procedures discussed below aim to test a set of hypotheses associated with the 
expectation of a reduction in corruption over time following the successful functioning of 
accountability. For the different accountability mechanisms under analysis, we can formulate 
them as follows:  
H1: Municipalities where the previous mayor/administration involved in corruption was voted 
out of office should experience a reduction in corruption levels. 
H2: Municipalities where the previous mayor involved in corruption has faced legal (civil or 
criminal prosecution), administrative (municipal accounts rejected by Court of Accounts) or 
political (impeachment) sanctions should experience a reduction in corruption levels. 
H3a: Municipalities with stronger media presence should experience a reduction in corruption 
levels. 
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H3b: Municipalities with higher civil society density should experience a reduction in corruption 
levels. 
In order to test these hypotheses, a difference-in-differences strategy and panel estimations 
with fixed- and random-effects were applied. These are complemented with additional 
estimation procedures to circumvent endogeneity problems and to verify the sensitivity and 
robustness of the results. These procedures are described in the sub-sections below. 
 
Difference-in-differences models 
The difference-in-differences estimation was applied with a reduced data set comprising only 
two periods for each municipality. For this method, the binary accountability variables were 
considered as “treatments”, and each time period was assigned a before and after treatment 
status. The period before treatment corresponds to T(0) in the panel data set, i.e. the 
administrative period in which audit 1 took place. The period after treatment corresponds to 
T(1), i.e. the first administrative period after that. 
The treatment status was assigned according to the occurrence of electoral and horizontal 
accountability until T(1)25, and the presence of local radio stations at the beginning of T(1) as 
the main indicator of social accountability. Since the second indicator of social accountability, 
civil society density, is a continuous variable, it is not possible to apply the treatment logic to 
this indicator, so it was included in some specifications as a municipal covariate26. All models 
were estimated for the narrow and broad samples. The analysis was conducted with ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression, and the estimated effect for an interaction term between the 
time period and the treatment assignment is considered as indicating the average treatment 
effect of the respective accountability treatments.  
                                                          
25
 In the case of electoral accountability, the treatment variable indicates its occurrence for the 
municipalities in which the incumbent mayor/administration was voted out of office in the election 
occurring at the end of T(0). In the case of horizontal accountability, the treatment variable considers 
sanctions observed until before the period in T(1) that was actually covered by audit 2. 
26
 In order to keep the comparability of this indicator over time, the two measures available based on 
different methodologies were tested separately in the models. Since they individually provide 
information only for two periods in the panel data set, the inclusion of this variable leads to a reduction 
in the sample size. 
121 
Table 5. Difference-in-differences models with log number of corruption violations as 
dependent variable (narrow sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
After treatment period -0.0581 0.0839 -0.0440 -0.119 -0.200 -0.0343 
 
(0.273) (0.335) (0.292) (0.293) (0.389) (0.298) 
EA treatment -0.0922 -0.0392 -0.0611 -0.0393 -0.0140 -0.0371 
 
(0.165) (0.180) (0.179) (0.193) (0.234) (0.186) 
EA treatment x after -0.252 -0.257 -0.360 -0.327 -0.126 -0.394 
 
(0.236) (0.324) (0.248) (0.260) (0.355) (0.258) 
HA treatment -0.183 -0.115 -0.380** -0.389* -0.252 -0.397** 
 
(0.143) (0.150) (0.189) (0.200) (0.233) (0.195) 
HA treatment x after 0.175 -0.0868 0.366 0.423* 0.261 0.373 
 
(0.214) (0.293) (0.247) (0.249) (0.375) (0.253) 
Radio treatment -0.0356 0.00895 0.0643 0.0358 0.266 0.0838 
 
(0.154) (0.182) (0.196) (0.193) (0.249) (0.203) 
Radio treatment x after 0.0481 0.0254 -0.0716 0.00554 -0.291 -0.103 
 
(0.227) (0.322) (0.258) (0.259) (0.390) (0.271) 
Log number CSOs (old) 
 
-0.118 
  
-0.158 
 
  
(0.126) 
  
(0.178) 
 Log number CSOs (new) 
  
-0.0752 
  
-0.0797 
   
(0.117) 
  
(0.118) 
Constant 13.21 2.213 21.03** 18.91* 14.00 21.69** 
 
(8.372) (10.19) (10.31) (10.01) (11.60) (10.39) 
       Observations 165 120 120 123 78 119 
R-squared 0.592 0.607 0.679 0.680 0.728 0.680 
       Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. Period 
fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, 
education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural 
resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal employees 
directly appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include gender, education level, 
previous political experience, affiliation to federal government party, margin of victory, legislative support and log 
campaign revenue (excluded in models 1, 2, and 3). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1). 
 
  
122 
Table 6. Difference-in-differences models with log number of corruption violations as 
dependent variable (broad sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
After treatment period -0.252 -0.146 -0.336 -0.326 -0.387 -0.346 
 
(0.245) (0.273) (0.290) (0.304) (0.340) (0.293) 
EA treatment -0.0286 0.00768 -0.0105 -0.00194 -0.0181 -0.0162 
 
(0.141) (0.153) (0.171) (0.181) (0.217) (0.178) 
EA treatment x after -0.0502 -0.185 0.107 0.102 0.0849 0.134 
 
(0.256) (0.314) (0.274) (0.289) (0.367) (0.282) 
HA treatment -0.174 -0.139 -0.320* -0.347** -0.323 -0.323* 
 
(0.135) (0.142) (0.167) (0.171) (0.200) (0.170) 
HA treatment x after 0.201 0.0203 0.354 0.371* 0.325 0.359 
 
(0.194) (0.231) (0.218) (0.222) (0.284) (0.220) 
Radio treatment -0.0604 -0.0445 -0.102 -0.0887 -0.160 -0.0981 
 
(0.139) (0.152) (0.185) (0.179) (0.218) (0.188) 
Radio treatment x after -0.0695 -0.0469 -0.153 -0.0535 0.0251 -0.146 
 
(0.211) (0.265) (0.228) (0.235) (0.316) (0.234) 
Log number CSOs (old) 
 
-0.109 
  
-0.210 
 
  
(0.113) 
  
(0.134) 
 Log number CSOs (new) 
  
-0.194** 
  
-0.195** 
   
(0.0965) 
  
(0.0956) 
Constant -0.248 -6.719 8.407 5.605 3.980 8.165 
 
(6.348) (7.841) (7.406) (7.262) (10.44) (7.415) 
       Observations 244 182 174 178 116 173 
R-squared 0.497 0.535 0.652 0.618 0.703 0.652 
              
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. 
Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region 
fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log 
% of natural resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of 
municipal employees directly appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include 
term in office, gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government party, 
margin of victory, legislative support and log campaign revenue (excluded in models 1, 2 and 3). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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As the corruption indicator taken as dependent variable for the analysis is a count variable, it is 
not appropriate for simple linear regression. Its distribution is heavily skewed, with values 
concentrated at the lower end of the scale, creating difficulties for estimation through linear 
regression27. In order to handle some of these problems, the models were estimated with a 
log-transformed dependent variable. The results are displayed in Table 5 and Table 6, for the 
narrow and broad samples, respectively. 
The estimated coefficients for the accountability treatment effects are not statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level, both in the narrow28 and broad samples. Also, some 
sensitivity to changes in the sample is observed. In the case of electoral accountability, the sign 
of the coefficients is mainly negative in the models with the narrow sample, but becomes 
somewhat unstable with the broad sample. For horizontal accountability, estimates are mostly 
positive, contradicting theory, and significant at the 90% confidence level in some 
specifications. The sign of the estimates for the radio presence treatment effect oscillates 
across specifications with both samples. Interestingly, the coefficients for civil society density 
(measured through the new methodology) are negative and statistically significant in the 
models with the broad sample, indicating that corruption is significantly lower as the number 
of non-profit organizations increases. An analysis of variance inflation factors shows no 
evidence that these results might be motivated by strong collinearity and highly inflated 
standard errors. Additional specifications with alternative indicators for some of the main 
control variables (not reported) provide very similar results to the ones shown below29. 
Regression diagnostics for these models reveal that they perform well in terms of normality of 
residuals (with the exception of models 3 and 6 in Table 5) and also pass a Ramsey test for 
                                                          
27
 Indeed, the models estimated with the number of corruption violations as dependent variable violate 
some assumptions of linear regression, such as the normality of residuals, and present problems of 
model fit with regards to functional form, as evidenced by a Ramsey test of omitted variables. Other 
estimation methods commonly used with count variables, such as Poisson and Negative Binomial 
regression, were also tested, but they failed to produce adequate model fits. These results are not 
reported. 
28
 For all models reported with the narrow sample–also in the other estimation procedures described 
later–, the variable indicating the term in office for the mayor in power was not included. Since this 
variable strongly correlates with the binary electoral accountability measure, its inclusion creates severe 
collinearity problems for the estimation. 
29
 The alternative specifications included HDI as an indicator of development, instead of its education 
component and log GDP, and literacy rate as an alternative to the education component of the HDI. 
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omitted variables, which points to an adequate fit in terms of functional form30. Finally, an 
analysis of dfbetas identified a few very influential observations with dfbetas above one 
standard error31. However, the models excluding those presented similar results to the 
previous models for the main independent variables (see Table 25 in Appendix B). 
This first estimation strategy presents no evidence of a significant deterrent effect of any of 
the accountability variables on corruption levels. In some models, the direction of the effect is 
unstable, or even contradicts the deterrence hypothesis, as is the case with horizontal 
accountability. An important issue with this approach, however, is a potential endogeneity 
bias. Accountability is expected to affect corruption ex ante, i.e. the occurrence of corruption 
in the present is affected by the expectation of sanctions in the future. At the same time, 
accountability in the form of sanctioning can only happen if corruption has taken place. 
Therefore, these two factors are not independent from each other.  
In order to circumvent this problem, another identification strategy was applied, exploring the 
exogenous release of information from the audits in period T(0) to identify the effect of 
electoral accountability on corruption levels32. Since there was no audit in period T(-1), the 
comparison between corruption levels observed in that period and in T(0) is used as a 
“control” situation for electoral accountability, whereas the comparison between corruption 
levels observed in T(0) and T(1) constitutes the “treatment” situation33. The assumption here is 
that the probability of electoral accountability for the treatment situation–referring to the 
election occurring at the end of T(0)–is potentialized by the release of information on the 
occurrence of corruption after audit 1, which is absent in the control situation–no audit took 
place prior to the election in T(-1)). Therefore, the change in the probability of electoral 
accountability between these two periods is captured by this exogenous factor. Moreover, the 
                                                          
30
 This Ramsey test verifies the significance of predicted values (hat) and their powers (hat-square) as 
predictors of the observed values of the dependent variable. In all cases, the null hypothesis of no 
omitted variable could not be rejected. 
31
 Different cutoff values for the identification of influential observations are suggested in the literature 
(Bollen and Jackman 1990). One of them takes sample size into consideration with the formula 2/√n. As 
an alternative, the less demanding value of one standard error can be used. 
32
 Although the horizontal accountability variable is also possibly affected by an endogeneity bias, it was 
not possible to find a similar exogenous factor as a substitute indicator in that case. 
33
 Control and treatment are referred to as “situations” instead of “cases” or “groups”, as to avoid an 
interpretation that these cases are associated with different units of observation. All municipalities have 
a control and treatment situation, and what varies are the time periods associated with each situation. 
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fact that the occurrence and timing of audit 1 is fully randomized adds inferential leverage to 
this approach. This setup is better illustrated in Figure 4, which shows a typical scenario where, 
by definition, audit 1 (A1) takes place in period T(0) and audit 2 (A2) occurs in the subsequent 
period, T(1); at the end of each period, elections (e.g. E1, E2, E3) are held. Due to the absence 
of an audit before E1, voters did not have access to information of corruption prior to that 
election, whereas the occurrence of audit 1 prior to E2 made such information available to 
voters. Therefore, electoral accountability should be stronger in E2, and we should see a 
deterrent effect from electoral accountability between T(1) and T(0) (treatment situation), but 
not between T(0) and T(-1) (control situation). 
 
Figure 4. Treatment and control situations 
 
 
For this analysis, a separate data set was constructed with four observations for each 
municipality, including data for T(-1), T(0) and T(1). The observations for T(0) are duplicated; 
one of them is considered as the after-treatment period for the control situation, and the 
other is designated as the before-treatment period for the treatment situation. The horizontal 
accountability and radio presence treatment are also included in the models34.  
                                                          
34
 In order to account for the time discrepancy between control and treatment, these variables were 
recoded as follows: horizontal accountability for the control situation received values reflecting its 
occurrence prior to the period audited in T(0), and retained the original values (sanctions occurring prior 
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Table 7. Difference-in-differences models with log number of corruption violations as 
dependent variable and audit information release as electoral accountability treatment 
(narrow sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
After treatment period -0.384** -0.450** -0.739** -0.768*** -0.925*** -0.733** 
 
(0.175) (0.188) (0.296) (0.282) (0.339) (0.302) 
EA treatment (audit information) -0.250 -0.333** -0.567** -0.569** -0.771** -0.569** 
 
(0.155) (0.159) (0.266) (0.256) (0.316) (0.271) 
EA treatment x after 0.0168 0.168 0.326 0.357 0.412 0.315 
 
(0.202) (0.216) (0.315) (0.316) (0.366) (0.328) 
HA treatment -0.0625 -0.0397 -0.301* -0.322* -0.259 -0.310* 
 
(0.116) (0.115) (0.156) (0.164) (0.167) (0.161) 
HA treatment x after 0.0996 0.0302 0.366* 0.405** 0.349 0.377* 
 
(0.164) (0.174) (0.194) (0.201) (0.219) (0.201) 
Radio treatment -0.183 -0.184 -0.0635 -0.0780 0.00116 -0.0540 
 
(0.122) (0.129) (0.140) (0.145) (0.169) (0.145) 
Radio treatment x after 0.135 0.148 0.0662 0.0942 0.0386 0.0545 
 
(0.160) (0.172) (0.182) (0.189) (0.221) (0.186) 
Log number CSOs (old) 
 
-0.0752 
  
-0.0761 
 
  
(0.0929) 
  
(0.138) 
 Log number CSOs (new) 
  
-0.0527 
  
-0.0533 
   
(0.0827) 
  
(0.0836) 
Constant 0.595 -8.431 14.62* 13.11 8.662 14.78* 
 
(6.493) (6.998) (7.875) (7.933) (7.752) (7.904) 
       Observations 286 237 167 169 120 165 
R-squared 0.581 0.610 0.692 0.694 0.744 0.692 
              
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. Period 
fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, 
education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural 
resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal 
employees directly appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include gender, 
education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government party, margin of victory, 
legislative support and log campaign revenue (excluded in models 1, 2, and 3). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
to period audited in T(1)) for the treatment situation; radio presence for the control periods received 
the value reflecting the presence of local radio in the first year of T(0), and also retained the original 
values for the treatment periods (presence of radio at beginning of T(1)). 
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Table 8. Difference-in-differences models with log number of corruption violations as 
dependent variable and audit information release as electoral accountability treatment (broad 
sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
After treatment period -0.316* -0.335* -0.865** -0.882*** -0.957*** -0.848** 
 
(0.176) (0.183) (0.364) (0.297) (0.324) (0.364) 
EA treatment (audit information) -0.237 -0.268* -0.680** -0.681** -0.720** -0.671** 
 
(0.150) (0.151) (0.332) (0.262) (0.278) (0.331) 
EA treatment x after -0.0607 -0.00187 0.493 0.554* 0.566* 0.498 
 
(0.205) (0.219) (0.364) (0.303) (0.322) (0.363) 
HA treatment -0.0521 -0.0535 -0.265* -0.296** -0.254 -0.263* 
 
(0.104) (0.105) (0.145) (0.146) (0.159) (0.147) 
HA treatment x after 0.127 0.0939 0.333* 0.349* 0.300 0.329* 
 
(0.145) (0.157) (0.177) (0.178) (0.199) (0.180) 
Radio treatment -0.116 -0.0944 -0.152 -0.132 -0.151 -0.147 
 
(0.110) (0.114) (0.155) (0.152) (0.173) (0.157) 
Radio treatment x after 0.0298 0.0303 0.0523 0.0700 0.149 0.0444 
 
(0.145) (0.153) (0.186) (0.189) (0.223) (0.189) 
Log number CSOs (old) 
 
-0.0882 
  
-0.197* 
 
  
(0.0766) 
  
(0.109) 
 Log number CSOs (new) 
  
-0.152* 
  
-0.154** 
   
(0.0777) 
  
(0.0766) 
Constant -4.837 -10.79** 9.533 7.738 6.429 9.359 
 
(4.486) (4.730) (5.919) (5.919) (7.304) (5.916) 
       Observations 419 352 237 240 173 235 
R-squared 0.510 0.537 0.663 0.644 0.699 0.665 
              
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. Period fixed-
effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, 
education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource 
royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal employees directly 
appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include term in office, gender, education 
level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government party, margin of victory, legislative support and 
log campaign revenue (excluded in models 1, 2 and 3). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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The models originally presented in Table 5 and Table 6 were re-estimated in this new setup. 
The results are shown in Table 7 and Table 8. This alternative approach for estimating the 
effect of electoral accountability yields consistently positive coefficients for the treatment 
effects in the case of the narrow sample, and also mostly positive in the case of the broad 
sample. Although these results are not statistically significant at the 95% level, only at the 90% 
level in some specifications, it is important to point out that variance inflation factors are 
considerably high (around 16) for the electoral accountability treatment, indicating that 
standard errors are inflated and about four times higher than they should be in the absence of 
high collinearity with other variables. For the other accountability treatments, the estimated 
treatment effects become consistently positive across all models with both samples, contrary 
to the expected deterrence role of accountability. However, these results are still not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, with the exception of the estimate for horizontal 
accountability in one specification with the narrow sample.  
These models also perform well in terms of the normality of residuals and the model fit. As in 
the original models, a few observations appear to be highly influential on some coefficients. 
After they are removed from the sample35, the estimates for the main treatment variables do 
not change significantly and retain the positive sign in almost all models, but these results are 
still not statistically significant at conventional levels. The only accountability indicator that 
appears to be significantly associated with lower corruption is civil society density (based on 
the new methodology) in the models with the broad sample. This is still the case in the 
estimations without influential observations. These results are displayed in Table 26 in 
Appendix B. 
It is puzzling to see, for all three treatment variables, positive effects on the corruption 
indicator, which are even sometimes statistically significant at least at the 90% confidence 
level, as this goes against the expectation derived from the deterrence hypothesis under test. 
Indeed, based on the theoretical discussion used to fundament the analysis, it is difficult to 
derive an explanation why corruption might in fact increase as a result of effective 
accountability, as the estimated treatment effects displayed above suggest. In light of these 
results, it is important to consider a potential bias from the measurement issues discussed in 
                                                          
35
 The criterion applied here was again to select only the observations with dfbetas above the absolute 
value of one standard error. 
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the previous section. As described earlier, the corruption estimates for later periods may be 
influenced by a higher probability of detection of irregularities in the second audit. Looking at 
the results presented so far, it is plausible that this measurement bias is resulting in an 
apparent increase of corruption. 
This begs the question whether the positive coefficients could be so biased as to mask a true 
significant negative treatment effect. However, as already argued before, it seems unlikely 
that a strong bias would persist in the presence of a true deterrent effect of accountability on 
corruption, as in that case the true level of corruption subject to detection in the second audit 
would be lower, thereby minimizing the potential for an apparently inflated number of 
corruption violations. Moreover, since the dependent variable used in the estimation is the 
log-transformed number of violations, the risk that observations with extreme values are 
driving the results is also reduced, and the sensitivity analysis has verified that results do not 
change significantly when influential observations are removed. 
This alternative setup to circumvent endogeneity problems in the case of electoral 
accountability offers yet another possibility to identify the effect of this variable on corruption 
levels. Given that the data is structured with one control situation and one treatment situation 
for each municipality, it is possible to explore the difference in corruption levels observed 
between T(-1) and T(0), i.e. in the control situation almost as a true counterfactual of the 
difference observed in the treatment situation for each panel unit, only accounting for the 
time difference between the two. Differently than in the standard difference-in-differences 
estimation, this offers stronger inferential leverage due to the fact that the primary 
comparison is between observations for the same municipality, which makes it possible to 
eliminate the effect of potential unobservable municipal characteristics. 
In order to extract the confounding effect of the time difference between the control and 
treatment situations, we estimate a regression model of corruption based on all time-varying 
covariates considered in the original difference-in-differences models, and predict the 
respective residuals for all observations36. These residuals reflect the remaining level of 
                                                          
36
 These models were also estimated with the log corruption violations as dependent variable, and 
included audit scope controls (number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years), 
period fixed-effects, municipal controls (education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of 
transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban 
population, log % of municipal employees directly appointed, and GDP growth), and mayor 
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corruption that should be explained only by the exogenous release of audit information in T(0). 
In order to better illustrate the basis for comparison here, let us consider Crk1 as the residual 
for T(-1) for municipality k, Crk2 the residual corruption for T(0), and Crk3 the residual for T(1). 
We are interested in the following differences: 
DTk = (Crk3 - Crk2), which reflects the difference before and after treatment for the treatment 
situation, and 
DCk = (Crk2 - Crk1), representing the difference between the before and after periods for the 
control situation. 
 
The “individual” treatment effect is the difference between DTk and DCk for each municipality. If 
we were to observe a deterrence effect of electoral accountability, we would expect DTk to be 
negative, with lower residual corruption levels in the after treatment period, and this 
difference should also be larger in magnitude than DCk. Therefore, in the presence of a 
deterrence effect of electoral accountability, the estimated treatment effect should be 
negative. In a first step, t-tests comparing the mean DT to the mean DC were conducted, 
showing no statistically significant difference between the two for any of the possible 
underlying models tested; all differences are also very small in magnitude, with standard 
errors at least twice as large, depending on the different model specification tested and the 
sample used. However, this procedure is comparing only the averages for each period. 
The next step was to calculate the actual “individual” treatment effects for each panel unit, 
and then to calculate the average treatment effect. Due to missing data for part of the 
observations in the data set, we unfortunately have much fewer panel units for which the 
direct comparison is possible, and this is the case only for residuals generated from models 
excluding number of civil society organizations and log campaign revenue. In order to have a 
slightly larger alternative sample to conduct the analysis, the residuals calculated with a 
reduced specification excluding two other control variables were also used. The resulting 
                                                                                                                                                                          
characteristics (gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government 
party, margin of victory, legislative support). Alternative specifications including also the number of civil 
society organizations and log campaign revenue were tested as well, but did not yield enough 
observations for direct comparison through this procedure. 
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average differences and the confidence intervals are displayed in Table 9. Through this 
procedure, although the estimated effects have the expected sign, we similarly fail to find an 
average treatment effect statistically distinguishable from zero in all variations tested. 
 
Table 9. Estimated average treatment effects 
 
N ATE Confidence interval 
Full specification 
    
Narrow Sample 34 -0.1112126 -0.5656146 0.34318943 
Broad Sample 48 -0.0969416 -0.4822255 0.28834238 
 
    
Reduced specification 
   Narrow Sample 44 -0.0466971 -0.493363 0.39996882 
Broad Sample 74 -0.1011003 -0.4347948 0.23259409 
     Note: The reduced specification excludes the log % of natural resource royalties in municipal revenue and 
the log % of municipal employees directly appointed. Confidence intervals calculated at 95% level. 
 
Over all, we see again that, even with alternative approaches to remove the endogeneity bias 
at least for the effects of electoral accountability, there is no robust evidence for any deterrent 
effect of accountability on future corruption levels, even taking into consideration a potential 
bias due to measurement issues. 
 
Panel regression models 
In addition to the difference-in-differences approach, panel regression with fixed- and random-
effects was conducted on data for all the five periods available. The tables below show the 
results for the main models with the full set of controls37. In the fixed-effects models with the 
narrow sample (Table 10), the estimates for electoral accountability are all negative, as 
predicted, and statistically significant at the 95% confidence level in three of the four models. 
In the case of social accountability, the coefficients for both indicators are mostly negative and 
statistically significant with the expected sign in part of the specifications. For horizontal 
                                                          
37
 Due to insufficient overlap between the time periods with data for civil society density based on the 
old methodology and for campaign funds, models including both variables could not be estimated. 
Therefore, for comparative purposes only models with the new measure for civil society are reported. 
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accountability, the estimated coefficients are also partly statistically significant, but their signs 
are still mainly positive. 
These first results appear to be sensitive to changes in the sample. For the same models 
estimated with the broad sample (Table 11), only the coefficients for horizontal accountability 
remain statistically significant, retaining the positive sign. The sign of the coefficient for 
electoral accountability becomes unstable. The estimates for radio presence and civil society 
density are still mostly negative, but no longer statistically significant. It is important to 
highlight that the models with the broad sample offer better conditions for verifying within-
unit changes, as they take into consideration more observations per municipality, on average. 
This is because the electoral accountability variable has several missing data points for the 
municipalities in the narrow sample, as the coding for this variable is based on a more 
restricted notion of electoral accountability. Therefore, the models with the narrow sample 
include several panel units with only one observation. 
Alternative specifications with a measure of change in vote share as the indicator for electoral 
accountability show that the results observed are not robust (see Table 27 in Appendix B). It is 
important to note that we expect the opposite relationship when using this variable: lower 
values of the change in vote share are associated with stronger accountability, thus we should 
expect coefficients to be positive. In only one of the models with the narrow sample do we see 
a statistically significant effect in the expected direction. The estimates for horizontal 
accountability and for civil society density become more erratic, with varying signs, although 
statistically significant in some specifications. The models with the broad sample are even less 
consistent with those yielded with the binary electoral accountability indicator, since all 
estimates have the opposite sign than what we would expect, and in two of the models the 
estimates are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 
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Table 10. Fixed-effects models with log number of corruption violations as dependent variable 
(narrow sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
EA previous mayor -0.542* -2.110*** -3.272*** -1.929*** 
 
(0.309) (0.464) (0.372) (0.432) 
HA previous mayor -0.164 0.611*** 0.371*** 0.211* 
 
(0.238) (0.193) (0.115) (0.109) 
Radio presence 0.556 -0.281* -0.451** -0.296*** 
 
(0.339) (0.145) (0.197) (0.106) 
Log number CSOs (new) 
 
-0.0315 
 
-0.856*** 
  
(0.240) 
 
(0.164) 
Constant -13.98 -25.91* -26.31*** -5.666 
 
(21.41) (13.80) (9.602) (7.454) 
     Observations 137 105 111 104 
R-squared 0.590 0.963 0.974 0.991 
Number of panel units 85 80 84 80 
          
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each 
period in years. Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. 
Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log 
population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in 
municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal 
employees directly appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics 
include gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal 
government party, margin of victory, legislative support and log campaign revenue 
(excluded in models 1 and 2). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 11. Fixed-effects models with log number of corruption violations as dependent variable 
(broad sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
EA previous mayor -0.0575 0.0163 -0.0249 0.0482 
 
(0.179) (0.215) (0.170) (0.222) 
HA previous mayor 0.171 0.369*** 0.359** 0.375*** 
 
(0.146) (0.140) (0.138) (0.139) 
Radio presence 0.148 -0.185 -0.0151 -0.222 
 
(0.156) (0.136) (0.147) (0.144) 
Log number CSOs (new) 
 
-0.286 
 
-0.250 
  
(0.209) 
 
(0.221) 
Constant -13.35 4.524 -2.121 7.703 
 
(10.00) (14.18) (13.38) (14.10) 
     Observations 269 200 210 199 
R-squared 0.524 0.694 0.746 0.698 
Number of panel units 130 127 129 127 
          
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each 
period in years. Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. 
Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log 
population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in 
municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal 
employees directly appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics 
include term in office, gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to 
federal government party, margin of victory, legislative support and log campaign 
revenue (excluded in models 1 and 2). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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The models from the tables above were also estimated with random-effects, in order to better 
account for the impact of some accountability variables that may vary little over time within 
some of the units in the sample (e.g. radio presence). The results for those models are 
presented in Table 12 and Table 13. For the narrow sample, the coefficients for electoral 
accountability are still negative, but no longer statistically significant. Horizontal accountability 
presents unstable signs in the narrow sample, and the estimates are not statistically significant 
either. The estimated effect for radio presence is now positive, contrary to what was 
hypothesized, but not statistically significant. Finally, only the coefficients for civil society 
density suggest a statistically significant effect of this indicator for social accountability, at least 
at the 90% confidence level. 
The results for the broad sample are to a large extent similar to those for the narrow sample. 
None of the accountability measures show a statistically significant effect, except civil society 
density. The coefficients for electoral accountability become also unstable and present a 
negative sign in one specification. The estimates for horizontal accountability continue to show 
positive signs. The coefficient for radio presence also becomes unstable and shows a positive 
sign in one of the models. The alternative specifications with change in vote share as a 
measure of electoral accountability also fail to find evidence for a deterrent effect of this 
accountability dimension on corruption (see Table 28 in Appendix B). The coefficients for this 
indicator present volatile signs across specifications with the narrow and broad samples. The 
results for the other accountability indicators are very similar to those observed in the original 
models. 
A Hausman test was conducted to confront the consistency and efficiency of the random-
effects results to those originating from the fixed-effects estimation. According to the test, the 
models with the narrow sample are generally less consistent than the fixed-effects alternative, 
except for model 1 in Table 12. For the broad sample, however, the random-effects results are 
preferred. In either case, however, these panel estimations also fail to offer robust evidence of 
a deterrent effect of the three dimensions of accountability on corruption levels in Brazilian 
municipalities.  
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Table 12. Random-effects models with log number of corruption violations as dependent 
variable (narrow sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
EA previous mayor -0.0521 -0.372 -0.244 -0.269 
 
(0.314) (0.466) (0.270) (0.490) 
HA previous mayor -0.107 -0.0188 0.0757 0.0932 
 
(0.154) (0.164) (0.181) (0.161) 
Radio presence 0.136 0.0775 0.0984 0.0688 
 
(0.147) (0.178) (0.180) (0.190) 
Log number CSOs (new) 
 
-0.273* 
 
-0.364** 
  
(0.144) 
 
(0.160) 
Constant 11.17 19.33 10.11 11.83 
 
(10.36) (12.82) (13.33) (14.32) 
     Observations 137 105 111 104 
Number of panel units 85 80 84 80 
          
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each 
period in years. Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. 
Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log 
population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in 
municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal 
employees directly appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics 
include gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal 
government party, margin of victory, legislative support and log campaign revenue 
(excluded in models 1 and 2). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 13. Random-effects models with log number of corruption violations as dependent 
variable (broad sample) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
EA previous mayor 0.0517 -0.00544 0.0840 0.0198 
 
(0.143) (0.156) (0.144) (0.158) 
HA previous mayor 0.0570 0.0490 0.0760 0.0562 
 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) 
Radio presence -0.0163 -0.0186 0.0241 -0.0208 
 
(0.104) (0.102) (0.108) (0.101) 
Log number CSOs (new) 
 
-0.269*** 
 
-0.261*** 
  
(0.0982) 
 
(0.0984) 
Constant -0.857 6.345 3.735 5.191 
 
(5.342) (6.200) (5.704) (6.192) 
     Observations 269 200 210 199 
Number of panel units 130 127 129 127 
          
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each 
period in years. Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. 
Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log 
population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in 
municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal employees 
directly appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include term in 
office, gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government 
party, margin of victory, legislative support and log campaign revenue (excluded in models 1 
and 2). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Discussion and conclusion 
The empirical results described above do not present robust evidence for a deterrent effect of 
the distinct dimensions of accountability on corruption levels over time. Throughout the 
different approaches explored we observe that, in most cases, the very direction of the 
estimated relationships cannot be unequivocally identified, often pointing at different 
directions. In the case of electoral accountability, the results echo previous studies that also 
failed to find evidence for a sustained effect of electoral accountability on corruption over time 
(Bobonis et al. 2012; Crisp et al. 2014), at least in the short term. Only the fixed-effects models 
with the narrow sample show a statistically significant effect of electoral accountability on 
corruption. However, as already pointed out, these results are based on a relative small and 
unbalanced panel, for which not enough longitudinal information is available for all cases. 
Furthermore, this was not corroborated by the other estimation exercises. 
For this variable, we also see some discrepancy between results with the narrow and broad 
samples. The results for the broad sample seem to be more volatile, with the direction of the 
effect varying more across specifications than with the narrow sample. On the one hand, the 
estimates for the broad sample may indeed reflect more accurately the relationship (or lack 
thereof) between the dependent and independent variables, as they are based on a larger 
amount of data. At the same time, however, it is important to highlight that there is an 
essential conceptual difference between the two samples with regards to how electoral 
accountability is operationalized. As a consequence, the observed discrepancy may suggest a 
difference in the strength of reelection incentives for candidates running themselves for 
reelection, as in the narrow sample, and those that present a successor candidate, who may 
still have some incentives to refrain from corruption, but less so than when their personal 
career and continuance in power is at stake. 
The case for a deterrent effect of social accountability is also relatively weak based on the 
evidence collected here. The effects of radio presence are mostly volatile, pointing to opposite 
directions depending on the model specification and the sample used. A statistically significant 
negative effect of this variable on corruption is seen only for the narrow sample in the fixed-
effects models, and this finds no support in the other estimation procedures used. A negative 
effect of civil society density, on the other hand, is partially supported by the data and is found 
to be statistically significant, mainly for the broader sample, in some of the estimations 
conducted. Moreover, this is the only accountability variable for which the expected negative 
139 
sign of the coefficients is consistent across virtually all models and specifications tested. 
Nevertheless, the evidence presented is insufficient to confirm a robust deterrent effect of 
social accountability through increased civil society presence.  
The most puzzling case is certainly that of horizontal accountability. For this variable, the 
estimated models indicate, more often than not, a positive association with future corruption 
levels, although this is only statistically significant at conventional levels in a few of the models 
tested. Here the data more clearly contradicts the postulated hypothesis, although the 
evidence is not robust to all specifications. 
A key concern associated with these results, however, is the possibility that they are 
influenced by a potential bias in the measurement of the corruption indicator, due to the fact 
that the results from later audits are influenced by the existence of irregularities identified in 
previous audits. This characteristic of the auditing process implies an increased likelihood of 
detecting corruption violations in subsequent audits, which could cause the number of 
corruption violations found in later audits to be higher than before. Indeed, in several of the 
procedures used, the estimated effect of the accountability variables showed a positive sign, 
suggesting that the occurrence of accountability is associated with increased corruption in 
future periods. These results would be consistent with the potential measurement bias 
discussed: corruption appears to be on the increase because later audits have looked for it 
more carefully. In the case of horizontal accountability, for which the estimates were almost 
always positive across the different models tested, it could be that this problem is even more 
pronounced, because it likely correlates with the probability of horizontal accountability 
occurring in the first place. Indeed, in municipalities with more violations found in audit 1, the 
probability that the mayor has faced formal sanctions as a consequence should be higher 
simply because there are more facts to prosecute, administrative irregularities would be more 
severe, and a reaction leading to his potential removal from office could also be more likely. 
Similarly, the likelihood of a more thorough second audit should increase with the number of 
violations found in audit 1, as auditors would have more motivation to verify whether the 
administration has incurred in the same abuses as before. 
Even though this means that the estimated effects cannot be fully taken at face value, there 
are reasons to believe that the nature and magnitude of the bias are not occulting a deterrent 
effect of accountability on corruption. In fact, the impact of this bias should decrease the 
stronger the deterrent effect. After all, auditors would not be able to detect more corruption if 
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it had in fact decreased. The often positive effects found for electoral and horizontal 
accountability, and also for radio presence, which in some cases were even statistically 
significant with a 90% confidence level, can thus be interpreted as an indication that the 
expected deterrent effect is not taking place. Moreover, the fact that the analysis is still able to 
find more consistent evidence of a negative effect of civil society presence in several of the 
models further supports this interpretation; otherwise, the estimates for this variable should 
be equally distorted by measurement bias in the corruption indicator. 
These methodological shortcomings notwithstanding, we can therefore conclude that the 
evidence at hand does not provide indication for the hypothesized deterrent effect of 
accountability. Why do these dimensions of accountability apparently fail to bring about the 
expected deterrent effect on corruption, at least based on the available evidence from the 
Brazilian case? Despite the universal aspect of the hypotheses considered, and the favorable 
variation across Brazilian municipalities, there are some contextual elements at the macro 
level that may contribute to understanding why the data at hand does not offer any solid 
support to the deterrence thesis related to the role of accountability. 
In the case of electoral accountability, the Brazilian context suggests that the probability of 
mayors losing office, considering the sample at hand, is not so low. The sample distribution for 
the electoral accountability indicators in the data set vary between 43% and 46% of 
observations where electoral accountability was observed, i.e. the mayor or administration in 
power was voted out of office. In contrast to arguments and evidence from other contexts of a 
so-called incumbency advantage, it seems that this phenomenon is not as prevailing in the 
Brazilian case38. On the contrary, recent studies even suggest that Brazilian mayors may face 
an “incumbency disadvantage” instead (Brambor and Ceneviva 2012). In such a context, 
politicians may perceive their probability of losing office as already considerable, regardless of 
their performance. Incumbents may consider this as a certain level of unpredictability or 
“noise” in the behavior of voters, which creates a higher degree of uncertainty that becomes 
counterproductive for electoral accountability (Besley 2006). In such cases, their preferred 
strategy may become to take advantage of available rents while they can (Crisp et al. 2014). 
                                                          
38
 Studies on the incumbency advantage often rely on the American electoral context, in particular the 
high reelection rates for members of Congress, which are in many cases above 90%. Similar studies 
about Brazilian representatives have found an average reelection rate of only 50% (Brambor and 
Ceneviva 2012). 
141 
This could be an alternative mechanism by which an increased probability of electoral 
accountability results rather in the opposite effect and weakens incentives to refrain from 
corruption. 
Contextual idiosyncrasies related to the effectiveness of horizontal accountability by Brazilian 
enforcement and oversight institutions, in particular in the case of the judicial system and the 
Courts of Accounts, could also shed some light on why we tend to see the opposite effect of 
this dimension of accountability on corruption outcomes for the sample under analysis. This is 
also connected to the operationalization of this independent variable: due to empirical 
limitations in measuring effective punishment, the horizontal accountability indicator reflects 
in most cases only potential sanctions. Moreover, it is also possible that, even in the cases 
where legal and administrative sanctions are comparatively more likely, political actors still 
perceive the general probability of facing concrete punishment in the foreseeable future as 
sufficiently low to motivate them to continue engaging in corruption39. 
In the case of social accountability through increased media presence, the often observed 
pattern of media capture by local elites in Brazil (Boas and Hidalgo 2011; Hervieu et al. 2013; 
de Lima and Lopes 2007; Porto 2011) could be a mechanism behind the absence of a deterrent 
effect of radio presence on corruption levels. In such an environment, the presence of local 
media would likely not result in increased scrutiny over the local government and in more 
information reaching voters, thus reducing the potential for a virtuous impact of the media 
through this channel of accountability. 
It is also possible that the potential payoffs of corruption are still high enough to offset the 
incentives produced by accountability (Pereira et al. 2009), and this cannot be fully captured in 
the present analysis. Non-monetary payoffs, such as local power and influence or other perks 
related to executive office, probably play a significant role in the local context in Brazil. Such 
factors are likely to be associated with the particularistic allocation of resources, and although 
the analysis here sought to take into account cross-unit variation in terms of budgetary 
                                                          
39
 The rejection of municipal accounts by the Courts of Accounts, for instance, must be ultimately 
confirmed by the municipal Legislative in order to have binding effects. In the case of legal prosecution, 
judicial procedures in Brazil tend to take several years before a final conviction is reached, and in 
criminal cases this may even lead to charges being dismissed altogether if procedures take longer than 
the time limitations for sentencing established by law. This sort of inefficiency may be yet another factor 
contributing to a perception of generally low risks of concrete legal sanctions (de Alencar and Gico Jr. 
2011). 
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resources and the potential use of patronage, such indicators probably only capture part of the 
picture. 
Although the present analysis suggests a rather grim perspective for the anti-corruption power 
of accountability mechanisms, the few points discussed above suggest that its study requires 
further efforts to understand how certain contextual dimensions may condition that potential 
effect. The recent literature on how different accountability mechanisms may impact 
corruption outcomes is relatively scarce. New attempts to more systematically examine this 
question empirically in other contextual settings could offer valuable additional insights on this 
relationship and also contribute to refining the theoretical foundations behind the deterrence 
hypothesis. 
Additionally, more efforts are necessary to incorporate a temporal dimension into the study of 
accountability and corruption. The analyses conducted here sought to take a further step into 
that direction, but the empirical strategies explored are based on a relatively short time 
horizon, looking only at the immediate effects of accountability on future corruption levels. 
Perhaps this limitation is another reason why the expected deterrent effect could not be 
confirmed by data. The effective functioning of accountability mechanisms is ultimately 
associated with the consolidation of democratic institutions, and the deterrent effects 
proposed by the theoretical literature may indeed take longer periods of time to crystallize. 
Future research in this area should thus aim at devising empirical strategies in order to 
examine this question also from a longer temporal perspective. Such remaining gaps in the 
literature offer a promising agenda for future scholarly work in this field. 
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Electoral accountability of corrupt politicians: conditioning factors 
revisited 
 
Abstract 
In the past years, a growing literature has examined the impact of corruption accusations on 
voting behavior and found that, although incumbents appear to suffer some vote share loss 
after being associated with corruption scandals, a vast majority of them gets reelected 
nonetheless. If voters do not exercise electoral accountability against corrupt politicians as 
effectively as democratic theory would expect, what conditions explain this pattern? Which 
factors favor or hinder their decision to remove corrupt incumbents from office? The literature 
suggests a number of contextual factors and voters’ attitudes that may condition corruption 
voting, but most studies examine them in a fragmented way. This paper seeks to address this 
gap in the existing scholarship on the topic by building a comprehensive model to test the 
validity of five central hypotheses discussed in previous works. Original corruption data from 
randomized audits in 383 Brazilian municipalities are used in the analysis. The results provide 
partial evidence for only two of the hypothesized mechanisms: (a) electoral accountability of 
corrupt incumbents is weakened by recent positive assessments of their performance in office, 
in particular in terms of improvements in economic conditions, and (b) voters appear to punish 
more strongly politicians facing more corruption accusations, but this is conditional on the 
timing of the audit. 
 
In the past years, the sustained electoral success of candidates accused of corruption in 
various contexts has puzzled many researchers. This apparent paradox of “unpopular 
corruption and popular corrupt politicians” (Kurer 2001, 63) has motivated two interconnected 
research streams: one concerned with estimating more precisely the extent to which voters 
retrospectively punish incumbents based on corruption information–what has been called 
corruption voting (Rundquist et al. 1977)–and another, more recent one seeking to understand 
what keeps voters from exercising electoral accountability against corrupt incumbents. 
The first of those research streams has largely corroborated that voters, more often than not, 
fail to hold corrupt politicians accountable at the ballot box. On the one hand, the electorate 
seems to withdraw some support for corrupt incumbents, resulting in (small) losses in their 
vote shares (Bågenholm 2013; Chong et al. 2015; Costas-Pérez et al. 2012; Dimock and 
Jacobson 1995; Eggers and Fisher 2011; Lafay and Servais 2000; Peters and Welch 1980; Reed 
1999; Welch and Hibbing 1997) and a somewhat lower probability of reelection (Chang et al. 
146 
2010; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Jucá et al. 2016; Pereira and Melo 2015). Nevertheless, still a vast 
majority of corrupt politicians are able to secure a new term, even in more consolidated 
democracies. Therefore, although voters are not completely oblivious to the involvement of 
their representatives with corruption, “[…] the modal corrupt politician is successfully 
reelected despite charges, or even convictions, of illegal behavior” (Golden 2006, 8). 
Moreover, the few cases of across-the-board rejection of corrupt politicians have been so 
exceptional1, that a more cynical observer may wonder not why voters sometimes fail to throw 
the rascals out, but instead why they are ever able to punish them at all (Johnston 2013). 
So if we know that electoral accountability does not always work, the question that begs more 
attention is when does it work, i.e. under what circumstances are voters willing and able to 
remove corrupt politicians from office? The literature briefly discussed above has also raised a 
few hypotheses on factors that may condition voters’ response to corruption accusations, 
including contextual factors such as the information environment (Chang et al. 2010; Ferraz 
and Finan 2008) and the type of electoral system (Eggers and Fisher 2011; Reed 1999), as well 
as characteristics of the electorate, such as partisanship (Dimock and Jacobson 1995). These 
and other hypotheses on how corruption voting is in fact contingent on a wide range of macro- 
and micro-level factors (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013) have been further developed in 
numerous recent observational and experimental studies pertaining to the second stream of 
research mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, current scholarship on these conditioning variables 
is still largely fragmented, with partly contradictory findings and studies that often examine 
isolated hypotheses and overlook other relevant competing explanations. 
The main objective of the analysis presented here is to contribute to this emerging empirical 
literature by assessing the determinants of electoral accountability against corrupt politicians 
more systematically, in a comprehensive model that emphasizes the main recurring 
hypotheses raised in the existing scholarship. In order to gain additional inferential leverage, 
the focus of the analysis will be on comparing the electoral performance of successful and 
unsuccessful corrupt politicians, thus exploring a sub-sample that allows us to implicitly 
observe complex simultaneous interactions between corruption information and other 
explanatory factors that have been only partly modeled in previous studies. 
                                                          
1
 See Castro and Nunes (2014), Rennó Jr. (2008) and Chang et al. (2010) for a few examples from Brazil 
and Italy. 
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The methodological approach relies on original corruption data from 383 Brazilian 
municipalities, thus exploiting both the availability of a concrete indicator of corruption and 
the advantages of a sub-national context with institutional commonalities. Overall, the findings 
show partial evidence for only two of the hypothesized mechanisms: (a) electoral 
accountability of corrupt incumbents is weakened by recent positive assessments of their 
performance in office, in particular in terms of improvements in economic conditions, and (b) 
voters appear to punish more strongly politicians facing more corruption accusations, but this 
is conditional on the timing of the audit. 
The study first presents an overview of the core hypotheses discussed in the literature and the 
related findings. The next section then describes the methodological approach and data 
sources, followed by the estimation procedures and results. The final section discusses the 
main findings and concludes with their implications for future research in this area. 
 
Theoretical background and previous findings 
The broader literature on electoral accountability has highlighted that its effectiveness can be 
affected or conditioned by a number of factors, from institutional structures2 to individual 
voter characteristics (Anderson 2007; Ashworth 2012; Kayser 2014). In the past years, several 
studies have addressed this question in the particular case of corruption voting, by examining 
various isolated arguments often articulated in the theoretical literature on retrospective 
voting and voting behavior more generally. This section seeks to present an overview of the 
most recurring arguments in the relevant literature and the related empirical findings. This 
review will serve as the basis for the selection of hypotheses to be tested later. 
                                                          
2
 As briefly mentioned earlier, formal institutional features such as electoral systems have been 
mentioned as potentially affecting corruption voting (Eggers and Fisher 2011; Reed 1999; de Sousa and 
Moriconi 2013). However, in the empirical literature of interest here, these factors have not been 
systematically explored, given that a vast majority of studies either takes an experimental approach or 
focuses on single countries, rendering such issues irrelevant. Two studies explore a moderating effect of 
institutional factors pertaining to the concept of clarity of responsibility, but both fail to find consistent 
evidence to support this, and comparability of results is weakened by the fact that the indicators used 
vary considerably (Ecker et al. 2016; Xezonakis et al. 2016). Given the limited emphasis that these 
factors have received so far in the existing literature, they are not included among the main hypotheses 
highlighted in this study, but are taken into consideration as control variables for the empirical analysis 
conducted later. 
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One of the key hypotheses of interest here refers to the role of information. Indeed, we can 
consider information on corrupt behavior on the part of incumbent politicians as a pre-
condition for electoral accountability, understood as a sanctioning mechanism. This argument 
has direct connection with contemporary models of electoral accountability that have 
emphasized the importance of the informational environment for voting behavior (Ashworth 
2012; Besley 2006; Klašnja 2011). Based on a principal-agent framework, such models rely on 
the idea that there is some information asymmetry between voters and politicians, where the 
former cannot fully observe politicians’ types (i.e. how honest or competent they are) and 
their actions in office. Therefore, it is argued that uninformed and ignorant voters are less 
likely to hold corrupt politicians accountable at the ballot box, since they lack the information 
to recognize the politicians’ type (Chang and Kerr 2009; Golden 2009; Klašnja 2011; Rundquist 
et al. 1977; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). By the same logic, increased availability of 
information should improve signals of politicians’ characteristics that are relevant for voters’ 
decisions, thereby increasing voters’ ability to punish corrupt incumbents and select better 
candidates. 
Once information on the corrupt behavior of politicians is made available, either through 
public enforcement agencies, media reports or accusations from opponents, an essential 
factor influencing its potential electoral impact is the extent to which this information 
effectively reaches voters. In association with this argument, a few studies have highlighted 
the influence of the media on electoral accountability against corrupt politicians. Ferraz and 
Finan (2008), for instance, analyze the impact of corruption information from municipal audit 
reports on the electoral performance of incumbent mayors in Brazil. They find that the 
presence of local radio stations strengthens the negative effect of the audits’ findings, when 
information on corruption dealings is uncovered. The study by Chang et al. (2010) on electoral 
accountability for corruption throughout Italian post-war legislatures also emphasizes the 
impact of the media in explaining the exceptional reaction of the electorate against corrupt 
legislators in the 1994 elections. The authors attribute this unique episode of strengthened 
electoral accountability to changes in the informational environment, due to an upsurge in 
press coverage of corruption issues at the time. A similar argument is made by Costas-Pérez et 
al. (2012), who find that more intense media coverage of corruption scandals involving Spanish 
mayors, measured as the number of news articles published, resulted in a larger loss of vote 
share in the subsequent elections. Klašnja et al. (2016) also argue that the effect of corruption 
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perceptions on voting intention is moderated by its level of salience, which is intensified by 
increased media coverage on the issue. 
Also in connection with the information hypothesis, a different approach is taken by Klašnja 
(2011), who uses a measure of political knowledge derived from survey data to capture the 
differential effects of corrupt accusations on voting behavior according to the level of political 
information that voters possess. He finds that a voter at a high level of political awareness is 
significantly less likely to vote for an incumbent involved in a corruption scandal, whereas less 
informed voters do not appear to have their decision influenced by the scandals. 
Finally, an experimental study by Figueiredo et al. (2011) used the context of the 2008 run-off 
municipal elections in São Paulo to test how targeted information on corruption involvement 
of the candidates would affect their electoral performance. Both the incumbent mayor and the 
challenger candidate had been simultaneously included in a black-list of candidates convicted 
on administrative improbity charges that was disclosed by a magistrate’s association prior to 
the election. The experiment involved distributing flyers with information on the conviction of 
one of the candidates to households in 100 randomly assigned voting precincts. The authors 
find a negative effect of the flyer treatment, but only in the case of the challenger candidate. 
These results partially confirm how ensuring that voters have access to information on 
corruption involvement of candidates can strengthen corruption voting, but the authors also 
point to other potential contingent effects related to candidate-specific attributes (e.g.party 
affiliation) or differences in the severity of the charges (Figueiredo et al. 2011, 28)3. These 
alternative hypotheses are discussed in more detail below. 
One important reservation to be made about the impact of information on electoral 
accountability concerns its credibility and reliability (Botero et al. 2015; Jiménez and Caínzos 
2004; de Sousa and Moriconi 2013; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2014). A key aspect refers to 
the source of the accusations, and the perceived agenda that the accusers might have. It is 
argued, for instance, that accusations from independent enforcement or control agencies 
                                                          
3
 Mr. Kassab received a conviction for improper use of public advertisement funds for an ad campaign 
that allegedly promoted his personal interests while he was Secretary of Planning in São Paulo, in 1997. 
The conviction was overturned on appeal. Ms. Suplicy, on the other hand, was convicted for having 
awarded a R$ 2 million no-bid contract, during her term as mayor of São Paulo (2001-2004), to a NGO 
founded by her in 1990 and where she was honorary chairman until 2000. Her conviction was still on 
appeal at the time of the election. 
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should be seen as less biased, and therefore more credible, by voters (Fernández-Vázquez et 
al. 2013; Klašnja 2011; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2014; cf. Sberna and Vannucci 2013;)4, in 
contrast to accusations from adversary parties, that would be more likely discounted by voters 
as “partisan tricks” (Rundquist et al. 1977, 955; cf. Bågenholm and Charron 2014). 
Two studies on corruption voting in Spain corroborate these arguments. A survey experiment 
conducted by Muñoz et al. (2012) found that the strategy of the accused incumbent’s political 
party of either acknowledging corruption allegations or denying them altogether has an impact 
on how credible voters perceive the accusations to be: respondents were more likely to 
dismiss corruption allegations from opposition parties as “noise”, i.e. empty accusations with 
little credibility, and continue to vote for the accused mayor when his/her party refused to 
acknowledge the charges. Another study by Costas-Pérez et al. (2012) shows that corruption 
scandals reported by the media and later corroborated by judicial investigations had a larger 
effect on electoral outcomes than those dismissed by the courts or not investigated, thus 
suggesting that voters assigned different degrees of credibility to the accusations based on the 
level of judicial involvement in the case. Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2014) similarly find 
evidence for the impact of source credibility on corruption voting in a survey experiment 
conducted in Brazil. They show that respondents’ were significantly less likely to vote for an 
incumbent mayor accused of corruption, and that this reaction was stronger when the 
accusation came from federal audits instead of an opposition party. 
Although the informational thesis remains prominent in the literature, it fails to account for 
many of the empirical cases that have been explored in previous studies, where punishment of 
corrupt politicians was limited despite highly visible scandals in countries with considerable 
press freedom and no apparent shortage of information (Chang and Kerr 2009). Therefore, 
other hypotheses have explored the perspective that voters may have other reasons to 
continue supporting corrupt politicians, despite being aware of their corrupt dealings, and thus 
face trade-offs in their voting decision. One such trade-off would involve an implicit exchange 
mechanism, whereby voters may rationally choose to support a corrupt candidate by weighing 
                                                          
4
 Nevertheless, De Sousa and Moriconi (2013) mention that this depends on the level of trust in those 
institutions. If, for instance, voters don’t trust the Judiciary, their confidence in information on 
prosecutions and convictions could be negatively affected. Botero et al. (2015) provide an example of 
this with their study on Colombia, where corruption information published in a reputable newspaper 
was seen as more trustworthy than that coming from the courts. 
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the corruption accusations against their evaluation of the politician’s type based on other 
criteria, such as competence or ideological congruence (Muñoz et al. 2012; Rundquist et al. 
1977; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). Therefore, while facing the choice between a corrupt 
candidate that appears to be competent or shares their views on other important issues and a 
clean candidate seen as incompetent or as having contrary positions on those issues, they may 
prefer the former. 
A few experimental studies from different settings have found evidence supporting the implicit 
exchange argument. Rundquist et al. (1977), for instance, show that respondents were much 
less likely to switch their vote after knowing that their preferred candidate was accused of 
corruption, whenever they shared his/her policy positions on issues that were particularly 
salient to the respective respondent. The experiment by Muñoz et al. (2012) in Spain also 
included treatment vignettes with information on the performance of the incumbent in office 
to test this hypothesis, showing that individuals who were told that the incumbent mayor had 
a good administration were significantly more likely to ignore the corruption accusation when 
declaring their vote preference, in comparison to those that were told the mayor’s 
administration was poor. 
Another survey experiment conducted by Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) in Greece also 
finds evidence in support of the implicit exchange hypothesis: respondents who were told that 
a mayor was accused of corruption, but had cut taxes during his/her administration, had a 
statistically significant higher propensity of voting for him/her in comparison to the control 
group that did not receive this information. Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013), on the other 
hand, find no robust evidence for the implicit exchange mechanism as a result of a survey 
experiment conducted in Brazil. Drawing on the Brazilian popular belief that voter behavior is 
commonly influenced by this logic–embodied in the well-known expression “rouba, mas faz” 
(“he robs, but gets things done”)–, they test whether voters, presented with a trade-off 
between a corrupt and competent5 mayor and a non-corrupt incompetent one, are more likely 
                                                          
5
 The understanding of competence applied in the study refers to the politician’s performance in 
providing public goods (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). 
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to vote for the former. Their results show that respondents were on average 34% more likely 
to vote for the clean incompetent mayor than for the corrupt competent one6. 
Some observational studies examine this type of trade-off hypothesis with different 
approaches, and find similarly confirmatory evidence. A study by Pereira and Melo (2015) on 
Brazilian municipalities tests whether voters are less reactive to accusations of corruption 
against governments that provide them with more public goods, measured as public 
expenditures on areas such as education, health, transportation, security, and housing. Indeed, 
they show that the impact of information about corruption on electoral outcomes exists, but 
disappears as the level of expenditures rises. Brollo (2010) also highlights a mediating effect of 
public expenditure. She finds that corruption information uncovered through municipal audits 
does impact mayors’ reelection chances, but argues that this effect is largely explained by the 
fact that municipalities with more irregularities are “punished” by the central government and 
receive less transfers. Thus, voters’ electoral response against corrupt mayors is in most cases 
a consequence of a decline in the provision of public infra-structure resulting from reduced 
federal transfers than a direct response to the corruption accusations per se. 
Also examining the municipal level in Spain, Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2013) discuss a different 
version of the implicit exchange hypothesis, where they test whether voters’ punishment of 
corrupt mayors is conditional on the welfare impact of their corrupt dealings. They classify 
each case of corruption in their sample as welfare-enhancing or welfare-decreasing, based on 
an assessment of the economic externalities associated with the corrupt transactions7, and 
find that corruption accusations only have a statistically significant negative effect on the 
incumbent’s vote share for the welfare-decreasing cases. Therefore, consistent with the 
implicit exchange idea, voters appear to be less likely to exercise electoral accountability 
                                                          
6
 Nevertheless, they do find partial evidence for the trade-off argument in a sub-sample of high income 
respondents, among which the corruption information had no effect on voting behavior. 
7
 The authors consider corruption to be welfare-enhancing when it leads to an increase of economic 
activity in the municipality, at least in the short term. An example that they mention is the construction 
of a housing project in a protected area, which generates new jobs and local demand. Cases of 
procurement fraud and embezzlement, on the other hand, more clearly generate inefficiencies and are 
thus considered as welfare-decreasing. The classification is associated with the counterfactual of the 
economic impact if the mayor had abstained from corruption (Fernández-Vázquez et al. 2013, 10).  
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against corrupt mayors if their illegal activities have generated economic benefits for the 
municipality8. 
A few other works have approached this implicit exchange hypothesis from a different 
perspective, by testing whether the state of the economy conditions corruption voting. It is 
argued that voters may trade-off corruption for economic well-being: under favorable 
economic conditions, they would be more willing to overlook corruption and continue to 
support the government, whereas a bad economic situation would trigger a stronger response 
of voters against corrupt politicians (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). Two cross-
national studies present evidence confirming this argument. A comparative analysis of 19 Latin 
American countries by Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) shows that, as citizens’ 
evaluations of the national economy improves, the effect of corruption perception on 
presidential support decreases, disappearing for very positive assessments of economic 
conditions. Another comparative study on 115 developing countries9 also found evidence that 
corruption perceptions only affect the incumbent government’s vote share negatively under 
low or negative economic growth (Choi and Woo 2010). An experimental study by Klašnja and 
Tucker (2012) also offers partial support for a moderating effect of economic conditions on 
corruption voting. They find evidence that corruption voting is conditional on bad economic 
circumstances in Moldova, identified as a high corruption country, but the same effect was not 
observed in a similar experiment conducted in Sweden, a low corruption country, where 
corruption voting took place regardless of the state of the economy. 
The implicit exchange argument emerged as a counterpoint to a more traditional hypothesis in 
the literature, namely that voters’ support for corrupt politicians may be related to another 
type of trade-off associated with more ‘explicit’ inducements, i.e. concrete material incentives 
that voters receive from a politician accused of corruption (Johnston 2013; Rundquist et al. 
1977). This would most likely be related to practices such as clientelism, or patronage, which 
can be understood as “[…] a particular mode of ‘exchange’ between electoral constituencies as 
principals and politicians as agents in democratic systems […]” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 
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 While testing the alternative hypothesis of the effect of information, though, they find that increased 
media attention to the scandal contributes to electoral retribution even in cases of welfare-enhancing 
corruption, which again highlights the conditioning effect of the information environment. 
9
 It is important to note, however, that the sample used in this study also includes partial democracies, 
which raises questions about its adequacy for examining conditions for electoral accountability. 
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7), where clients usually receive material inducements such as jobs, contracts, cash transfers 
or other similar advantages in return for political support to their patrons (Manzetti and 
Wilson 2007). Voters that belong to clientelistic networks thus have an incentive to retribute 
material benefits that they receive or expect to receive from their patron politicians by voting 
for them, regardless of whether they are accused of corruption in office or not (Chang and Kerr 
2009; Kurer 2001; Manzetti and Wilson 2007). 
This hypothesis can be particularly difficult to test empirically due to the challenge of 
documenting good measures of clientelism (Kitschelt et al. 2009). Manzetti and Wilson (2007), 
for instance, examine the effect of individual corruption perceptions on support for the 
government conditioned by the level of clientelism in a sample of 14 countries. They try to go 
around the problem of measuring the latter variable by using an indicator of weak institutions–
an index of government effectiveness–, based on the argument that clientelism and weak 
institutions are closely associated. They find that respondents who perceive corruption to be 
widespread in their country are more likely to be satisfied with the government when 
government effectiveness is low, and the authors argue that, in those conditions, voters are 
more likely to benefit from patronage10.  
Chang and Kerr (2009) also explore the consequences of corruption on government support 
conditioned by the existence of patronage, but they develop a more specific, survey-based 
indicator of patronage at the individual level. Using Afrobarometer data for 18 sub-Saharan 
African democracies, they examine the effect of personal experience with corruption on 
government support, conditioned on voters’ status of “insiders”, which includes both 
patronage insiders, i.e. voters that directly benefit from patronage networks, and identity 
insiders, who may identify with politicians on a partisan or ethnic basis. Respondents were 
coded as patronage insiders when their response to the question of what they would do to 
solve problems they might face due to bureaucratic red tape or government harassment was 
“use connections to influential people”, which the authors interpret as a sign that those 
individuals are more likely to have such connections in the first place. Their empirical analysis 
                                                          
10
 However, several questions may be raised about their assumptions and choice of indicator for 
clientelism, since government effectiveness may be linked to support for government through other 
mechanisms besides the one hypothesized by them. 
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finds that experience with corruption among insiders has no significant effect on support for 
the government, whereas it has a significant negative effect in the case of outsiders11. 
Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013), on the other hand, do not find strong evidence that 
clientelism weakens voters’ reaction to corruption accusations. Their experiment included a 
clientelism treatment in which participants were told that the mayor had implemented a 
program of temporary jobs for unemployed citizens in the municipal administration by-passing 
the usual hiring procedures in the public sector. They find that information on the mayor’s 
attempt to build a clientelistic network had an estimated negative effect on the propensity to 
vote for this mayor, although this was not robustly significant12. 
The studies by Chang and Kerr (2009) and Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) discussed above 
draw attention to another factor that may influence electoral accountability of corrupt 
politicians, namely voters’ identity bias. When voters identify with those politicians on aspects 
such as partisanship or ethnicity, they may be more inclined to dismiss corruption accusations 
either because they deem them unreliable or because they tend to be more tolerant of 
corruption involvement by politicians they support or identify with (Anduiza et al. 2013; Chang 
and Kerr 2009; Golden 2009; Jiménez and Caínzos 2004; Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 2013; 
Muñoz et al. 2012). Therefore, such identity-related factors appear to distort the cognitive 
process by which voters interpret information on corruption, and may thus reduce their 
disposition to punish corrupt incumbents with whom they share such characteristics13. 
The empirical evidence on these arguments are inconclusive. Chang and Kerr (2009) partly 
provide support for this hypothesis in their study, in which they find that partisan and ethnic 
insiders’ perception of corruption by the incumbent they support is significantly lower than for 
outsiders, i.e. those that identified with the opposition parties or other ethnic groups. 
However, they do not find confirmatory evidence that these insiders are indeed more tolerant 
of corruption. Dimock and Jacobson (1995) also offer evidence for the partisanship argument, 
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 One drawback from the study, though, is that the authors do not distinguish between patronage and 
identity insiders, thus making it impossible to identify to which degree each mechanism is driving these 
results. 
12
 It is important to note, however, that the study does not apply the clientelism hypothesis as involving 
whether respondents directly benefited from clientelistic exchange. 
13
 The impact of these factors can also be related to extensions of political agency models. One such 
analysis is offered by Besley (2006, 124–28). 
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showing that party identification had a significant impact in voters’ reaction to the House Bank 
scandal. Ecker et al. (2016) also provide evidence for this hypothesis with their finding that 
individuals’ inclination to vote for the opposition is influenced by their perception of 
corruption in the country, but only for those that are not particularly attached to any political 
party. 
Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013), on the other hand, find no evidence that party 
identification affects voters’ decision to support or punish corrupt incumbents. The study by 
Rundquist et al. (1977) even finds evidence contradicting the partisanship hypothesis, as the 
respondents with strong party identities in their survey were more likely to switch their vote to 
the opposition when their preferred candidate was accused of corruption. The study by Chong 
et al. (2015) on corruption voting in 12 Mexican municipalities also finds evidence countering 
the partisanship argument, in that information of corruption appears to weaken party 
identification. A similar effect is found by Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2015) in the Brazilian 
context, where accusations of corruption against certain parties appear to shift partisan 
attachments towards other parties within the more educated electorate. 
At the same time, other studies offer additional evidence in support of the causal mechanism 
associated with the identity bias hypothesis. Anderson and Tverdova (2003), for instance, find 
that political allegiances more generally condition the impact of corruption on voters’ attitudes 
toward government. They observe that the level of perceived corruption in the country has a 
negative impact on respondents’ evaluation of the political system, but voters’ that support 
the opposition tend to have a significantly lower evaluation than voters that elected the 
incumbent government. A study by Davis et al. (2004) on Latin America similarly finds that 
perceptions of corruption are significantly affected by partisanship. In a survey with almost 
3,400 respondents from Chile, Mexico and Costa Rica, supporters of the incumbent parties had 
on average lower perceptions of corruption than opposition supporters. Finally, a survey 
experiment conducted by Anduiza et al. (2013) in Spain also corroborates these claims. 
Participants were told that a hypothetical mayor had been accused of influence peddling, with 
the treatment vignette varying with regards to the party affiliation of the mayor: no party 
affiliation mentioned, the respondent’s party (same party treatment) or the party opposed to 
the respondent’s party (different party treatment). Respondents in the same party treatment 
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group judged the accusation to be significantly less serious than respondents in the different 
party treatment group14. 
Another aspect that may condition corruption voting is voters‘ perceptions about the 
availability of viable alternatives in the political market (Charron and Bågenholm 2016; Jiménez 
and Caínzos 2004; Kurer 2001; Muñoz et al. 2012; Pavão 2015; de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). 
This issue can be directly linked to another central element of the contemporary political 
agency literature, namely the distribution of good and bad types in the pool of politicians 
available to voters. Differently than earlier models of retrospective voting where the 
electorate was expected to simply decide to retain an incumbent based on his/her 
performance in office, more recent variations of political agency models emphasize that voters 
in fact seek to select the best available candidate as well (Ashworth 2012; Besley 2006; Fearon 
1999). Therefore, voters’ decision to keep or replace an incumbent depends also on their 
expectations about the probability that challengers are of a better type. In a context where 
voters become cynical and perceive the political elite as a whole as being corruption, they may 
have little incentive to replace a corrupt incumbent (Kurer 2001; Muñoz et al. 2012; Pavão 
2015). 
Although this argument is raised in several more theoretical discussions in the literature, only 
two studies were found that directly test it empirically, and they point to different findings. 
The experimental study by Muñoz et al. (2012), for instance, tests whether voters who are led 
to believe that all candidates are corrupt are more likely to vote for a corrupt incumbent. 
However, they fail to confirm this hypothesis. A recent work by Pavão (2015), on the other 
hand, argues that voters, especially in contexts with more widespread corruption, tend to be 
more cynical about corruption and to see all the options of parties and candidates available to 
them as relatively undifferentiated on this dimension. Using survey data from Brazil and also 
from a cross-national setting, she provides empirical evidence of this type of cynicism and that 
this attitude weakens corruption voting. 
It may also be the case that voters do identify possible “clean” alternatives, but none that 
correspond to their ideological preferences (Jiménez and Caínzos 2004). Reed (1999) presents 
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 The authors highlight that this result was apparently driven by individuals with lower political 
sophistication, since the same pattern was not observed among those with a higher level of political 
knowledge. 
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this as one of the reasons that hindered electoral accountability against the scandal-ridden 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan for most of the post-war period. This argument is 
developed in a more sophisticated manner by Charron and Bågenholm (2016), who use data 
from a recent European survey to show that voters with more extreme ideological positions, 
either to the left or the right of the scale, are less likely to react to corruption accusations and 
change their vote than their more centrist counterparts, as they face fewer alternatives in the 
political spectrum. In line with their argument, they find that this is less so the case as the 
effective number of political parties increases. Another study by the same authors provides 
additional evidence for the alternatives hypothesis. Bågenholm and Charron (2014) find that 
the vote share gains for European political parties that use anti-corruption rhetoric, including 
accusations against opponents, in their electoral campaigns are most pronounced in the case 
of new parties. A similar finding is presented by Engler (2016), who also provides evidence that 
changes in perceptions of corruption across different countries and time periods has favored 
the electoral performance of new parties. These findings may be construed as an effect of 
signaling to voters that the entry of new players into the political market may strengthen 
electoral accountability by increasing the number of legitimate alternatives available. 
Finally, another relevant factor conditioning corruption voting is the severity of the 
irregularities attributed to those accused (Jiménez and Caínzos 2004). Ferraz and Finan (2008), 
for instance, show evidence of this in their study of the electoral effects of audit reports in 
Brazilian municipalities. They find that the level of corruption found in the audits conditions 
the effect of the audit results on mayor reelection rates, significantly reducing the probability 
of reelection for those accused of more violations. Chong et al. (2015) also find that the level 
of corruption impacted voters’ electoral reaction in Mexican municipalities, where they 
observed larger vote share losses for incumbent mayors in municipalities where the share of 
diverted resources was above 66%. Figueiredo et al. (2011) also allude to the potential impact 
of this factor in explaining the different degree of corruption voting against the two mayoral 
candidates in São Paulo, where an impact of information of corruption was only found in the 
case of the candidate with more severe charges. 
As revealed by the literature review presented above, existing research on the conditioning 
factors of electoral accountability against corrupt politicians is considerably fragmented. 
Firstly, we find a variety of relevant hypotheses that have been repeatedly examined in 
numerous empirical studies, but often with contradictory findings. Secondly, although a 
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number of studies consider more than one hypothesis in the analysis conducted, they still fail 
to take other important alternative arguments into account, and therefore do not provide a 
consistent and comprehensive empirical analysis of the factors that explain why electoral 
accountability in such cases is sometimes effective and others not. 
One clear example are the studies examining two of the central hypotheses discussed in the 
literature, namely the role of information and clientelism. In the case of the former argument, 
the contributions on the Italian (Chang et al. 2010) and Brazilian (Ferraz and Finan 2008; 
Figueiredo et al. 2011; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013) contexts do not address the potential 
role of clientelism in political systems where clientelistic practices are still very relevant 
(Desposato 2006; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 3). Similarly, the studies assessing the role of 
clientelism in explaining electoral support to corrupt politicians, such as the ones by Manzetti 
and Wilson (2007) and by Chang and Kerr (2009), do not take potential variation in the 
availability of information into account. The many experimental studies in this field tend to do 
a better job at controlling for (most) other potential explanations, either through 
randomization or in the experimental design itself, but limitations to their external validity and 
the extent to which survey responses indeed reflect concrete behavior demand some caution 
in the interpretation of such results (Charron and Bågenholm 2016; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 
2015). 
Another weakness that emerges from the literature at hand relates to the type of data used in 
a considerable part of the studies surveyed. Many of them rely on perceptions of corruption, 
such as aggregate perception indicators at the country-level or measures of individual 
perceptions from a variety of surveys. This raises a few issues about potential inherent biases 
present in such sources of data (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Davis et al. 2004; Mondo 2016) 
and endogeneity problems associated with identifying the direction of causality in the 
relationship between perception data and voting preferences (Kayser 2014). 
A third limitation that we can identify is that most of the studies mentioned focus on 
examining the effect of corruption information on the reelection of politicians, and thus 
establish a comparison between corrupt and non-corrupt politicians. However, there is great 
variation in how strongly politicians accused of corruption are held accountable by voters, and 
it is important to examine what factors explain this variation. If the studies find, in general, 
that the majority of corrupt politicians manage to get reelected, it is relevant to understand 
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the factors that may explain why the rest does not, and this perspective has only rarely been 
explored (Reed 1999; Rennó Jr. 2008). 
This study will attempt to address these limitations by developing a more comprehensive 
model of corruption voting, including the main hypotheses highlighted in the discussion 
above15 and other potential confounding factors raised in the literature on voting behavior. 
Additionally, this work seeks to make an empirical contribution to this area of research by 
exploring a concrete indicator of corruption in Brazilian municipalities, derived from audit 
reports, and by testing unexplored indicators for some of the main independent variables 
analyzed. Finally, the focus will be set on the factors explaining the electoral fate of successful 
and unsuccessful corrupt politicians, which allows us to implicitly model simultaneous 
interactions of all the independent variables considered with the occurrence of corruption, 
something that has only been partly modeled in previous studies. With this approach, the 
objective here is to help improve our understanding of how electoral accountability of corrupt 
politicians is contingent on other factors and under which conditions it is more likely to be 
effective. The details on the methodology and the data applied are discussed in the next 
section. 
 
Methodological approach and data sources 
As already highlighted, the main goal of this study is to make a contribution to research on the 
conditions that favor or hinder electoral accountability against corrupt politicians by assessing 
the validity of the main hypotheses discussed earlier in a single, more comprehensive model, 
allowing us to better evaluate their relative weight in explaining the electoral performance of 
corrupt incumbents. In order to do that, the empirical setting selected for the analysis is that 
of Brazilian municipalities. 
Although focusing on the aggregate level to analyze a phenomenon ultimately connected to 
individual behavior may involve the danger of incurring in ecological fallacies, the choice of 
setting for the study was motivated by several important advantages that this context offers in 
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 The only explanation that will not be directly addresses, due to contextual conditions related to the 
Brazilian setting, is the identity bias hypothesis. The reasons for this methodological choice are 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
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terms of inferential leverage and data availability. Firstly, focusing on the sub-national level in 
a single country allows us to control for several commonalities across sub-national units, 
including a wide range of formal institutions and also cultural factors that may affect electoral 
accountability and its covariates. At the same time, we still observe considerable internal 
variation among Brazilian municipalities on many dimensions of interest to this study. 
Secondly, data sources for Brazilian municipalities are very rich, and offer the opportunity to 
explore novel indicators for some variables that are rarely available for other levels of analysis. 
In particular, the availability of several randomized audit rounds conducted by a federal agency 
in hundreds of municipalities provides us with valuable and credible information on the 
concrete occurrence of corruption at this administrative level. This is an important 
methodological advantage, in contrast to several previous works that have used data on 
corruption perceptions instead. As suggested by a number of studies (Anderson and Tverdova 
2003; Davis et al. 2004), individual corruption perceptions may not be the most adequate 
measure to identify an effect of corruption on voting, as these perceptions may be themselves 
affected by individual biases16. For this reason, given some of the trade-offs involved in 
studying corruption voting at the individual level versus an aggregate level of analysis, the 
points raised above are believed to tip the balance in favor of the latter for the purpose of this 
study. 
Brazil is also an ideal case for this analysis due to the fact that almost all the hypotheses 
discussed above are highly relevant for the Brazilian context, as shown by the large number of 
studies focusing on this country to examine the conditions for electoral accountability (Ferraz 
and Finan 2008; Figueiredo et al. 2011; Pavão 2015; Pereira and Melo 2015; Rennó Jr. 2008; 
Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2014; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). And even though no study 
has directly tested the material inducement hypothesis in this particular context, the specific 
literature on clientelism points out that this is also a relevant issue in Brazilian politics, with 
considerable regional variation (Desposato 2006; Speck 2003). Therefore, five main 
hypotheses were selected from the literature review presented earlier as the central focus of 
the empirical analysis developed here. They are summarized as follows:  
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 This is not only pointed out in the case of corruption voting, but also in the literature on performance 
voting and economic voting more generally: voters that are more sympathetic to the government tend 
to have more positive perceptions of that government’s performance than those who are more critical 
to begin with (Kayser 2014). 
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Information 
H1: In contexts where the electorate has access to more information on corrupt behavior by 
politicians, the likelihood that corrupt incumbents are voted out of office is higher. 
Implicit exchange 
H2: In contexts where the administration of corrupt incumbents has improved economic well-
being and public service provision, the likelihood that they are voted out of office is lower. 
Material inducement 
H3: In contexts where clientelism and patronage are more prevalent, the likelihood that corrupt 
incumbents are voted out of office is lower. 
Alternatives 
H4: In contexts where voters find more alternatives to vote for, the likelihood that corrupt 
incumbents are voted out of office is higher. 
Severity of accusations 
H5: Corrupt incumbents that are accused of several acts of corruption are more likely to be 
voted out of office. 
 
As we can see, the only hypothesis discussed in the previous section that is not included for 
testing in this study is the role of identity bias, either based on ethnicity or in the form of 
partisanship. The main reason for this is that the specific political literature on voting behavior 
in Brazil suggests that these factors are of limited relevance for this particular context. In the 
case of ethnic identities, they do not appear to reflect a significant characteristic of the linkage 
between voters and candidates in Brazil. Ethnic voting has been examined more often with a 
focus on the black electorate, and the existing literature shows very little evidence that ethnic 
identities significantly influence voting behavior in Brazil, highlighting rather that black voters 
tend to vote more according to other types of social and ideological cleavages (Campos 2015; 
Mitchell 2009). Moreover, there is no official data available on the racial profile of candidates 
for the 2008 election which would enable an analysis of this hypothesis as part of this study. 
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As for the effect of partisanship, a few factors contribute to weaken our a priori expectation 
that partisan identities should play a strong role in voting decisions among the electorate. 
Several studies on elections in Brazil highlight that voting behavior is much more influenced by 
personalistic aspects, such as candidates’ attributes and image, than partisan preferences 
(Almeida 2008; Ames et al. 2009; Kinzo 2005; Nicolau 2002, 2015; Samuels 2006)17. Even 
though voters may, on legislative elections, vote for a specific party label, a small share of 
votes is cast like this (Nicolau 2002, 2015; Samuels 1997). Additionally, the behavior of the 
political elites, marked historically by very prevalent party switching, indicates that their 
electoral strategies do not strongly rely on party identification, thus suggesting that this is not 
a strong orientation among the electorate (Nicolau 2002; Novaes 2014; Samuels 1997)18. At 
the individual level, several studies have shown that the share of voters that identify with a 
particular party is relatively low in comparison to more established democracies, and these 
identities appear to be quite malleable and fluid over short periods of time, being in particular 
negatively affected by corruption scandals (Kinzo 2005; Nicolau 2014; Samuels 2006b; Winters 
and Weitz-Shapiro 2015)19. Finally, recent evidence indicates that, even for the minority of 
voters that have a specific party preference, this preference is rarely translated into their 
actual voting decision (Nicolau 2015). As a consequence of these arguments suggesting a weak 
role of partisanship in voting behavior in Brazil, we can also infer that an attempt to capture 
partisan preferences at the aggregate level, which would have to rely on indicators such as 
electoral volatility or historical vote shares of different parties, would not be a reliable 
strategy. 
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 This is likely fostered by a candidate-centered electoral system, based on plurality rule (with runoff 
election in some cases) for Executive offices and open list proportional representation for the legislative 
bodies at all levels of government (Kinzo 2005; Samuels 1997). 
18
 Party-switching appears to have somewhat decreased since a ruling by the Superior Electoral Court 
(TSE) from 2007 established that legislative seats belong to the party and not to the candidate, thus 
opening the possibility that turncoat legislators lose their seat as a result of going to a different party 
after elected (Novaes 2014). However, despite the reduced incentives for opportunistic party-switching 
after this ruling, this type of behavior is still widespread, as politicians have made use of the few 
loopholes still legally allowed (e.g. founding of new parties or mergers, allegations of internal 
persecution due to ideological differences) to avoid potentially losing office. 
19
 It is important to note that partisan identity is heavily skewed towards the Worker’s Party (PT), which 
seems to be the only party with a more solid base of supporters (Kinzo 2005; Samuels 2006b; Samuels 
and Zucco 2014). 
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Therefore, given the several arguments in the literature suggesting the limited relevance of 
ethnic identities and partisanship to understanding voting behavior in this context, together 
with the empirical challenges of measuring these variables, these hypotheses are not included 
for testing in the models developed here. The operationalization of variables for testing the 
other five hypotheses selected, as well as the criteria for sample selection, are described in the 
sub-sections below. 
 
Sample selection and coding procedure for the corruption data 
The sample used in this study was chosen in connection to the availability of data on 
corruption occurrences from audit reports published by the Brazilian Federal Comptroller’s 
Office (CGU). Since the criteria for sample selection and the data collection from those reports 
are interlinked, they are both presented together in this sub-section. The variable derived from 
the coding of the audit reports is used here for two main purposes: (a) to determine a key sub-
sample of interest for the analysis, namely municipalities where at least one corruption 
occurrence was found, and (b) to operationalize the main independent variable for testing H5. 
All municipalities included in the sample have been previously audited through a lottery 
program conducted by the CGU. The program was introduced in 2003 and has conducted 40 
lottery rounds until 201520. So far, over 2,000 municipalities have been audited at least once, 
representing almost 40% of all Brazilian municipalities21. The time period covered by the 
program includes three electoral cycles: 2004, 2008 and 2012. However, due to time and 
resource constraints for the data collection, the analysis was restricted to the 2008 electoral 
cycle, i.e. municipalities selected in any of the 12 audit rounds that took place between 2005 
and October 2008, when the municipal elections took place22. 
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 The randomized lottery is still being implemented, although under the scope of a new audit strategy 
and no longer as a stand-alone audit program. 
21
 For more detailed background information on the program, see Mondo (2016). 
22
 Two other reasons motivated this decision. First, previous studies using data from this series of audit 
reports have already analyzed its impact on the 2004 elections (Brollo 2010; Ferraz and Finan 2008), so 
covering a different time period is an opportunity to test whether previous findings also hold for 
another time frame. Second, data coverage on other relevant covariates for the following period, 
namely the 2012 electoral cycle, is more limited, and fewer municipalities were audited between 2009 
and 2012. 
165 
During the selected period, a total of 720 municipalities were audited through the lottery 
system. However, since we are interested in the impact of corruption information on the 
electoral performance of incumbent mayors after the release of the reports, only those 
municipalities where the mayor in power ran for reelection in 2008 can be included in the 
analysis23. Therefore, the final sample for which corruption data from the audit reports was 
collected includes 383 municipalities. Although this represents only slightly less than 7% of all 
Brazilian municipalities, this sample is still quite representative of the whole universe of cases, 
in terms of regional distribution, development levels and population (see Table 30 in Appendix 
C). 
For the selected municipalities, the content of the audit reports published by the CGU was 
coded to generate a variable representing the number of corruption violations found by the 
auditors. Only violations associated with the period under the incumbent’s mayor 
administration, i.e. the period 2005-2008 were included in the database. Following other 
works based on these audit reports (Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011), irregularities associated 
with either diversion of public funds, overinvoicing or procurement fraud were coded as 
corruption violations24. Differently than previous studies, however, this study considered an 
additional nuance for the coding of this information, namely the variation in the language used 
by the auditors to describe the various situations coded as instances of corruption. For 
instance, similar situations are portrayed in some of the reports with more technical language, 
which may not be immediately perceived as associated with corruption by the general public, 
while others use less ambiguous terms such as fraud, favoritism, or simulation25. This may 
ultimately impact how voters perceive the corruption information and how they use it to 
ponder their voting decision. All irregularities describing situations pertaining to any of the 
three categories mentioned above were coded as corruption violations, but those portrayed 
with terms more clearly associated with corruption were coded as “unambiguous” violations, 
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 Brazilian mayors are only allowed to run for one consecutive term at a time. Therefore, the sample 
excludes municipalities with second-term mayors and those where the incumbent mayor decided not to 
run again. 
24
 For a more detailed description of the coding procedure and the criteria applied, see Mondo (2016).  
25
 Despite this type of variation across the different audit reports, comparability on the substance of the 
information is still warranted by the high level of professionalization of the auditors employed by the 
CGU, and also by the fact that all audits follow the same guidelines and standards and use the same 
techniques to identify administrative irregularities in the audited units. Therefore, it is unlikely that it 
reflects systematic variation in terms of how effective auditors are in uncovering corruption violations. 
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and those described with more technical language were coded as “ambiguous”26. The variables 
based on both coding strategies will be tested in the empirical analysis.  
 
Other variables and data sources 
A wide range of data sources for Brazilian municipalities offer several useful indicators for 
testing the hypotheses described earlier. Starting with the dependent variable of interest, 
namely electoral accountability of corrupt mayors, the main indicator used is a binary variable 
indicating whether the incumbent mayor associated with corruption found in the audit was 
voted out of office (1) or not (0) in the 2008 election. An alternative indicator for robustness 
checks is the change in vote share experienced by the incumbent mayor between 2004 and 
2008. Both indicators are derived from official electoral records published by TSE. 
In order to test the information hypothesis (H1), two alternative indicators derived from 
municipal surveys conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) were 
selected in order to capture variation in local media presence across municipalities. The first 
one indicates the presence of local radio stations, and the second one the presence of local 
newspapers (Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011). For both indicators, the year of reference is 2006. 
Given that information from the audit reports was disseminated by the CGU through 
summaries of the findings made available to the media (Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011), the 
indicators chosen are believed to reflect a key feature of the local information environment 
that potentially captures variation in the intensity with which the corruption information may 
have reached the local electorates. Additionally, since the corruption data collected originated 
from audits conducted by an external federal agency, credibility issues associated with the 
information hypothesis becomes less relevant for our context, which is another advantage 
from using a concrete indicator of corruption. 
To assess the validity of the implicit exchange hypothesis (H2), the analysis relies on three 
types of indicators. The first one is based on an index of municipal development (IFDM) 
published by the Industry Federation of Rio de Janeiro (Firjan), which is derived from different 
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 Based on an inductive approach, a list of terms and expressions was identified as more clearly 
depicting corruption irregularities according to their language connotation and their common use in 
media reports about corruption. 
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sub-indicators compiled from official sources. The index ranges from 0 to 1 and includes three 
components: Employment and Income, Education and Health, thus reflecting both an 
assessment of the economic conditions of the moment and the quality of basic public service 
provision in two key areas27. Therefore, this indicator appears to be particularly useful for 
testing this hypothesis because it reflects the state of affairs in three areas that voters care 
about and are likely to consider in their retrospective evaluation of the municipal government. 
The indicator is available for each year of our period of interest, and in order to capture what 
voters might assess in terms of improvement or worsening of the conditions in those three 
areas, we use the change in the indicator observed between 2005 and 2008. A second 
indicator applied in the analysis measures the real percentage change in total 
intergovernmental transfers during the incumbent’s administration as compared to the 
previous term, therefore between 2004 and 2008. This indicator, similar to the first one, also 
follows approaches found in the literature to assess the implicit exchange hypothesis based on 
potential changes in the provision of public services (Brollo 2010; Pereira and Melo 2015). The 
third indicator used is the average municipal GDP per capita growth for the incumbent’s term, 
which captures a change in the state of the economy as a potential conditioning effect of 
corruption voting28.  
For the material inducement hypothesis (H3), the main indicator applied in the study is a novel 
measure of patronage derived from the IBGE municipal surveys, namely the share of municipal 
employees selected exclusively through direct appointment, i.e. those that have not been 
recruited through any kind of competitive recruitment procedure (e.g. public examinations). 
This is considered as a useful measure of patronage at the municipal level because it reflects 
the degree of discretion used by office holders in the appointment of positions in the 
municipal bureaucracy, which may be used also for political reasons (Barone 2010). Indeed, 
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 Information on the index is available on http://www.firjan.com.br/ifdm/. The sub-indicators used to 
compile each dimension are the following: the Employment and Income component reflects change in 
formal employment, share of formal occupation rate in the local market, change in average income, 
average wages and the Gini coefficient; the Education component includes coverage of childcare, age-
grade distortion in basic education, share of teachers with a higher education, average daily school 
hours, abandonment rate and performance test results; and the Health component considers coverage 
of regular pre-natal care, share of unexplained deaths, avoidable infant mortality and avoidable hospital 
admission due to lacking basic healthcare. 
28
 In order to test for potential voter “myopia” regarding government performance information (Kayser 
2014), the GDP per capita growth only for the election year is also considered, as well as the change in 
the IFDM and in intergovernmental transfers only between 2007 and 2008. 
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the high variation across Brazilian municipalities is quite telling about how mayors make use of 
this discretion to different degrees: although the mean share of exclusively appointed officials 
is around 10%, this figure may extend to more than 70% in some cases29. The indicator for 
2008 is applied in the analysis, and alternatively we also employ an indicator of change in the 
share of directly appointed employees in the municipal administration, using as reference for 
comparison the years of 2004 and 2008, which might better capture the extent to which the 
incumbent mayors’ electoral performance may be have been affected by increases or 
decreases in the distribution of patronage during their administration. 
Testing the alternatives hypothesis (H4) involves some empirical challenges, since it is 
essentially impossible to precisely observe and measure the range of politicians’ types 
available to voters for the mayoral election in each municipality. Given this difficulty, this study 
draws on insights from Charron and Bågenholm (2016), who use the effective number of 
parties (ENP) as a proxy for the options available to voters. The logic is that, where voters have 
elected more parties to the local legislative, it is likely that they perceive a wider range of 
alternatives in the local electoral market. For this indicator, the average for 2004 and 2008 is 
used, as to minimize the effect of potential shocks from each election year on the resulting 
indicator. 
Finally, the number of corruption violations in each municipality derived from the CGU audit 
reports, as described in the previous sub-section, is the measure used to operationalize the 
severity of accusations faced by incumbent mayors (H5). The number of each audit round is 
also included in the analysis to account for a potential moderating effect of the timing of the 
audit, as voters may react more strongly to information on corruption made public closer to 
the election (Brollo 2010; Costas-Pérez et al. 2012). 
In addition to the key independent variables described above, the empirical analyses 
developed here take into account a number of other potential confounders. Municipal 
characteristics such as total population, percentage of urban population, literacy rate, 
                                                          
29
 It is important to acknowledge that this is certainly not the only means mayors have to distribute 
material resources to their clienteles. One example are cash transfer programs, and there is some 
evidence that even a federal program of the kind has been used for clientelistic purposes at the 
municipal level in Brazil, since the registration of beneficiaries is conducted by the municipal 
administration (Tudball 2016). Nevertheless, an indicator of patronage can still reflect an important part 
of clientelistic exchanges at this level of the public administration in the Brazilian context (Barone 2010; 
Santos 2013). 
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municipal GDP, municipal area, and the year the municipality was founded are included, based 
on data from IBGE. Regional dummies are included in some models as well to account for 
remaining unobserved differences across regions. Also, characteristics of the incumbent 
candidates, such as gender and education level, are included, as well as their margin of victory 
from the previous election. 
Other factors mentioned in the literature as affecting electoral accountability were considered. 
A large discussion in the literature on performance voting, more strongly in the case of 
economic voting, refers to the impact of institutional factors on how well voters can hold 
incumbent governments accountable at the ballot box. For the analysis conducted here, 
however, the confounding effects of political institutions can be, at least in part, eliminated, as 
factors related to formal institutions are not varying across observations. However, some 
variation may exist in the composition of local governments that affects voters’ ability to 
allocate responsibility for outcomes to the right individuals–what is referred to as clarity of 
responsibility (Hobolt et al. 2013). In order to take this into account, two indicators are 
included as controls: the share of legislative seats held by the incumbent mayor’s coalition, 
and the number of coalition parties (Xezonakis et al. 2016). 
In the specific literature on voting behavior in Brazil, other political factors are mentioned as 
impacting the electoral performance of incumbent mayors. An association with politicians in 
power at other levels of government has been shown to impact electoral results in some 
occasions (Lavareda and Telles 2011; Oliveira and Fernandes 2013; Pereira and Melo 2015; 
Pereira et al. 2009). Therefore, we consider both whether the incumbent mayor was affiliated 
to the same party as the state governor at the time, and to the Worker’s Party (PT), the one in 
power in the federal government30. Finally, the amount of funds used to finance the campaign 
appears as a relevant determinant of electoral performance in this context (Jucá et al. 2016). 
  
                                                          
30
 Even though the partisanship argument is not directly tested in the models presented here, this 
variable should contribute to eliminating part of the potential, although arguably limited bias that the 
absence of partisanship data could cause, as it should capture some effects of party identification with 
the PT, which is the strongest among the electorate (Kinzo 2005; Samuels 2006b; Samuels and Zucco 
2014). 
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Empirical results 
The context of Brazilian municipalities offers an interesting setting for this study not only due 
to methodological advantages from a sub-national sample, but also due to a considerable 
degree of variation observed across the municipalities on the several indicators of interest for 
the empirical analysis conducted here. This is illustrated in Table 31 in Appendix C, which 
displays the summary statistics for all the variables of interest. 
For the models estimated here, three different samples are considered: (a) the full sample of 
383 observations, (b) a sample of 259 municipalities where at least one “unambiguous” 
corruption violation was found (“Corruption sample A”), and (c) an alternative sample with 315 
municipalities where any corruption violation was found (“Corruption sample B”). The full 
sample is used for baseline models of determinants of electoral accountability, without taking 
into account potential moderating effects of the main independent variables. Corruption 
Samples A and B, in turn, are used to estimate models that essentially compare only electorally 
successful versus unsuccessful corrupt mayors, allowing us to identify differential effects of the 
independent variables considered. 
The first estimation strategy employed is a logistic regression with the binary indicator of 
electoral accountability as a dependent variable. Table 14 provides results for a selected set of 
models including local radio as an indicator of media presence, IFDM four-year change as an 
indicator of government performance, the share of directly appointed municipal employees in 
2008, and the number of unambiguous corruption violations, with both unrestricted 
specifications including only the main independent variables and full specifications with basic 
municipal and incumbent characteristics. Regarding the impact of the number of corruption 
violations on electoral accountability, part of the models also test for an additional 
conditioning effect of the timing of release of the corruption information, operationalized 
simply by the lottery number associated with the audit conducted in each municipality. Models 
1 to 4 consider the full sample of municipalities, and models 5 to 8 include only municipalities 
with at least one unambiguous corruption violation. 
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Table 14. Logistic regression results with unambiguous corruption violations 
 
Full sample Corruption Sample A 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         Local radio 0.120 0.160 0.0360 0.0735 0.305 0.363 0.157 0.204 
 
(0.246) (0.249) (0.276) (0.280) (0.306) (0.311) (0.343) (0.351) 
IFDM change (2005-2008) -2.012 -2.318 -1.929 -2.045 -2.493 -2.995 -2.653 -3.050 
 
(1.999) (2.014) (2.188) (2.210) (2.474) (2.506) (2.731) (2.786) 
% directly appointed employees 0.00225 0.000798 0.00799 0.00668 0.00429 0.00412 0.0111 0.0116 
 
(0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0188) (0.0191) 
Mean ENP -0.0322 -0.0437 0.00178 -0.0143 0.0761 0.0472 0.132 0.0884 
 
(0.0970) (0.0973) (0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.116) (0.134) (0.137) 
Corruption violations (unambiguous) -0.0152 0.130* -0.0104 0.180** -0.0196 0.167* -0.0151 0.240** 
 
(0.0182) (0.0743) (0.0198) (0.0770) (0.0207) (0.0910) (0.0226) (0.0941) 
Lottery number 
 
0.0180 
 
0.0121   0.0557 
 
0.0414 
  
(0.0408) 
 
(0.0424)   (0.0603) 
 
(0.0627) 
Corruption violations*lottery number 
 
-0.0155* 
 
-0.0194**   -0.0198** 
 
-0.0254** 
  
(0.00814) 
 
(0.00818)   (0.00991) 
 
(0.00999) 
Constant -0.565 -0.681 -3.937** -4.559** -1.127* -1.527** -3.996 -5.109* 
 
(0.498) (0.549) (1.988) (2.049) (0.598) (0.724) (2.507) (2.650) 
     
  
   Observations 358 358 358 358 240 240 240 240 
Municipal characteristics 
  
x x   
 
x x 
Incumbent characteristics     x x     x x 
Note: Municipal controls include population, % of urban population, literacy rate and log municipal GDP. Mayor controls include gender, education level, 
margin of victory in previous election, affiliation to federal government party, affiliation to state government party and campaign revenue. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A first comparative glance across these two groups reveals sizeable differences in the 
estimated coefficients for the different samples, with larger estimated effects for the 
corruption sub-sample. Although the effects are in most cases not statistically significant, 
these differences already offer some indication of differential effects of our independent 
variables once we restrict the sample only to municipalities with incumbents accused of 
corruption. This is in line with our expectation of moderating effects of these variables on 
corruption voting. 
Nevertheless, these first models do not offer empirical support for hypotheses H1 to H4. The 
coefficients for radio presence, IFDM change and ENP mean have the expected sign, but are 
not statistically significant, and the coefficient for the percentage of directly appointed 
municipal employees, our indicator for patronage, is positive, contrary to the effect postulated 
in H3, and similarly not statistically significant. We find evidence only in favor of H5. In the 
models without the interaction term, the coefficients for the number of corruption violations 
are negative, contrary to our expectation, and not statistically significant. The coefficients 
estimated with the interaction, however, become positive and statistically significant at 
conventional levels for 3 of the 4 models presented; the coefficient for the interaction term is 
also statistically significant. Interestingly, these effects appear to become stronger and more 
significant once the two sets of control variables are introduced. In order to better grasp the 
nature of the total effect of corruption conditional on the varying lottery number, it is 
necessary to estimate the marginal effects, which are illustrated in Figure 5 for models 4 and 8. 
The marginal effects for Models 2 and 6, which do not include the controls, are shown in 
Figure 7 in Appendix C. 
The graphs show that the number of corruption violations has an initially positive effect on the 
probability of incumbent mayors accused of corruption being voted out of office, but this 
effect decreases for later audits. In the case of the full sample, the effect is statistically 
significant until the 5th audit, and for the corruption sub-sample it still holds for the 6th audit 
conducted in the period, which took place in early 2006. Surprisingly, this goes against the 
expectation that the effects becomes stronger the closer the audit is to the election. We also 
observe these positive effects of corruption on electoral accountability for models estimated 
with the alternative corruption indicator, including both ambiguous and unambiguous 
violations (see Table 32 in Appendix C), but the estimated marginal effect for both the full 
sample and the corruption sub-sample is considerably smaller and less significant, 
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disappearing after the 4th audit round (see Figure 8 in Appendix C). The difference between the 
results based on the two different codings of the corruption violations suggests that the 
manner in which corruption accusations are communicated may also impact how voters 
perceive that information and incorporate it into their voting calculations. 
 
Figure 5. Conditional marginal effects of unambiguous corruption violations for full models 
 
 
The magnitude of the effects becomes clearer by looking at the difference in the predicted 
probability of electoral accountability for different levels of corruption, as illustrated in Table 
15 below. For example, taking the first audit round as reference in the case of Corruption 
Sample A, the probability of being voted out of office for a typical corrupt mayor in a typical 
municipality increases from 0.48 to 0.81 as the number of unambiguous corruption violations 
found in the audit moves from the mean (4) to one standard deviation above that value (11). 
For the 5th audit round, this difference is much smaller, but still large, as the probability of 
electoral accountability for the same mayor increases 20 percentage points for the equivalent 
change in the number of corruption violations. In general, the significant positive effect of the 
number of corruption violations on electoral accountability, conditional on the timing of the 
audit, holds for all models tested, except for specifications including change in 
intergovernmental transfers as an indicator of government performance to test H2. 
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Table 15. Predicted probabilities of electoral accountability for different levels of corruption  
 Full sample Corruption Sample A 
Number of unambiguous 
corruption violations 
Audit 1 Audit 5 Audit 1 Audit 5 
1 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.34 
4 (mean) 0.48 0.42 0.48 0.42 
11 (1 sd above mean) 0.74 0.56 0.81 0.62 
18 (2 sd above mean) 0.90 0.70 0.95 0.78 
 
 Full sample Corruption Sample B 
Number of total corruption 
violations 
Audit 1 Audit 5 Audit 1 Audit 5 
1 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.35 
7 (mean) 0.46 0.41 0.48 0.42 
17 (1 sd above mean) 0.68 0.52 0.72 0.55 
27 (2 sd above mean) 0.84 0.62 0.88 0.67 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated for model specifications including basic municipal and 
mayor controls, with IFDM change (2005-2008), % directly appointed employees, mean ENP, 
population, % of urban population, literacy rate, log municipal GDP, mayor education level, 
margin of victory in previous election and campaign revenue held at their means, and local 
radio presence, mayor gender, affiliation to federal government party and affiliation to state 
government party held at their median values. 
 
The results described above remain largely the same across other specifications tested with 
alternative indicators for the independent variables, as well as additional control variables 
such as municipal area, the municipality’s year of foundation, regional dummies and also two 
indicators of clarity of responsibility. In the case of H1, for instance, we find no evidence for a 
moderating effect of local newspaper presence on corruption voting either. For this variable, 
we see a different pattern across the coefficients than the one observed with radio presence: 
the estimates for the full sample are larger than the ones for Corruption Samples A and B. 
Although the differences are not statistically significant, this might indicate that radio indeed 
played a more important role in the dissemination of the corruption information than printed 
media, as suggested by Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011). For H3, using an indicator of change in 
the distribution of patronage during the incumbent’s administration does not substantially 
alter the results and also falls short of confirming the hypothesis. However, one puzzling result 
is that this variable is found to be a statistically significant predictor of electoral accountability 
in some models with the full sample, but also with a positive effect on the dependent variable, 
contrary to the theoretical expectation that increased patronage should decrease the 
probability of mayors’ being voted out of office. 
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One interesting exception is found regarding the validity of H2, though. Table 16 illustrates 
models with equivalent specifications to the ones shown in Table 14, only varying the 
performance indicators used to test H2. All three indicators used to measure incumbent 
government performance for the whole administrative period of 2005-2008 show no 
statistically significant effect on the probability of electoral accountability. However, two 
alternative indicators capturing the change only for the last year of the incumbent mayor’s 
term, namely the change in the IFDM between 2007 and 2008 and GDP per capita growth for 
2008, are found to have significant negative effects, although only at the 90% confidence level 
for the former, in models with Corruption Sample A. Models with a one-year change in 
intergovernmental transfers were also estimated (not reported), and with this variable we see 
negative effects significant at the 90% level only for Corruption Sample B, and no significant 
effects for the other samples. These results also hold across specifications and with additional 
controls. This provides partial confirmation of H2, but conditional on the time frame for which 
government performance is measured. 
These effects become clearer once we observe the change in the predicted probability of 
electoral accountability against corrupt incumbents for different values of the indicators of 
interest, illustrated in Figure 6. In the case of GDP per capita growth, a change from a value of 
one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above it is associated with a 
decrease in the probability of the incumbent being voted out of office of about 15 percentage 
points, and in the case of IFDM change the same difference is associated with a decrease of 12 
percentage points. For the one-year change in intergovernmental transfers, in the case of 
Corruption Sample B, the corresponding decrease in the probability of electoral accountability 
is of about 10 percentage points. 
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Table 16. Logistic regression results with unambiguous corruption violations and different indicators of government performance 
 
Full sample Corruption Sample A 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Local radio 0.0735 0.130 0.174 0.173 0.0261 0.204 0.413 0.406 0.410 0.306 
 
(0.280) (0.273) (0.266) (0.267) (0.290) (0.351) (0.348) (0.333) (0.340) (0.369) 
IFDM change (2005-2008) -2.045 
    
-3.050 
    
 
(2.210) 
    
(2.786) 
    IFDM change (2007-2008) 
 
-1.487 
    
-7.233* 
   
  
(3.164) 
    
(4.066) 
   GDP per capita growth (yearly average, 2005-2008) 
  
-0.00720 
    
-0.0131 
  
   
(0.0176) 
    
(0.0239) 
  GDP per capita growth (2008) 
   
-0.00868 
    
-0.0257** 
 
    
(0.00829) 
    
(0.0116) 
 Change in intergovernmental transfers (2004-2008) 
    
-0.00713 
    
-0.0103 
     
(0.00529) 
    
(0.00685) 
% directly appointed employees 0.00668 0.00496 0.00882 0.00767 0.00136 0.0116 0.00944 0.0162 0.0145 0.00924 
 
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0163) (0.0191) (0.0188) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0191) 
Mean ENP -0.0143 -0.00344 -0.00805 -0.0180 -0.0323 0.0884 0.0843 0.0940 0.0774 0.0898 
 
(0.113) (0.110) (0.108) (0.108) (0.117) (0.137) (0.134) (0.129) (0.130) (0.137) 
Corruption violations (unambiguous) 0.180** 0.157** 0.171** 0.170** 0.135 0.240** 0.210** 0.212** 0.212** 0.147 
 
(0.0770) (0.0737) (0.0712) (0.0714) (0.102) (0.0941) (0.0908) (0.0855) (0.0868) (0.127) 
Lottery number 0.0121 0.0171 0.0184 0.0166 0.0440 0.0414 0.0461 0.0461 0.0404 0.0637 
 
(0.0424) (0.0407) (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0443) (0.0627) (0.0604) (0.0582) (0.0585) (0.0665) 
Corruption violations*lottery number -0.0194** -0.0161** -0.0167** -0.0167** -0.0160 -0.0254** -0.0220** -0.0213** -0.0214** -0.0189 
 
(0.00818) (0.00749) (0.00724) (0.00725) (0.0105) (0.00999) (0.00933) (0.00871) (0.00882) (0.0130) 
 
(2.049) (1.944) (1.914) (1.911) (2.099) (2.650) (2.511) (2.455) (2.469) (2.726) 
           Observations 358 370 383 383 341 240 248 259 259 228 
Note: All models include municipal (population, % of urban population, literacy rate and log municipal GDP) and mayor controls (gender, education level, margin of 
victory in previous election, affiliation to federal government party, affiliation to state government party and campaign revenue). Standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 6. Predicted probabilities for selected government performance measures 
 
 
Two important things can be inferred from these results. First, we see that electoral 
accountability of corrupt incumbents can be significantly weakened when their administration 
is associated with positive outcomes in other dimensions that are important to voters, such as 
the economy and the provision of public services. Secondly, voters appear to behave 
myopically in this regard, and give more weight to their perception of the incumbent’s 
performance in the recent past, which is in line with findings from the economic voting 
literature (Kayser 2014). 
It is also worth noting the estimation results for some of the control variables considered in 
the models. The specifications including indicators of clarity of responsibility, discussed in the 
literature as potentially conditioning factors of corruption voting and performance voting more 
generally, do not provide any evidence of these factors as relevant predictors of electoral 
accountability in the context at hand. Also, the incumbent’s affiliation to the state governor’s 
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party emerges as one of the stronger predictors of the dependent variable, with a considerable 
negative effect on the probability of electoral accountability. This is extremely robust across all 
specifications tested, and the effect appears to be even stronger for Corruption Sample A. This 
finding suggests that securing direct support from the state governor is a very effective 
strategy to improve a mayor’s chances of reelection, in particular for those accused of 
corruption. 
In order to verify the robustness of the results described above, two approaches were taken. 
First, the models were checked for the presence of influential observations that might be 
driving the results observed, through which one observation with abnormally high leverage 
was identified, but the results remain essentially the same once this observation is excluded 
from the samples. However, there were a number of other observations with relatively high 
leverage remaining. Therefore, a second approach was used to minimize the potential 
influence of observations with extreme values in the corruption variables. For this purpose, 
both variables–the one with only unambiguous violations and the one with all corruption 
violations–were recoded, collapsing values above two standard deviations from the mean 
under the same maximum value of 18 violations for the unambiguous measure and 27 
violations for the alternative measure. The recoded observations correspond roughly to the 
top 5% of the distribution in each case. The results with the recoded variables (see Table 33 in 
Appendix C) broadly confirm the initial estimates for the models with the unambiguous 
measure of corruption, and the marginal effects are also very similar in terms of statistical 
significance and magnitude, but the estimated marginal effects for the total number of 
corruption violations, in particular for Corruption Sample B, are no longer statistically 
significant for any audit round. 
This suggests that the severity of the accusations against incumbent mayors seems to, under 
certain conditions, play a moderating role on how corruption information affects voters’ 
decision to hold them accountable or not in the next election, thus still partly confirming H5. 
Again, the fact that the effect is significant for Corruption Sample A, but not for Corruption 
Sample B offers further corroboration that there seem to be cognitive barriers at play 
regarding how corruption information in different formats is received and interpreted by the 
public. 
As to the estimated effects of the other independent variables, the results remain largely 
unchanged. The indicators used to verify H1, H3 and H4 are still without any statistically 
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significant effects across all models, whereas the measures of IFDM change and GDP per capita 
growth for the election year maintain their statistical significance in models with Corruption 
Sample A, at the 95% and the 90% confidence levels, respectively, and change in governmental 
transfers is still significant at the 90% confidence level for Corruption Sample B. The magnitude 
of their effects is also very similar. 
Another approach to test the robustness and sensitivity of the results was to estimate the 
same models through linear regression with an alternative indicator for the dependent 
variable, namely the change in vote share observed by the incumbents between the 2004 and 
2008 elections. The results of this procedure differ from the previous models in a few respects. 
For the first models estimated, we used the original corruption variables, which yielded 
statistically significant estimates for the corruption variable and the interaction term with 
lottery number in 3 of the 4 models (see Table 34 in Appendix C). After calculating the 
corresponding marginal effect for corruption violations, we observe a statistically significant 
negative effect on the change in vote share for early audit rounds in the models using the 
number of unambiguous corruption violations (see Figure 9 in Appendix C). It is important to 
note that the expected sign for the effect is indeed the opposite than with the other 
dependent variable, as lower values in the vote share difference are indicative of stronger 
electoral accountability. Therefore, this finding is apparently in line with H5. This effect 
becomes less negative and turns positive for later audits, in a pattern similar to the one 
observed with the original models presented earlier. However, the estimated marginal effect is 
positive and statistically significant for the last audit rounds, which is a quite puzzling result. 
This part of the effect appears to be more robust across different specifications than the 
negative effect observed for the first audits. In models with Corruption Sample B, only the 
positive effect for later audits is statistically significant. Again, in models using change in 
intergovernmental transfers as an indicator of government performance, we no longer see 
statistically significant effects for the corruption variables. 
Regarding the estimates for the other independent variables, these models also fail to provide 
any evidence in favor of H1, H3 and H4. For H2, we again see a statistically significant positive 
effect of GDP per capita growth, relative to the election year only, in models with Corruption 
Sample A, but the effect of the one-year IFDM change, which was significant at the 90% 
confidence level in the original models, is no longer significant here. A striking change with 
regards to the original models is that the third indicator for incumbent government 
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performance tested, namely change in intergovernmental transfers, appears as one of the 
strongest predictors of vote share difference, displaying statistically significant positive effects 
in all models tested. These effects are also of substantial magnitude: taking the estimate for 
the full samples, they represent an additional 7.5 percentage points in the vote share 
difference in the case of a municipality with an average value in this variable, and the effect is 
even a bit stronger for Corruption Sample A, with additional 9 percentage points in the 
mayor’s vote share between elections. The one-year change in transfers is also statistically 
significant with positive effects in all models except those with Corruption Sample A. 
For the linear models with the alternative dependent variable we also replicated the same 
specifications with the recoded corruption variables, in order to similarly reduce the potential 
influence of observations with extreme values in those variables. The results reveal that this 
was a justified concern: the estimated marginal effects for the corruption variables are no 
longer statistically significant at conventional levels for any of the different specifications 
tested, indicating that the previous results were likely driven by outliers. The results for the 
other independent variables remain largely unchanged. 
Overall, the analysis of the data at hand reveals a mixed picture. Out of the five hypotheses 
considered, we find partial evidence in support only of the implicit exchange mechanism (H2) 
and of a moderating effect of the severity of corruption accusations (H5). In models where 
electoral accountability is associated with survival in office, the data suggest that voters take 
accusations of corruption into account in their voting calculus, punishing more strongly mayors 
charged with more corruption violations. However, this effect is observed only in the case of 
earlier audits. At the same time, voters’ impetus to punish corrupt mayors appears to be 
weakened by recent improvement in economic conditions. When we consider electoral 
accountability as reflected in the vote share of incumbent mayors, on the other hand, we find 
no robust moderating effect of corruption violations, but we still find similar confirmatory 
evidence for the moderating role of the incumbent government’s performance as measured by 
recent GDP per capita growth and real change in intergovernmental transfers. The implications 
of those findings for research in this field and for future lines of inquiry are discussed in the 
next section. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
This study sought to empirically reexamine key hypotheses discussed in the literature on 
conditioning factors of electoral accountability against corrupt politicians, drawing on original 
corruption data from 383 Brazilian municipalities. In contrast to the fragmented way in which 
those hypotheses have been often assessed in previous studies, it aimed at constructing a 
more comprehensive model accounting for a wider range of competing explanations, and 
explicitly focused on analyzing their relatively explanatory power with regards to the electoral 
performance of a sub-sample of incumbents accused of corruption. 
The empirical analysis presented above suggests that, indeed, not all of the explanations 
offered in the literature appear to account equally well for variation in the strength of electoral 
accountability of corrupt incumbents in different contexts. In the case of the information 
hypothesis, for instance, we did not find confirmation that stronger media presence 
contributes to increasing the likelihood that corrupt incumbents will be punished by voters. 
This result essentially contrasts with findings by Ferraz and Finan (2008), also in the context of 
Brazilian municipalities, that voters’ reaction to corruption information in the 2004 election 
was stronger in municipalities with local radio presence. 
One explanation for these conflicting findings could be related to the different time period 
analyzed here, and the possibility that the audit results received less local media attention in 
the 2005-2008 period than in the previous one. Indeed, already in 2005 the CGU changed the 
dissemination strategy regarding the audit results, publishing only the full audit reports online 
without making a summary of the findings available in the form of press releases (Avis et al. 
2016). Therefore, as results became less accessible to the local media, it may be that it reached 
voters less and less throughout the years31. 
It is also possible, for instance, that the audit results became particularly newsworthy in the 
first years after the program was introduced in 2003, due to the novelty of the lottery policy 
itself and the fact that more audits took place in 2003 and 2004, with seven audits being 
conducted in each year. Since 2005, however, the program was slowly scaled down, with five 
audit rounds in 2005, three in 2006 and 2007 and only two conducted in 2008. Moreover, the 
                                                          
31
 The study mentioned is actually co-authored by Ferraz and Finan and briefly mentions that, in a 
replication of their original analysis for the 2008 elections, they also failed to find an electoral 
disciplining effect through increased punishment of corrupt mayors by voters (Avis et al 2016). 
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years of 2005 and 2006 saw the emergence of two major corruption scandals of national 
amplitude32, which may have dominated corruption reporting thereafter also at the local level. 
Even though one of those scandals involved corruption acts in municipalities as well, its 
national dimension, in particular the involvement of Members of Parliament, received more 
attention from national news agencies, which are a main source of news for local outlets. 
The possibility that local corruption information derived from the audits became less salient in 
the period at hand, and therefore may have not reached the electorate or impacted voters’ 
decision so strongly, is a plausible underlying mechanism that would be worth exploring, but 
the lack of reliable data on local media coverage of corruption prevents further investigation 
under the scope of this study. It is certainly an important limitation of the present analysis that 
the modeled relationship of local media presence as a potential moderator of corruption 
voting can only rely on an assumed connection between local media presence and increased 
dissemination of corruption information. The impossibility to more directly capture the 
variation in this connection is also a possible explanation why the lack of support for the 
information hypothesis similarly contradicts others studies highlighting a moderating effect of 
information on corruption voting through increased media coverage of corruption (Chang et al. 
2010; Costas-Pérez et al. 2012; Klašnja et al. 2016). One possible confounding factor that 
would interfere in this process is the occurrence of media capture by local political groups, 
which is as relatively common phenomenon in Brazil (Boas and Hidalgo 2011; de Lima and 
Lopes 2007), but could not be taken into account in the analysis due to data limitations. These 
are nuances that could be explored in further studies examining the Brazilian case and could 
shed additional light about the validity of the information hypothesis for this context. 
How do we reconcile this possible scenario with the finding of a significant positive effect of 
the number of corruption violations on electoral accountability of corrupt mayors? If voters 
are indeed knowingly punishing more those mayors facing graver, or at least more numerous 
                                                          
32
 In 2005, revelations emerged about a scheme allegedly put in place by the Federal Executive to 
“purchase” legislative support in Congress through monthly payouts, which became known as 
Mensalão. In the following year, the Sanguessugas (“Leeches”) scandal came to light with the 
uncovering of a massive fraud scheme in the procurement of ambulances, which articulated corruption 
dealings both at the national and at the municipal level: first, budgetary amendments to finance new 
ambulances were proposed by representatives in Congress, then approval for the execution of the 
purchase would be secured through the involvement of officials in the Ministry of Health, and finally 
procurement procedures in numerous municipalities all over the country were manipulated to favor 
suppliers connected to the scheme.  
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accusations of corruption, this information must have reached them somehow. Indeed, the 
analysis described in the previous section shows that this may be the case, but only for earlier 
audits. Initially, this result appears to be counterintuitive, since the original suspicion was that 
voters would be more able to use corruption information that has reached them closer to the 
election. However, this finding would still be consistent with a process in which the audit 
findings become less salient over the years, in particular following the interruption in the 
dissemination of the press releases by the CGU, and therefore only findings from earlier audits 
would have been reported sufficiently to have informed voters’ decision at a later point. 
There are two other possible mechanisms, though, that could be behind the observed effect of 
the number of corruption violations on electoral accountability, conditional on the timing of 
the audit. Firstly, what we see as an effect of the corruption information disseminated only 
through earlier audits may be actually driven by the fact that those corruption violations are 
more likely to have led to criminal or civil charges against the respective mayors by the time 
the election took place. In this case, the effects estimated in the models here would at least in 
part be picking up the effect of an alternative source of information for voters, originating 
from a parallel mechanism of horizontal accountability (O’Donnell 1999), and this information 
would certainly have been reported closer to the election than the original audit reports. Since 
data about this is outside the scope of the present study, this possible mechanism cannot be 
directly examined here, but it alludes to an important limitation of the present analysis and of 
others studies on the electoral accountability of corrupt politicians, which fail to adequately 
assess and account for the effects of potential interactions between different accountability 
channels that may reinforce each other (Mainwaring and Welna 2003; Peruzzotti and 
Smulovitz 2006a). 
Another interpretation of the results presented here that we are unable to rule out, however, 
speaks to the findings by Brollo (2010), who argues that the apparent negative electoral effects 
of corruption information uncovered by the municipal audits in Brazil are in fact explained by 
reduced intergovernmental transfers faced by municipalities where irregularities are found, as 
a sort of administrative sanction imposed by the federal government as a consequence of the 
audits. The results from the models estimated with the change in intergovernmental transfers 
appear to be consistent with this claim. Indeed, the conditional effects of corruption violations 
are not observed in any of the models including this variable as an indicator for testing the 
implicit exchange hypothesis. And even though the change in intergovernmental transfers is 
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not found to be a strong predictor of electoral accountability in the logistic regression models, 
it becomes a very strong explanatory variable for vote share difference in the linear regression 
models.  
Brollo’s (2010) discussion of the mechanism behind this argument essentially reflects the 
implicit exchange hypothesis: the reduction in intergovernmental changes received by the 
municipalities would negatively affect the provision of public infrastructure, which would 
directly be felt by the population as a decrease in welfare and in the provision of public goods 
by the local administration. However, this would take some time to materialize, which again 
could be an explanation why the apparent effects of corruption violations are found only for 
earlier audits. This explanation seems consistent with part of the results presented here, but it 
essentially implies that the effect attributed to corruption violations is in fact coming from an 
underlying implicit exchange mechanism. However, in alternative model specifications tested 
with the IFDM change and GDP per capita growth as indicators for this same mechanism, we 
still find evidence of that the number of corruption violations has an independent conditional 
effect on the electoral performance of corrupt incumbents. Therefore, there might be other 
micro-mechanisms connecting changes in intergovernmental transfers to voters’ reactions that 
have not been captured here and remain unclear, and which could thus be further examined in 
future research, at least applicable to the Brazilian context. 
The possibility that the conditional effects of the number of corruption violations might be 
associated with an underlying implicit exchange mechanism only reinforces the other findings 
presented earlier regarding the partial validity of this hypothesis for the context at hand. 
Indeed, the empirical analysis conducted here finds evidence that a positive performance by 
the incumbent government in terms of economic conditions, measured as GDP per capita 
growth, and less strongly in the case of a broader measure encompassing also an improvement 
in basic public services, contributes to weakening electoral accountability of corrupt 
incumbents. However, voters appear to be myopic when using this assessment in their voting 
decision, given that the identified effect was only seen for performance measures referring to 
the immediate past before the election. In any case, the findings from the present study 
suggest without a doubt that, among the five main hypotheses tested, this appears to be the 
strongest conditioning factor affecting corruption voting for the context at hand. 
Regarding the two remaining hypotheses, namely the role of patronage and of the range of 
alternatives available to voters, we fail to find corroborating evidence for either. It is important 
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to acknowledge that the empirical strategy employed in this study faces considerable 
challenges regarding measurement of these variables, which are inherently difficult to capture 
empirically. The proxy indicator for patronage explored in this analysis, for instance, yielded 
estimates that, although not statistically significant, pointed consistently in the opposite 
direction than the original expectation. This may be an indication that the measure chosen is 
not capturing the phenomenon of interest adequately, i.e. it may be either capturing other 
information unaccounted for in the model, or it may be missing an important part of the 
picture of how the clientelism mechanism works in reality. As mentioned before, the 
distribution of patronage is certainly only one resource that mayors have at their disposal as a 
way of distributing material advantages to supporters. Therefore, future attempts to examine 
this hypothesis further would likely require improvements in how to more adequately capture 
this mechanism empirically. A similar problem possibly occurs with the attempt to measure 
the political alternatives available to voters: the effective number of parties may only poorly 
reflect how voters perceive the range of options that the political market of candidates offers 
them in terms of corrupt and non-corrupt types. Again, measurement advances with especially 
ingenious strategies may be required in future research to better grasp the mechanism of 
interest here. 
Another interesting insight from the findings presented here refers to the different results 
observed for Corruption Samples A and B. The distinction between the two sample lies 
essentially in the fact that, for the former, only corruption information presented in more 
accessible language was considered. Based on this coding decision, our expectation would be 
that the observed effects related to corruption voting are more pronounced for Corruption 
Sample A, which is largely corroborated by the fact that the effects in support of the implicit 
exchange mechanism and of the number of corruption violations are either stronger, or 
observed exclusively in the case of samples defined according to the “unambiguous” 
corruption information. This suggests that there are also relevant cognitive barriers related to 
voters’ ability to use corruption information as a useful criterion. 
This issue becomes particularly important when we consider its implications for the discussion 
about the credibility of information sources. Several authors have highlighted that official 
sources, such as enforcement bodies, tend to be a more credible source of information on 
corruption (Fernández-Vázquez et al. 2013; Klašnja 2011; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2014). At 
the same time, however, information from such agencies are likely to be made available in 
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more technical language that is also less accessible to the public, in particular to less 
sophisticated voters. Therefore, their effective impact on voting behavior could depend on the 
existence of other channels that manage to “translate” corruption accusations from such 
sources adequately, so that they become more informative to the electorate and have the 
desired effect of contributing to electoral accountability against politicians accused of 
malfeasance. 
Regarding the methodological approach taken in this study, the results shown here strengthen 
the case for empirical analyses looking specifically at sub-samples of incumbents accused of 
corruption. Even though the estimated effects for the main independent variables were not all 
found to be statistically significant, we see in almost all cases sizeable differences in the 
coefficients between the full and the “corruption” samples that indicate potential differential 
effects beyond those that the analysis was able to identify more clearly, such as in the case of 
performance indicators. Indeed, this illustrates the level of complexity to adequately modeling 
the phenomenon of interest, and on top of this the analysis developed here provides evidence 
of yet another intervening variable, namely the timing of release of the corruption 
information. Other studies should consider this perspective to try to better capture these 
multiple conditional effects more accurately than past studies have done. 
As to the chosen level of analysis, it is important to acknowledge that this study highlights the 
added value of using a concrete aggregate measure of corruption, but there certainly are costs 
to measuring other determinants of voting behavior at the aggregate level, in particular those 
that are meant to capture variation in individual voter characteristics. The study of electoral 
accountability inherently involves the interaction between contextual and individual-level 
variables, and it is challenging to model this adequately mainly due to data constraints. 
Although new approaches have been tried to overcome this difficulty in studies looking at 
performance voting more broadly (e.g. Hellwig 2011), analyses of corruption voting face an 
additional challenge related to the difficulty of empirically capturing aggregate corruption 
levels. For most studies in this area, still the mainstream approach is the use of perception-
based indicators, which may themselves involve considerable biases. Therefore, an important 
agenda for future research on determinants of electoral accountability against corrupt 
politicians is without a doubt the development of new indicators that allow for cross-level 
analyses that better reflect the underlying mechanisms associated with voters’ reaction to 
corruption. 
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Overall, the findings presented in this study contribute to reinforcing the general picture that 
already comes across from the literature on the electoral accountability of corrupt politicians 
as an inherently complex phenomenon, likely contingent on a broad spectrum of contextual 
and attitudinal factors (Jiménez and Caínzos 2004; de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). Fully 
understanding its determinants may be an unattainable goal for empirical research in this field, 
but the current state of knowledge offers a great deal of fertile ground for exploring this issue 
further, with a number of empirical and methodological challenges yet to be overcome. In 
particular, innovative approaches regarding improvements in the measurement of corruption 
itself and of other indicators for addressing the hypotheses analyzed here are much needed for 
advancing our comprehension of the workings of electoral accountability as an essential 
feature of democratic regimes. 
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation set out to address two related research puzzles that have been the focus of 
much scholarly work in the last decades: what is the impact of democracy on corruption, and 
what explains the large variation in corruption levels observed across democratic regimes? 
Differently than most previous research on these issues, it sought to tackle these questions 
from a distinct perspective, considering the multidimensional nature of democracy and the 
consequent multiplicity of causal mechanisms that might be behind the association between 
stronger democratic institutions and lower corruption observed in a number of cross-national 
comparative studies (e.g. Kolstad & Wiig, 2016; Pellegata, 2012; Saha et al. 2014). 
Indeed, as shown in the first part of the dissertation, the vast literature on democracy and 
corruption includes several theoretical arguments alluding to the role of different dimensions 
of democracy as potentially explaining its impact on corruption outcomes in a political system. 
Based on a review of those arguments, it was argued that, although the theoretical 
explanations for an effect of democracy on corruption do make reference to various possible 
causal mechanisms, they can be connected by a common thread, namely accountability, and 
can be linked to three sub-dimensions of this key attribute of democracy: electoral, social and 
horizontal accountability. With this discussion, the dissertation sought to make a first 
contribution to this broader literature, by taking an approach that emphasizes the need to 
examine more closely and more directly the actual causal mechanisms linking democracy and 
corruption, and proposing that this be done from the angle of those three dimensions of 
accountability as a key causal link. 
The conceptual framework proposed set the ground for the two main empirical analyses 
developed in the dissertation. The first one, addressed in the second part of the study, drew 
on theoretical principal-agent models to test whether those dimensions of accountability exert 
a commonly hypothesized deterrent effect on corrupt behavior, thus reducing corruption 
levels over time. The second one, discussed in Part III, looked more specifically at the factors 
that might explain when accountability–in the form of concrete sanctions–takes place, 
focusing on the conditioning factors of electoral accountability against corrupt politicians, or 
what is also described in the literature as corruption voting. These empirical analyses sought to 
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make a contribution to more specific strands of research, dealing respectively with the impact 
of accountability on corruption and the determinants of corruption voting. 
In both cases, the study relied on original political corruption data collected from over 600 
audit reports on municipalities randomly selected through a federal audit program 
implemented by the Brazilian government. For the analyses presented in Part II, a sub-sample 
of 140 municipalities that have faced multiple audits in the period between 2003 and 2013 was 
taken as the basis for a novel panel data set covering five municipal administrative terms. In 
Part III, the analyses conducted employed corruption data for a cross-section of 383 
municipalities.  
In line with previous findings from the empirical literature in both lines of research addressed 
in this study, the overall picture that emerges from the work presented here is not very 
optimistic. In the first case, no robust evidence is found for a deterrent effect of accountability 
on corruption over time, be it through elections, increased civil society and media presence, or 
formal institutional sanctions. These findings might seem counterintuitive, given the fact that 
the idea of accountability as a deterrent to corruption has established itself as a strong 
assumption in several areas of political research. However, empirical evidence to support it is 
still limited. In the case of electoral accountability, for instance, a few studies indicate that 
incumbent politicians facing the threat of losing office in the next election engage in less 
corruption in the present (Bobonis et al. 2012; Ferraz and Finan 2011); at the same time, other 
findings indicate that the threat of accountability may not always be sufficient to hinder rent-
seeking behavior (Pereira et al. 2009), and that even when incumbents seem to refrain from 
corruption in the short-term, they may compensate with increased predatory behavior after 
they have been able to secure an additional term in office (Bobonis et al. 2012). 
In the case of horizontal accountability, some evidence suggesting a deterrent effect of public 
audits on corruption has been found (Avis et al. 2016; Olken 2007; Zamboni Filho 2011); 
however, it may be also the case that corrupt officials adapt their behavior to increased 
detection risks in some areas, moving to other forms of rent-seeking that remain under the 
radar of monitoring institutions (Olken 2007). Regarding social accountability, some authors 
present direct evidence of a negative effect of increased media presence on corruption (Ferraz 
and Finan 2011), and others find a broader association between media freedom and lower 
corruption (e.g. Adsera et al. 2003; Brunetti and Weder 2003), but the impact of civil society 
presence still has not been systematically studied (Schatz 2013). In the analysis conducted 
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here, the evidence points more strongly to an effect of civil society presence in reducing future 
corruption, but this too is not fully robust to all the estimation procedures applied. 
From the second empirical analysis, we also conclude that conditions for successful electoral 
accountability of corrupt incumbents may be more restrictive than usually expected. Out of 
the five main hypotheses tested, the study corroborates only two conditioning factors 
discussed in the literature on corruption voting. First, the severity of corruption accusations 
seems to be a relevant criterion for voters while making their decision, but only under certain 
conditions. More specifically, the analysis found that the effect of corruption information 
varied with the timing in which this information was made available to the public. However, a 
more careful consideration of this finding suggests that this conditional effect may be 
associated with the level of salience that corruption had at the time of the election. In the 
particular context of the 2008 municipal elections in Brazil, media attention on the municipal 
audit results may have declined throughout the years prior to the election, either because the 
audit results were disseminated in a less accessible format, because the original excitement 
around the audit program slowly died down, or also because other national corruption 
scandals make have attracted more media attention. This is consistent with evidence from 
other contexts indicating that increased salience of corruption driven by stronger media 
attention seems to play a key role in how corruption information impacts electoral results 
(Chang et al. 2010; Costas-Pérez et al. 2012; Klašnja et al. 2016). 
The second hypothesis that is supported by the evidence from Brazilian municipalities is the 
impact of an implicit exchange mechanism, whereby voters weigh the corruption information 
against other relevant criteria, in particular the more general performance of the incumbent 
government. In this case, voters’ inclination to remove corrupt incumbents from office appears 
to be significantly weakened by positive economic results and, to some extent, improvements 
in the provision of public services. However, here voters seem to behave myopically and give 
more importance to recent improvements in performance. This finding resonates with results 
from several previous studies showing a moderating effect of perceptions of incumbents’ 
performance on corruption voting (Choi and Woo 2010; Klašnja et al. 2016; Muñoz et al. 2012; 
Pereira and Melo 2015; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). 
Surely, some limitations to the present analyses must be acknowledged. Similar to virtually 
every other study dealing with elusive concepts such as accountability and corruption, 
measurement challenges relating to these variables are among the main obstacles for the 
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empirical work presented. Despite such difficulties, this dissertation sought to make an 
additional empirical contribution to the operationalization of these constructs. In the case of 
accountability, original data for the occurrence of horizontal accountability was collected; 
regarding corruption, an indicator of political corruption was devised and extracted from the 
results of repeated randomized municipal audit rounds in Brazil and was also explored in a 
longitudinal dimension that is rarely available for this type of data. However, some data 
limitations could not be fully overcome. In the first case, the horizontal accountability indicator 
could only capture stronger potential for formal sanctions, and as a consequence may not fully 
reflect how a deterrent effect of this accountability dimension on corruption might work in 
reality. The corruption estimates used in the longitudinal analysis, in turn, are likely to suffer 
from a certain degree of measurement bias, due to lack of independence between the 
corruption information found in later audits and the results from previous audits. Although 
these issues do not eliminate the applicability of the indicators for the analyses conducted, 
they exemplify some of the practical difficulties that are faced in attempts to more directly 
measure these phenomena. 
Similar measurement problems also impact other indicators used in the analyses, such as the 
proxy for clientelism applied in Part III, which is maybe capturing only a part of this 
phenomenon and its potential impact on electoral accountability. Moreover, other relevant 
factors could not be taken into account in the study due to data constraints. One example is 
the possibility of local media capture that could impact the reliability of the radio presence 
variable employed both as an indicator of social accountability and as a moderating factor of 
corruption voting to capture variation in the availability of corruption information to voters. 
Indeed, a more refined analysis of the impact of local media would ideally take into account 
data on the ownership of media by local politicians, in order to provide a more accurate 
picture of the media environment at this level of analysis in Brazil. However, such data are not 
easily obtainable and would have required additional efforts to data collection that were 
simply beyond the scope and the resources available for the conclusion of this study. 
There are also some limitations regarding the inferential scope of both analyses. For the 
empirical exercises described in Part II, the availability of panel data for a relatively short time 
frame implies that the estimated effects for the different dimensions of accountability on 
future corruption levels comprehend only potential immediate effects. Therefore, the 
possibility that a longer period of time is necessary for the accountability mechanisms to 
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exercise a suppressing effect on corruption cannot be tested by the data at hand. In the 
analysis presented in Part III, a central issue related to the inferences drawn from the analysis 
refers to the use of aggregate level data to assess the validity of some hypotheses that are 
associated with mechanisms at the individual level. This has been a challenge also in the 
broader literature on electoral accountability and voting behavior (Hellwig 2011), and 
approaches to conduct multi-level analysis in the case of corruption voting, which are still 
hindered by limited availability of adequate data, remain a part of the agenda for further 
research in this area. 
Another relevant question regards the potential for external validity of the findings presented 
here. It is true that the analyses include data from a specific context, and the results must also 
be considered in the light of certain idiosyncrasies associated with the particular institutional 
and political environment in Brazil. The lack of a deterrent effect of horizontal accountability, 
for instance, may be linked to the fact that formal sanctioning mechanisms in Brazil are still not 
effective enough to significantly increase the expected probability of punishment in order to 
tip the balance in political actors’ calculations of the costs associated with corrupt behavior. 
Similarly, specific dynamics of local media ownership and their potential impact on media 
freedom seem to be common in the Brazilian case and could be an important mechanism 
behind the patterns observed in the data employed here. Nevertheless, the large variation 
observed among Brazilian municipalities on a number of other factors still contributes to show 
that this context has parallel with cross-national variation in numerous respects, thus 
contributing to strengthening the external validity of the results. Moreover, the empirical 
findings described in this dissertation go in a similar direction of findings from previous studies 
covering other countries or even large-N cross-national comparisons, suggesting that they are 
likely reflecting a more general pattern on how the connection between accountability and 
corruption works. 
In spite of the several limitations mentioned above, the work conducted as part of this 
dissertation provides additional pieces to the more general puzzle of the relationship between 
democracy, accountability and corruption and adds to earlier evidence showing that neither 
the expected corruption-reducing effects of accountability nor the effective occurrence of 
electoral accountability can be taken for granted in democratic regimes. These ideas have 
been treated as universal assumptions in studies on democracy and corruption, but an 
emerging empirical literature–this study included–examining the proposed causal mechanisms 
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more closely has consistently put their validity into question. Considering the point of 
departure of the dissertation, which emphasized the theoretical discussions on the causal 
mechanisms possibly linking democracy and corruption as reflecting the hypothesized impact 
of different dimensions of accountability, the findings presented here have important 
implications with regards to those theoretical underpinnings. 
Indeed, the scant evidence for an anti-corruption effect of democracy through the described 
accountability channels indicates that the general causal claims found in the literature should 
not be taken at face value. However, there may be different reasons why these claims still lack 
strong empirical support. For example, it may be the case that the hypothesized effect of 
accountability does takes place, but under specific conditions that have not been fully 
identified. In this case, existing theories would need some refinement with regards to the 
conditions that might impact the expected effect of accountability on corruption. One such 
possible condition could be the time horizon considered. From the analysis presented here, 
given the limitation in the time frame available for the data collected, we cannot rule out that 
a longer period of time might be needed for a possible deterrent effect to materialize or 
become perceptible. This would be consistent with earlier comparative studies indicating an 
association between older democracies and lower corruption (e.g. Lederman et al. 2005; 
Pellegata 2012; Serra 2004). 
Another possibility briefly mentioned in Part II of this dissertation is that the effect of 
accountability on corruption may sometimes be non-linear. In the case of electoral 
accountability, there are some discussions in the literature that suggest this is the case. In the 
Brazilian municipal context, where some authors speak of an incumbency disadvantage 
(Brambor and Ceneviva 2012), the level of electoral uncertainty and the risk of losing office 
may be so high as to offset the expected disciplining effects of electoral accountability and 
create the opposite incentives. Indeed, engaging in more corruption while they can may 
become a more feasible strategy for politicians in office if they perceive the risk of losing office 
as high (Crisp et al. 2014). Other studies also suggest that electoral competition may have a 
non-linear impact on the responsiveness of elected officials more broadly (Kayser and 
Lindstädt 2015), and on corruption more specifically, indicating that incentives for corrupt 
behavior might be lowest under an intermediate level of competition (Afridi et al. 2016). 
Studies examining these types of hypotheses in different contexts could make an invaluable 
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contribution to improving theoretical arguments on the causal nexus between accountability 
and corruption. 
Moreover, even if accountability would in fact impact corruption negatively under certain 
favorable conditions, it is also unclear whether all dimensions of accountability are equally 
important to help reduce corruption over time. Studies examining the potential impact of 
horizontal and social accountability on corruption are still scarce. More research considering 
the potential confounding effects of the different accountability dimensions, as well as how 
they may interact with one another, is necessary too. In this respect, new studies taking into 
account the potential anti-corruption effect of different accountability mechanisms, possibly 
covering distinct contexts, would also be useful to help clarify these issues and generate new 
hypotheses on how contextual factors might be relevant for a better understanding of the links 
between accountability and corruption. 
Finally, it may also be the case that the empirical association between stronger democracy and 
lower corruption observed in the comparative literature is explained by other mechanisms 
besides accountability. The existing literature still seems to offer limited insights in this regard, 
but future discussions in this direction, exploring alternative mechanisms, would also be an 
important contribution to shedding additional light on this topic of research and providing for 
new lines of inquiry on the impact of democracy on corruption. 
In addition to these possibilities for future research in this area, we should not lose sight of the 
need for further improving available indicators of corruption. In this respect, this study follows 
a much welcome trend that has developed in recent years towards the development of 
concrete indicators of corruption, departing from more traditional measurement approaches 
based on public perceptions or bribery victimization (see Fazekas et al. 2016 for a review). 
Advances in this area are important for two reasons. First, concrete indicators should help 
avoid some of the biases often pointed out in the literature with regards to perception-based 
indicators, which may reveal more about the beliefs of respondents than about the actual 
prevalence of corruption in a particular context (Abramo 2007; Escresa and Picci 2015; Knack 
2006; Olken 2009; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2010; Treisman 2007). This could lead to 
substantial improvements in the validity and reliability of existing indicators. Second, these 
types of indicators allow researchers to capture different facets of the corruption 
phenomenon (Fazekas et al. 2016). As many have argued, corruption is not a uniform practice, 
it comes in different shapes and sizes; consequently, different types of corruption may be 
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associated with different underlying causes and dynamics (e.g. Bauhr 2016; Hellman et al. 
2000; Johnston 2005, 2014). This is still a relatively little explored terrain in the area of 
corruption studies, and efforts to slowly overcome measurement challenges that help provide 
a more accurate picture of the problem from different angles could open up new possibilities 
for better understanding corruption and finding more effective ways to tackle it in its different 
manifestations. 
Other efforts to produce more fine-grained depictions of how and to what extent corruption 
occurs in different contexts should include measures that capture in-country variation as well. 
As illustrated by the case of Brazil explored in this dissertation, internal variation in the 
prevalence of corruption across sub-national units can be significant, and this is another useful 
dimension of analysis for studying this topic. Finally, the longitudinal perspective is still a big 
gap in corruption measurement, and new approaches to gathering indicators of corruption and 
their variation over time could have a groundbreaking impact on corruption research. Needless 
to say, these are certainly challenging goals, given the inherent difficulties of measuring 
corruption, but novel and ingenious strategies to capture this phenomenon empirically are 
being elaborated more and more often by researchers. 
All in all, recent research on democracy, accountability and corruption has helped produce 
new insights on their underlying relationships, showing that some of the assumptions 
commonly held in the literature need more careful investigation. Indeed, the latest findings 
suggest that the link between these factors may be more complex than usually acknowledged, 
and more empirical work is needed to improve our understanding of the causal mechanisms 
linking democracy and corruption. Fortunately, several avenues of research should emerge 
from the existing limitations of scholarly works in this field, providing a promising ground for 
new approaches and perspectives. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 17. Comparison between sample and universe of cases 
 Sample Brazil 
Regional distribution   
North 15% 8% 
Northeast 45% 32% 
Southeast 16% 30% 
South 14% 21% 
Center-West 9% 8% 
   
Distribution by population bracket (IBGE 2013) 
Up to 5,000 13% 23% 
5,001-10,000 20% 22% 
10,001-20,000 27% 25% 
20,001-50,000 24% 19% 
50,001-100,000 7% 6% 
100,001-500,000 9% 5% 
More than 500,000 0% 1% 
   
Mean development indicators  
HDI (2010) 0.637 0.659 
HDI education (2010) 0.538 0.559 
% Literacy (2010) 64.0 83.8 
% Urban population (2010) 81.3 63.8 
GDP per capita (2012 BRL) 11,531 14,897 
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Table 18. Regional comparison of development indicators 
Region IDH (2010) GDP (2012 BRL) % Literacy (2010) % Urban population (2010) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
North 0.608 0.609 515,329.81 122,036.00 82.7 83.4 56.7 55.8 
Northeast 0.591 0.588 331,874.16 73,960.50 72.7 72.3 55.2 54.5 
Southeast 0.699 0.705 1,453,240.60 144,654.50 89.2 90.7 74.9 79.0 
South 0.714 0.716 598,366.97 126,190.00 92.1 92.6 60.7 61.6 
Center-West 0.689 0.693 923,741.17 156,047.50 87.7 87.9 71.8 74.8 
All 0.659 0.665 789,235.22 109,731.00 83.8 86.9 63.8 64.7 
 
 
Table 19. Pairwise correlations between corruption measure and development indicators 
 Number of corruption 
violations 
Residual number of 
violations without 
audit scope variables 
Log number of 
corruption violations 
Residual log number 
of violations without 
audit scope variables 
GDP per capita -0.2138* -0.2352* -0.2053* -0.2333* 
HDI -0.2443* -0.1629* -0.2313* -0.1494* 
Literacy -0.2532* -0.2860* -0.2706* -0.2697* 
Note: * p<0.05.     
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Table 20. Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Median St. Deviation Min Max 
Dependent variable       
N. of corruption violations 408 8.659 5 10.599 60 0 
Independent variables       
EA: previous mayor voted out (narrow sample) 229 0.454 0 0.499 1 0 
EA: previous mayor/administration voted out 
(broad sample) 
330 0.476 0 0.500 1 0 
EA: change in vote share 334 -7.048 -5.1 19.04 57.6 -61.7 
Audit scope       
Number of audit service orders 408 19.122 15 15.753 103 1 
Time period covered (in years) 408 2.818 3 1.192 4 1 
Municipal characteristics       
Municipal area 408 1746 527 3780 33595 33 
Population 408 31563 14564 59529 486487 1948 
% of urban population 408 60.0 60.8 21.7 100 15.5 
% of municipal employees directly appointed 358 9.983 7.7 8.264 57.9 0 
Municipal HDI 408 0.534 0.537 0.109 0.808 0.293 
Education component of municipal HDI 408 0.381 0.37 0.147 0.768 0.102 
Municipal GDP (1000 BRL) 408 329723 85426 888377 9584190 4385 
Municipal GDP per capita 408 8238 6285 5618 40418 2242 
Municipal GDP growth (yearly average) 408 6.515 5.8 12.562 202.6 -14.9 
% of transfers in municipal revenue 405 90.208 93 8.479 99.7 50.3 
% of natural resource royalties in municipal 
revenue 
353 1.077 0.53 2.284 21.95 0 
Year of foundation 408 1963 1960 21 1997 1933 
Local radio presence 404 0.582 1 0.494 1 0 
Mayor characteristics       
Mayor affiliated to federal government party 408 0.105 0 0.307 1 0 
Term in office 408 1.272 1 0.446 2 1 
Gender 358 1.103 1 0.305 2 1 
Education level 357 6.482 7 1.811 8 2 
Political experience 408 0.463 0 0.499 1 0 
Margin of victory in previous election 403 18.375 12.4 19.643 100 0 
Legislative support (% of mayor's party seats in 
local council) 
407 0.263 0.22 0.158 1 0 
Total campaign revenue in previous election 236 133466 69801 218928 2080263 0 
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Table 21. Regression models with number of corruption violations as dependent variable 
 
OLS Poisson Negative binomial 
 
NS BS NS BS NS BS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
EA previous mayor -1.782 0.294 -0.307 -0.101 -0.322 0.150 
 
(2.002) (2.406) (0.251) (0.263) (0.257) (0.211) 
  
  
 
  
  Observations 94 154 94 154 94 154 
R-squared 0.495 0.424         
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. 
Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region 
fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % 
of natural resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of 
municipal employees directly appointed, log municipal area, GDP growth and local radio presence. Mayor 
characteristics include, gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal 
government party, margin of victory, legislative support, log campaign revenue and term in office (only in 
models 2, 4 and 6). Robust standard errors in parentheses. NS = Narrow sample; BS = Broad sample. 
 
Table 22. Regression models with log number of corruption violations as dependent variable 
without selected influential observations 
 
Narrow sample Broad sample 
  (1) (2) 
      
EA previous mayor -0.223 0.235 
 
(0.237) (0.197) 
 
  
 Observations 92 152 
R-squared 0.639 0.616 
Audit scope controls Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each 
period in years. Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. 
Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log 
population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in 
municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal 
employees directly appointed, log municipal area, GDP growth and local radio presence. 
Mayor characteristics include, gender, education level, previous political experience, 
affiliation to federal government party, margin of victory, legislative support, log 
campaign revenue and term in office (only in model 2). Influential observations with 
dfbetas above 1 excluded (PR-Saudade do Iguaçu in period 3 removed in models 1 and 2; 
BA-Nazare in period 4 removed in model 1; RO-Rolim de Moura in period 3 removed in 
model 2). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 23. Regression models with log number of corruption violations as dependent variable 
and change in vote share as indicator for electoral accountability 
 
Narrow sample Broad sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
EA (change in vote share) 0.00229 0.000680 -0.00135 0.000842 0.000165 -0.000367 
 
(0.00532) (0.00473) (0.00491) (0.00394) (0.00351) (0.00335) 
   
  
   Observations 106 105 105 159 157 157 
R-squared 0.282 0.513 0.610 0.305 0.526 0.586 
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Mayor controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. Period 
fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, 
education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural 
resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal employees 
directly appointed, log municipal area, GDP growth and local radio presence. Mayor characteristics include, 
gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government party, margin of victory, 
legislative support, log campaign revenue and term in office (only in models 4-6). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 24. Summary statistics 
 N Mean Median St. Deviation Min Max 
Dependent variable 
N. of corruption violations 437 8.368 5 10.531 0 60 
Independent variables 
EA: previous mayor voted out (narrow sample) 245 0.437 0 0.497 0 1 
EA: previous mayor/administration voted out (broad 
sample) 
355 0.462 0 0.499 0 1 
EA: change in vote share 334 -7.048 -5.1 19.040 -61.7 57.6 
HA: previous mayor sanctioned 408 0.402 0 0.491 0 1 
SA: N. of non-profit organizations (old methodology) 263 81.384 36 185.072 2 1752 
SA: N. of non-profit organizations (new methodology) 241 75.224 29 177.437 1 1775 
SA: local radio presence 433 0.573 1 0.495 0 1 
Audit scope 
Number of audit service orders 437 19.119 16 15.697 1 103 
Time period covered (in years) 437 2.796 3 1.193 1 4 
Municipal characteristics 
Municipal area 437 1865 527 4061 33 33595 
Population 437 32248 14541 60245 1948 486487 
% of urban population 437 60.1 60.9 22.2 15.5 100 
% of literate population 437 76.4 77.1 12.3 47.5 97.9 
% of municipal employees directly appointed 384 9.978 7.7 8.185 0 57.9 
Municipal HDI 437 0.535 0.537 0.109 0.293 0.808 
Education component of municipal HDI 437 0.381 0.37 0.147 0.102 0.768 
Municipal GDP (1000 BRL) 437 363832 86154 1043257 4385 10100000 
Municipal GDP per capita 437 8483 6529 6134 2242 40418 
Municipal GDP growth (yearly average) 437 6.566 5.8 12.216 -14.9 202.6 
% of transfers in municipal revenue 434 90.095 93 8.585 50.3 99.7 
% of natural resource royalties in municipal revenue 379 1.080 0.53 2.301 0 21.95 
Year of foundation 437 1963 1960 21 1933 1997 
Mayor characteristics 
Affiliation to federal government party 437 0.112 0 0.316 0 1 
Term in office 437 1.279 1 0.449 1 2 
Gender 384 1.102 1 0.302 1 2 
Education level 383 6.462 7 1.818 2 8 
Political experience 408 0.463 0 0.499 0 1 
Previous terms in office 408 0.554 0 0.659 0 3 
Margin of victory in previous election 431 18.065 12.1 19.369 0 100 
Legislative support (share of mayor's party seats in local 
council) 
424 0.263 0.22 0.158 0 1 
Total campaign revenue in previous election 253 132626 68754 213577 0 2080263 
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Table 25. Difference-in-differences models with log number of corruption violations as 
dependent variable without selected influential observations 
 
Narrow Sample Broad Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
After treatment period -0.0704 -0.0444 -0.285 -0.190 -0.196 -0.261 -0.394 
 
(0.274) (0.289) (0.316) (0.385) (0.317) (0.243) (0.336) 
EA treatment -0.0820 -0.0641 0.0300 -0.0442 0.0361 -0.0165 -0.0370 
 
(0.165) (0.176) (0.202) (0.236) (0.195) (0.142) (0.215) 
EA treatment x after -0.259 -0.349 -0.314 -0.144 -0.387 -0.0570 0.114 
 
(0.232) (0.242) (0.258) (0.358) (0.256) (0.255) (0.366) 
HA treatment -0.163 -0.344* -0.354* -0.249 -0.354* -0.168 -0.349* 
 
(0.141) (0.188) (0.201) (0.241) (0.194) (0.134) (0.202) 
HA treatment x after 0.168 0.336 0.449* 0.303 0.387 0.205 0.339 
 
(0.212) (0.242) (0.247) (0.391) (0.247) (0.192) (0.282) 
Radio treatment -0.0389 0.0794 0.0678 0.389 0.130 -0.0673 -0.169 
 
(0.154) (0.194) (0.194) (0.265) (0.204) (0.140) (0.215) 
Radio treatment x after 0.0648 -0.0836 0.0380 -0.417 -0.0824 -0.0636 0.0212 
 
(0.228) (0.258) (0.262) (0.411) (0.270) (0.211) (0.314) 
Log number CSOs (old) 
   
-0.190 
  
-0.228* 
    
(0.193) 
  
(0.136) 
Log number CSOs (new) 
 
-0.0628 
  
-0.0938 
  
  
(0.120) 
  
(0.119) 
  Constant 13.77 20.68** 16.80* 18.63 19.93** 0.492 3.473 
 
(8.369) (10.24) (9.493) (11.74) (9.865) (6.341) (10.33) 
        Observations 164 119 121 76 117 243 115 
R-squared 0.597 0.682 0.687 0.731 0.690 0.500 0.707 
                
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. Period fixed-
effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, education 
component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in 
municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal employees directly appointed, log 
municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include term in office (excluded in models 1-5), gender, 
education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government party, margin of victory, legislative 
support and log campaign revenue (excluded in models 1, 2 and 6). Influential observations with dfbetas above 1 
excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 26. Difference-in-differences models with log number of corruption violations as dependent variable and audit information release as indicator 
for the electoral accountability treatment, without selected influential observations 
 
Narrow Sample Broad Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
After treatment period -0.398** -0.746** -0.793*** -1.272*** -0.949*** -0.323* -0.500* -0.479* 
 
(0.178) (0.287) (0.278) (0.338) (0.325) (0.176) (0.267) (0.259) 
EA treatment (audit information) -0.259* -0.540** -0.527** -1.128*** -0.797** -0.242 -0.353 -0.343 
 
(0.156) (0.264) (0.255) (0.335) (0.327) (0.150) (0.221) (0.214) 
EA treatment x after 0.0292 0.265 0.192 0.734* 0.502 -0.0543 0.171 0.174 
 
(0.201) (0.312) (0.311) (0.383) (0.380) (0.205) (0.264) (0.260) 
HA treatment -0.0533 -0.231 -0.249 -0.103 -0.168 -0.0485 -0.248* -0.246* 
 
(0.116) (0.151) (0.162) (0.167) (0.156) (0.104) (0.144) (0.145) 
HA treatment x after 0.0958 0.352* 0.423** 0.234 0.289 0.127 0.315* 0.312* 
 
(0.163) (0.186) (0.196) (0.211) (0.192) (0.145) (0.176) (0.179) 
Radio treatment -0.177 -0.0648 -0.0634 0.0469 -0.0210 -0.115 -0.0996 -0.0935 
 
(0.122) (0.138) (0.148) (0.158) (0.145) (0.111) (0.154) (0.155) 
Radio treatment x after 0.146 0.126 0.186 0.0896 0.0818 0.0341 0.00325 -0.00589 
 
(0.161) (0.175) (0.184) (0.199) (0.177) (0.146) (0.184) (0.187) 
Log number CSOs (old) 
   
-0.0545 
    
    
(0.126) 
    Log number CSOs (new) 
 
-0.0434 
  
-0.0289 
 
-0.171** -0.173** 
  
(0.0808) 
  
(0.0843) 
 
(0.0758) (0.0746) 
Constant 1.543 17.20** 14.35* 11.40 17.18** -4.325 9.479 9.299 
 
(6.721) (7.724) (7.461) (7.779) (7.766) (4.525) (5.944) (5.936) 
Observations 285 165 166 117 162 418 236 234 
R-squared 0.583 0.704 0.713 0.765 0.707 0.511 0.668 0.669 
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include 
region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of natural resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of 
foundation, log % of municipal employees directly appointed, log municipal area and GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include term in office (excluded in models 1-5), gender, education level, previous 
political experience, affiliation to federal government party, margin of victory, legislative support and log campaign revenue (excluded in models 1, 2, 6 and 7). Influential observations with dfbetas above 1 
excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 27. Fixed-effects models with log number of corruption violations as dependent variable and change in vote share as indicator for electoral 
accountability 
 
Narrow Sample Broad Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
EA (change in vote share) 0.00217 -0.0103* 0.0137* 0.0151*** -0.00615* -0.00752 -0.00622 -0.00757* 
 
(0.00595) (0.00532) (0.00731) (0.00479) (0.00336) (0.00471) (0.00424) (0.00451) 
HA previous mayor -0.167 0.758*** 0.206 -0.0438 0.159 0.396*** 0.385*** 0.399*** 
 
(0.246) (0.154) (0.144) (0.166) (0.141) (0.139) (0.138) (0.140) 
Radio presence 0.541 -0.123 -0.459 -0.397** 0.162 -0.151 0.0369 -0.192 
 
(0.335) (0.171) (0.286) (0.154) (0.160) (0.136) (0.160) (0.153) 
Log number CSOs (new) 
 
0.400 
 
-1.354*** 
 
-0.313 
 
-0.283 
  
(0.255) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.203) 
 
(0.212) 
Constant -18.33 -11.21 -20.80* 6.363 -12.53 3.297 -4.865 6.506 
 
(21.56) (16.10) (12.50) (6.205) (9.833) (13.84) (13.50) (13.93) 
         Observations 136 104 110 103 264 199 209 198 
R-squared 0.580 0.941 0.935 0.988 0.545 0.707 0.753 0.712 
Number of panel units 84 79 83 79 129 126 128 126 
                  
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded 
from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of 
natural resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal employees directly appointed, log municipal area and 
GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include term in office, gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government party, margin of 
victory, legislative support and log campaign revenue (excluded in models 1, 2, 5 and 6). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 28. Random-effects models with log number of corruption violations as dependent variable and change in vote share as indicator for electoral 
accountability 
 
Narrow Sample Broad Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
EA (change in vote share) -0.00116 0.00411 0.00356 0.00493 -0.00363 -0.000363 -0.000710 -0.000266 
 
(0.00315) (0.00472) (0.00424) (0.00419) (0.00276) (0.00294) (0.00273) (0.00291) 
HA previous mayor -0.112 -0.0445 -0.00770 0.0713 0.0318 0.0533 0.0702 0.0592 
 
(0.151) (0.159) (0.167) (0.163) (0.106) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) 
Radio presence 0.142 0.0646 0.139 0.0476 -0.0118 -0.0153 0.0232 -0.0203 
 
(0.145) (0.170) (0.160) (0.182) (0.107) (0.103) (0.113) (0.104) 
Log number CSOs (new) 
 
-0.237* 
 
-0.345** 
 
-0.268*** 
 
-0.260** 
  
(0.142) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.102) 
Constant 11.34 19.20 14.68 12.14 0.790 6.322 4.262 5.275 
 
(10.37) (12.58) (12.29) (13.78) (5.225) (6.161) (5.628) (6.134) 
         Observations 136 104 110 103 264 199 209 198 
Number of panel units 84 79 83 79 129 126 128 126 
                  
Audit scope controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mayor controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Audit scope controls include number of service orders and time coverage for each period in years. Period fixed-effects refer to time period identification coded 
from 1 to 5. Municipal controls include region fixed-effects, education component of HDI, log GDP, log population, % of transfers in municipal revenue, log % of 
natural resource royalties in municipal revenue, % of urban population, year of foundation, log % of municipal employees directly appointed, log municipal area and 
GDP growth. Mayor characteristics include term in office, gender, education level, previous political experience, affiliation to federal government party, margin of 
victory, legislative support and log campaign revenue (excluded in models 1, 2, 5 and 6). Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 29. Description of variables 
Variable Description Source 
Time period 4-year administrative period (1=1997-2000; 2=2001-
2004; 3=2005-2008; 4=2009-2012; 5=2013- ) 
 
Time period 
(relative) 
Time period with respect to occurrence of audit 1 
(0=period in which audit 1 took place; -1=period prior to 
occurrence of audit 1; 1=period subsequent to 
occurrence of audit 1) 
 
Corruption 
violations 
Number of corruption violations found in audits (total 
for all audits covering the period) 
Own calculations 
based on CGU audit 
reports 
Electoral 
accountability 
Whether previous mayor/administration was voted out 
(cases in which they did not run/present a successor 
coded as missing) 
Electoral records (TSE) 
Change in vote 
share 
Change in vote share of mayor/administration in power 
in the previous period 
Electoral records (TSE) 
Horizontal 
accountability 
Whether previous mayor suffered prosecution, 
accounts rejection or impeachment prior to period 
covered by audits in time period in question 
Federal and State 
Court records; Courts 
of Accounts' records; 
media reports 
Radio presence Presence of local radio station in time period in 
question 
IBGE municipal profiles 
(1999, 2001, 2005, 
2009 and 2012) 
Civil society density Number of non-profit organizations (for old 
methodology, data available for 2002 and 2006, for new 
methodology, data available for 2006 and 2010) 
IBGE (2002, 2006 and 
2010) 
Audit service 
orders 
Number of service orders applied in audits (total for all 
audits covering the period) 
Own calculations 
based on CGU audit 
reports 
Audit time period Number of years covered in audits (considering all 
audits covering the period) 
Own calculations 
based on CGU audit 
reports 
Region Region where municipality is located (1=North; 
2=Northeast; 3=Southeast; 4=South; 5=Center-West) 
IBGE 
Municipal area Municipal area in km
2
 IBGE 2013 estimates 
Population 4-year average population for the period (except for 
2013) 
IBGE 
Urban population Percentage of urban population (periods 1-3=2000 
data; periods 4-5=2010 data) 
IBGE Census (2000 and 
2010) 
Literacy Percentage of literate population (periods 1-3=2000 
data; periods 4-5=2010 data) 
IBGE Census (2000 and 
2010) 
Municipal 
employment 
Percentage of municipal employees (direct and indirect 
administration) that are exclusively directly appointed 
(T2=2004;T3=2008;T4=2012;T5=2013) 
IBGE municipal profiles 
(2004, 2008, 2012 and 
2013) 
HDI Municipal Human Development Index (periods 1-
3=2000 data; periods 4-5=2010 data) 
UNDP estimates based 
on IBGE Census (2000 
and 2010) 
HDI education Education component of municipal Human 
Development Index (periods 1-3=2000 data; periods 4-
5=2010 data) 
UNDP estimates based 
on IBGE Census (2000 
and 2010) 
GDP Municipal GDP in constant 2012 prices (R$ 1000), yearly 
average for the period (exceptions: T1=1999-2000; 
T5=data for 2012) 
Own calculations 
based on IBGE data 
228 
GDP growth Growth in municipal GDP, yearly average for the period 
(exceptions: period 1=data for 2000; period 5=data for 
2012) 
Own calculations 
based on IBGE data 
GDP growth 
deviation 
Deviation between municipal GDP growth and national 
GDP growth, yearly average for the period (exceptions: 
T1=1999-2000; T5=data for 2012) 
Own calculations 
based on IBGE data 
Transfers revenue Percentage of revenue from current transfers in total 
municipal current revenue, yearly average for the 
period (exception: period 5=data for 2012) 
Own calculations 
based on STN data 
Natural resource 
revenue 
Percentage of revenue from natural resource 
exploitation in total municipal current revenue, yearly 
average for the period (exceptions: period 2=2002-
2004; period 5=data for 2012) 
Own calculations 
based on STN data 
Year founded Year municipality was founded IBGE 
Federal 
government party 
Whether mayor in power was affiliated to the party in 
the federal government 
Electoral records (TSE) 
Term in office Whether mayor in power was 1st or 2nd term Electoral records (TSE) 
Mayor gender Gender of mayor in power (1=Male; 2=Female) Electoral records (TSE) 
Mayor education Educational level of mayor in power (2=Literate;3=Basic 
education incomplete;4=Basic education 
complete;5=Secondary education 
incomplete;6=Secondary education complete;7=Higher 
education incomplete;8=Higher education complete) 
Electoral records (TSE) 
Mayor political 
experience 
Whether mayor in power has occupied a mayor's office 
previously 
Electoral records (TSE), 
official documents, 
mayor's profiles, 
media reports 
Mayor previous 
terms 
Number of terms previously served as mayor (also in 
other municipalities) 
Electoral records (TSE), 
official documents, 
mayor's profiles, 
media reports 
Mayor margin Margin of victory of mayor of victory in previous 
election (in cases in which the deputy mayor took 
office, this is the same as the previous mayor; cases in 
which the mayor was not directly elected, data is 
missing) 
Electoral records (TSE) 
Mayor campaign 
revenue 
Total campaign revenue raised by mayor in power in 
previous election 
Electoral records (TSE), 
Transparência Brasil 
Mayor political 
support 
Share of seats obtained by the mayor's party in the local 
legislative 
Electoral records (TSE) 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 30. Comparison between sample and universe of cases 
 
Sample Brazil 
Regional distribution 
North 10% 8% 
Northeast 36% 32% 
Southeast 27% 30% 
South 18% 21% 
Center-West 9% 8% 
   
Distribution by population bracket 
Up to 5,000 22% 23% 
5,001-10,000 23% 22% 
10,001-20,000 23% 25% 
20,001-50,000 21% 19% 
50,001-100,000 6% 6% 
100,001-500,000 4% 5% 
More than 500,000 0% 1% 
   
Mean development indicators 
HDI (2010) 0,652 0,659 
HDI education (2010) 0,550 0,559 
% Literacy (2010) 82,9 83,8 
% Urban population (2010) 63,3 63,8 
GDP per capita in 2008 (2012 constant BRL) 11019 12754 
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Table 31. Summary statistics 
  N Mean Median St. Deviation Min Max 
Dependent variables 
EA: incumbent mayor voted out 383 0.324 0 0.469 0 1 
EA: change in vote share 383 -0.842 -0.4 14.742 -46.8 50.7 
Independent variables 
Local radio presence 383 0.637 1 0.481 0 1 
Local newspaper presence 383 0.379 0 0.486 0 1 
IFDM change, 2005-2008 358 0.052 0.048 0.058 -0.134 0.25 
IFDM change, 2007-2008 370 0.008 0.008 0.038 -0.126 0.135 
Real % change in total intergovernmental 
transfers, 2004-2008 
341 60.637 58.7 24.718 -18.5 198.4 
Real % change in total intergovernmental 
transfers, 2007-2008 
339 17.152 16.5 10.184 -44.8 73.5 
Mean yearly % GDP per capita growth, 2005-2008 383 6.147 5.7 6.702 -16.7 55.5 
% GDP per capita growth, 2008 383 6.740 5 14.180 -31.9 108.9 
% of directly appointed municipal employees 383 10.284 8.1 7.650 0 44.9 
Change in % of directly appointed municipal 
employees, 2004-2008 
382 1.910 1.5 7.696 -33.4 31.2 
Mean ENP 383 4.574 4.5 1.206 1.8 10.6 
Number of corruption violations (unambiguous) 383 4.248 2 7.199 0 55 
Number of corruption violations (all) 383 7.426 4 9.771 0 63 
Municipal characteristics 
Municipal area (km2) 383 1754 434 6167 11 84213 
Population, 2008 383 24667 11196 41234 1643 331412 
% Urban population 383 57.7 58.4 22.8 4.2 100 
Literacy rate 383 76.8 79.2 12.7 39.3 97.1 
GDP per capita, 2008 383 11019 8554 8444 2117 63157 
Year the municipality was founded 383 1963 1959 22 1909 1997 
Incumbent characteristics 
Gender 383 1.084 1 0.277 1 2 
Education level 383 6.527 7 1.690 2 8 
Total campaign funds 383 128954 59787 305151 0 4817067 
Margin of victory, 2004 383 13.734 9.6 14.732 0 100 
Affiliation to federal government party 383 0.094 0 0.292 0 1 
Affiliation to state government party 383 0.211 0 0.409 0 1 
Coalition's share of seats 383 0.487 0.44 0.176 0 1 
Number of coalition parties 383 4.355 4 2.434 1 16 
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Table 32. Logistic regression results with all corruption violations 
 
Full sample Corruption Sample B 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Local radio 0.128 0.145 0.0430 0.0542 0.223 0.252 0.137 0.162 
 
(0.246) (0.248) (0.277) (0.280) (0.275) (0.277) (0.310) (0.314) 
IFDM change (2005-2008) -2.054 -2.117 -1.936 -1.886 -2.664 -2.737 -1.966 -1.882 
 
(1.997) (2.005) (2.188) (2.207) (2.227) (2.237) (2.479) (2.507) 
% directly appointed employees 0.00197 0.000215 0.00777 0.00556 0.00112 0.000346 0.00738 0.00630 
 
(0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0158) (0.0160) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0175) 
Mean ENP -0.0358 -0.0384 -0.00157 -0.000542 -0.0128 -0.0201 0.0364 0.0348 
 
(0.0970) (0.0969) (0.112) (0.112) (0.105) (0.106) (0.121) (0.122) 
Corruption violations (all) -0.00983 0.0703 -0.00835 0.103** -0.0136 0.0674 -0.00793 0.115** 
 
(0.0129) (0.0451) (0.0144) (0.0475) (0.0142) (0.0503) (0.0159) (0.0535) 
Lottery number 
 
0.0263 
 
0.0292   0.0244 
 
0.0272 
  
(0.0448) 
 
(0.0472)   (0.0552) 
 
(0.0573) 
Corruption violations*lottery number 
 
-0.00899* 
 
-0.0120** 
 
-0.00881 
 
-0.0127** 
  
(0.00512) 
 
(0.00532)   (0.00567) 
 
(0.00591) 
Constant -0.539 -0.728 -3.919** -4.667** -0.597 -0.810 -4.228* -5.092** 
 
(0.502) (0.558) (1.989) (2.058) (0.547) (0.645) (2.210) (2.299) 
     
  
   Observations 358 358 358 358 294 294 294 294 
Municipal characteristics 
  
x x   
 
x x 
Incumbent characteristics     x x     x x 
Note: Municipal controls include population, % of urban population, literacy rate and log municipal GDP. Mayor controls include gender, education level, 
margin of victory in previous election, affiliation to federal government party, affiliation to state government party and campaign revenue. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 33. Logistic regression results using recoded corruption variables 
  
Full sample 
Corruption 
sample A 
Corruption 
sample B 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Local radio 0.0788 0.0643 0.217 0.174 
 
(0.280) (0.279) (0.350) (0.312) 
IFDM change (2005-2008) -2.022 -1.864 -3.011 -1.834 
 
(2.209) (2.202) (2.782) (2.502) 
% directly appointed employees 0.00658 0.00523 0.0108 0.00565 
 
(0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0190) (0.0174) 
Mean ENP -0.0176 -0.00483 0.0808 0.0306 
 
(0.113) (0.112) (0.137) (0.122) 
Lottery number 0.00837 0.0250 0.0400 0.0181 
 
(0.0446) (0.0501) (0.0674) (0.0622) 
Corruption violations (unambiguous) 0.182** 
 
0.245** 
 
 
(0.0860) 
 
(0.109) 
 Corruption violations (unambiguous)*lottery number -0.0194** 
 
-0.0262** 
 
 
(0.00942) 
 
(0.0117) 
 Corruption violations (all) 
 
0.0915 
 
0.101 
  
(0.0557) 
 
(0.0652) 
Corruption violations (all)*lottery number 
 
-0.0111* 
 
-0.0114 
  
(0.00620) 
 
(0.00711) 
Constant -4.434** -4.447** -4.847* -4.807** 
 
(2.040) (2.047) (2.627) (2.286) 
     Observations 358 358 240 294 
Note: All models include municipal (population, % of urban population, literacy rate and log municipal GDP) and 
mayor controls (gender, education level, margin of victory in previous election, affiliation to federal government 
party, affiliation to state government party and campaign revenue). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 34. Linear regression models with vote share difference as dependent variable 
  
Full sample 
Corruption 
sample A 
Corruption 
sample B 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Local radio -0.601 -0.512 -0.672 -0.475 
 
(1.571) (1.550) (1.914) (1.739) 
IFDM change (2005-2008) 20.12 19.07 19.35 19.41 
 
(12.53) (12.47) (15.13) (14.43) 
% directly appointed employees -0.133 -0.117 -0.160 -0.135 
 
(0.102) (0.101) (0.130) (0.112) 
Mean ENP -0.804 -0.824 -0.514 -0.213 
 
(0.675) (0.672) (0.772) (0.729) 
Lottery number 0.316 0.111 0.188 0.232 
 
(0.252) (0.278) (0.342) (0.329) 
Corruption violations (unambiguous) -0.999** 
 
-1.140** 
 
 
(0.478) 
 
(0.547) 
 Corruption violations (unambiguous)*lottery number 0.114** 
 
0.129** 
 
 
(0.0452) 
 
(0.0511) 
 Corruption violations (all) 
 
-0.580* 
 
-0.581 
  
(0.330) 
 
(0.370) 
Corruption violations (all)*lottery number 
 
0.0793** 
 
0.0758** 
  
(0.0311) 
 
(0.0350) 
Constant -2.948 -2.600 14.34 6.170 
 
(12.26) (12.35) (14.73) (13.68) 
     Observations 358 358 240 294 
R-squared 0.232 0.236 0.257 0.239 
Note: All models include municipal (population, % of urban population, literacy rate and log municipal GDP) and 
mayor controls (gender, education level, margin of victory in previous election, affiliation to federal government 
party, affiliation to state government party and campaign revenue). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 7. Conditional marginal effects of unambiguous corruption violations for unrestricted 
models 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Conditional marginal effects of all corruption violations for full models 
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Figure 9. Conditional marginal effects of unambiguous corruption violations on vote share 
difference 
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